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 This dissertation examines the production and experience of class and racial 
distinctions in contemporary Mexico City by focusing on encounter and proximity 
between different social groups in the country’s most emblematic urban center. It draws 
on eighteenth months of ethnographic fieldwork with artists and young professionals 
living in the city’s historic center as part of a public-private redevelopment plan locally 
known as the “rescue.” Led by multimillionaire Carlos Slim, this endeavor has been 
framed as an initiative of civil society to recover the symbolic heart of the nation from 
crime and illegality while transforming it into a secure and livable space for all 
Mexicans. The rescue mobilizes a neoliberal idiom of the modern (associated in Mexico 
and across the world with democracy and responsible citizenship, a retreating state and a 
free market economy) and epitomizes the illegibility of public and private distinctions.  
 I focus on moments of encounter between the historic center’s new affluent 
residents, on the one hand, and the inhabitants of its dilapidated tenements and the 
vendors of its informal street markets, on the other. Such encounters slide into suspicion, 
uncertainty, instability and misrecognition. In focusing on encounter I trace new 
residents’ desire for commonality, for an “all of us” in the historic center (a recognition 
as urban dwellers or as fellow citizens), and their anxieties about the very possibility of 
this commonality.  Such situated fears, I argue, articulate with longstanding elite 
  
apprehensions in Mexico about the popular masses, historically construed as the 
embodiment of the national subject and at the same time as the manifestation of atavistic 
residues. In the discourses and practices of different agents of rescue (new residents, the 
police, private investors and state officials) these masses figure at once as subjects to be 
redeemed and as plainly irredeemable others, unfit for the requirements of modern 
democratic citizenship. The dissertation thus traces relations between new residents’ 
quotidian fears of crime and violence in the socially mixed spaces of the historic center 
on the one hand, and contemporary debates and anxieties over liberal democracy, 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
Making Contact 
We have finally made contact with the teenagers from the vecindad1 down the 
street,” Monica2 told me excitedly as we chatted over beers and a dense cloud of 
cigarette smoke in a small bar located in the southwestern edges of Mexico City’s historic 
center, a derelict and mostly impoverished area with a reputation of being dangerous. 
With a relaxed and bohemian atmosphere, dim lights and walls covered with sepia-
tainted bullfighting posters, plastic figurines of wrestlers, abstract paintings and a variety 
of other disparate objects, the bar was a favorite meeting place for young artists, students 
and cultural promoters who had recently moved to the historic center. It was Thursday 
past nine in the evening and the bar was almost full, flooded with the sounds of electronic 
music and loud chatter. The street outside was dark and mostly empty, save for a couple 
of kids playing soccer nearby or for scattered pedestrians returning home from work.  
The first contact to which Monica referred, she told me, had occurred a few nights 
earlier as she sat drinking at the same place in the company of her old friend Pedro, a 
thirty two year old poet who owned the bar, and a couple of other artists who lived or 
worked nearby. It was past midnight when a teenager in baggy pants and a tight white t-
shirt (the Hip-Hop fashion style of the kids who usually loitered on the street) came in 
                                                 
1 Vecindades, the most common form of housing in Mexico City’s historic center, are old, usually derelict, 
in some cases colonial buildings, with one or several courtyards that have been converted into multi-family 
houses and are often occupied by poor residents. 
 
2 With the exception of prominent public figures, the names of the people who appear in this dissertation, 





and walked straight to the bar, looking confused. He was under the influence of chemo, 
an industrial solvent consumed as a cheap drug, and its strong smell inundated the space 
around him. Monica, an outgoing and eccentric writer and academic in her early thirties 
who had a reputation for being somewhat reckless, invited the young man to join their 
table. He was nineteen, named Manuel, and lived in the most rundown of all the street’s 
buildings. After a while of small chatter and uncomfortable silences Manuel gestured that 
he was leaving and Monica asked if she could join. She would love to see the interior of 
his building, she said. Manuel agreed. They walked the thirty meters that separated the 
bar from his home in absolute silence and sat together in the dark and derelict interior 
patio of the vecindad. Manuel offered Monica some of his chemo, which she refused 
nonchalantly. About fifteen minutes later, he walked her back to the bar and left.  
When telling me his version of this incident, Pedro confessed that he had been 
rather unhappy with Monica’s behavior. Going with that kid at such late hours, he felt, 
had been most imprudent. He and the rest had been very nervous, feeling responsible for 
whatever could have happened to Monica in the vecindad. Besides, what if Manuel kept 
returning? Pedro said he would not know how to handle him and did not want him in his 
bar under the influence of chemo. But Monica would have none of it. She saw this as a 
golden opportunity to reach out to (and into) a hostile and vulnerable group in the area.  
Manuel kept returning day after day, just as Pedro had feared. He eventually asked 
for a job, or at least for free beers. So Pedro and Monica came up with a solution: getting 
him involved in one of their cultural endeavors, “Poetry and Combat.” The project 
consisted of disseminating poetry throughout the historic center by printing famous short 




the paper bags of the corner bakery, so that people would encounter a poem with their 
daily bread. At another time they threw thousands of poems from the roof of a building at 
a street corner near the bar—poetry falling from the sky. From Manuel they asked that he 
distribute poems in his vecindad and obtain the signature of his neighbors for every poem 
that he delivered to them. He would be paid a small compensation for this. Monica was 
happy with the plan. She did not want to lose Manuel once contact had been made. “I 
want to shake the barriers a bit” (cimbrar un poquito las barreras), she told me, 
“although I know we can’t really change his life. It would be very difficult at this point.”  
Monica and Pedro both worked for Culture Space, an eclectic cultural institution 
adjacent to the bar that, with a brew of highbrow conceptual art exhibitions and handcraft 
workshops, aimed to appeal to artists from throughout the city as well as to lower class 
residents from the vicinity. Privately funded by multimillionaire Carlos Slim, Culture 
Space was founded less than a year earlier in the context of a public-private initiative to 
revitalize and repopulate the city’s historic center. Locally known as “the rescue,” this 
project discursively construed the historic center as a site that, having been taken over by 
disorder and illegality, had to be rescued for the sake of all Mexicans. It thus rendered the 
project a public, national endeavor and also a civic duty toward the symbolic heart of the 
nation.  
Monica and Pedro’s encounter with Manuel captures the ambivalent subject 
positions of the artists and cultural producers who have moved to the historic center in 
the context of this initiative and with whom I conducted my research. Ranging from 
highly affluent professionals to struggling artists, these new residents of the historic 




cultural capital. They viewed themselves as morally progressive and cultivated 
alternative life styles. Bohemian and unconventional, they aspired to “shake the barriers” 
that separated them from people like Manuel, to establish new possibilities for and forms 
of sociability between different social groups. At the same time they found themselves 
embedded in Mexico’s class and racial tensions and hierarchies, where encounters 
generally take place in the form of patron-client relations of co-dependency.  
As such, they related to Manuel in pedagogical terms, seeking for example to 
inculcate in him civility and respect for public space. Ultimately, however, they doubted 
the possibility of living together with him as neighbors. To be sure, as a drug addict 
perhaps involved in criminal activities Manuel represents an “extreme” case. But the 
anxieties and faux passes that pervaded the interaction above traversed new residents’ 
encounters with other lower class (or perceived as lower class) residents of the historic 
center. For, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, these lower class residents were at 
once the rescue’s intended beneficiaries and that from which the symbolic heart of the 
nation had to be recovered through the transformation of the urban landscape as well as 
the introduction of a sophisticated policing apparatus. 
This dissertation is concerned with the instabilities and the boundaries that run 
through encounters such as the one that I related above. Focusing on encounter, 
proximity and quotidian interaction between different social groups in the nation’s most 
emblematic urban center, I explore the production and experience of class and racial 
distinctions in contemporary Mexico City. My interest is to understand how the new 
residents of the historic center, people like Monica and Pedro who belong to a young 




aspirations—a yearning to inhabit Mexico City as a cosmopolitan urban space 
comparable to other great capitals of the world—and their own embeddedness in 
Mexico’s class and racial hierarchies. Rather than focusing on the exclusions brought 
about by the rescue, I examine the sorts of urban encounters that it has generated. I 
analyze new residents’ desire for the city, imagined as a dense and socially mixed place, 
and I explore ethnographically how their cosmopolitan aspirations and their anxieties 
about the complicated realities of the historic center play out and are negotiated on the 
ground.  
In what follows, I will inquire what it would mean to be cosmopolitan in today’s 
Mexico City, and who could claim this class position in the historic center. How, I will 
ask, are such claims destabilized? And what sorts of different temporalities come into 
play in the rescue of the historic center and in the imaginary of urban cosmopolitanism 
that it mobilizes? How do new residents navigate their cosmopolitan aspirations and their 
participation in the quotidian negotiations of life and citizenship in Mexico City’s historic 
center? At the same time, I will also examine how the rescue reflects contemporary 
transformations of the urban landscape and the ways in which different subjects use and 
experience it. In what ways do quotidian interactions at once reflect and produce new 
forms of social and political belonging? What do they tell us about the fate of the urban 
masses within present political ideologies and forms of governance?  
I explore these questions in the course of five chapters, looking at multiple 
instances where new residents come together with the lower classes that inhabit the 
center and at once mobilize a desire for commonality and doubt its possibility. I focus in 




vecindades, such as the one described above, and the vendors of its informal street 
markets. The sorts of ambivalences that emerge in such interactions begin to come into 
view, for example, in the case of Ricardo, a cultural entrepreneur who moved to the 
affluent area of the historic center, which was also targeted by the rescue, where he 
opened an art gallery after returning from a stint in Paris. Ricardo once told me that, after 
living in the center, he had finally gotten to know another Mexico, which he described as 
“more sad but more fascinating.” He grew up in an exclusive residential neighborhood 
surrounded by slums in the outskirts of the city. While living there he never thought 
about what he called the “huge contrasts” within Mexican society, instead taking them for 
granted as the natural order of things. In the historic center, he said, it was different. He 
had become “more tolerant” and had learnt to see people like the lady who sold tamales 
in the street corner in a different light, “almost as neighbors.” However, he was worried 
that the city’s social contrasts were always a problem on the brink of explosion. In fact, 
he doubted that “they” had also become more tolerant and accepting of the possibility of 
living together.  
Ricardo’s reflections suggest that aspirations to urban cosmopolitanism at once take 
shape and come into doubt in the urban encounter. He desires the historic center because 
it resounds, for him, with certain ideals of multiplicity, anonymity and tolerance. He 
wants to encounter the other as an innocuous, unremarkable stranger. But that same other 
constantly slides into a menacing force. New residents often referred to the masses of 
informal vendors and other workers that inhabited the center’s streets as the most 
pressing, and seemingly intractable, of the center’s problems. They talked about them as 




historic center an inhabitable, enjoyable space. Those same masses were a central target 
of the security apparatus implemented in the context of rescue.3 In other words, the 
characters that provoked fascination also appeared as menacing figures and as the object 
of new residents’ anxieties about the always-present possibility that “rescue” would fail. 
They constantly slipped into the figure of “the criminal” until the distinction between 
them seemed to collapse. 
In exploring these interactions, I trace connections between the images of the 
cosmopolitan that appear in my materials with longstanding apprehensions among 
Mexican elites of being out of joint with the present, of being trapped in a backward time, 
never able to catch up. Claudio Lomnitz (2001) has referred to such apprehensions as a 
continuing aspiration to an “unachieved modernity;” Fernando Escalante (1992: 227) has 
discussed them as a sense of permanently living in “a key of (not) yet.” As an imagined 
spatial and temporal elsewhere, the cosmopolitan, I argue, stands in tension with other 
temporalities that have come to be blamed for the country’s failures, and which in the 
historic center are particularly embodied by the urban masses. 
A related, central concern of the dissertation is the circulation of particular idioms 
of individual responsibility and citizenship in the historic center and the affective 
investments that they engender. I interrogate how these idioms are part of new residents’ 
lived experiences and how they mediate their quotidian interactions with other social 
groups. Let me return to Monica and Manuel to elaborate on this point. After the 
                                                 
3 The centrality of security for urban renewal at the historic center reproduced a discourse of law and order 
that has accompanied similar projects around the world, namely, to make areas safe for investment and 
inhabitable for certain classes. I will analyze this aspect of the rescue project in Chapter 5. See: Smith, N. 





“contact” that I described above, Manuel kept asking Pedro for free beers, a situation that 
drove the latter crazy and which was not easy to handle. Pedro did not want to provoke 
Manuel. Monica, on the other hand, insisted that Pedro charge something, at least two or 
three pesos (beers were fifteen pesos at the bar), for Manuel’s beers. According to her, 
Manuel needed to understand that things are not for free in life. One night as she was 
sitting at the bar with Manuel she told him he could help himself to some of her beer: “I 
paid for it, and therefore I can share it with you.” Manuel took the almost empty beer 
bottle but, when Monica got distracted, he tried to change it for someone else’s full 
bottle, which stood on an adjacent table. Monica caught him red handed and, without a 
word, changed the bottles back again. “Why did you do that if no one saw?” asked an 
annoyed Manuel. “I saw it,” was Monica’s reply, “and it is not right.” “You saw it, you 
saw it, you saw it,” muttered Manuel several times. Monica took this repetition as an 
indication that he had understood that his action was wrong.  
Beyond enacting a commitment to abide by the rules and to take responsibility for 
her own actions, Monica expressed a similarly strong commitment to instill these values 
in Manuel. These affectively charged commitments to individual responsibility, I show 
throughout the dissertation, formed an important dimension of new residents’ 
cosmopolitans aspirations. Like her, many new residents imagined the cosmopolitan city 
as inhabited by a particular kind of citizen: civic minded, respectful of public space and 
tolerant of difference.  
Attending to these idioms of responsibility and citizenship, I explore how the 
masses of the historic center figure in the discourse of rescue at once as subjects to be 




unfit for the requirements of the present. A central argument of this dissertation is that the 
situated anxieties that emerge from my materials articulate with broader and longstanding 
elite apprehensions about the popular masses, which have historically been construed in 
Mexico as the quintessential embodiment of the national subject and, at the same time, as 
the manifestation of atavistic residues. Moreover, I argue that the sense of threat and 
incommensurability that we find in the interactions that I examine divulges the 
persistence of a racial imaginary that, while disavowed by the myth of mestizaje, has 
remained inscribed at the heart of the nation and has long haunted elite imaginations of a 
modern, democratic Mexico. 
Situating the rescue and the aspirations, fears and affective commitments of the 
new residents in a particular historical moment across the world, I argue that whereas the 
post-revolutionary national project sought to domesticate the putatively violent popular 
masses through their integration into the corporate structures of an authoritarian, one-
party regime, today’s neoliberal governance renders them as an uncontainable, residual 
and threatening force. I thus trace relations between quotidian fears of crime and 
misrecognition in the oversaturated and socially mixed urban spaces of the historic center 
on the one hand, and wider debates and anxieties over democracy and citizenship on the 
other.  
The Mayor and the Billionaire to the Rescue 
In the summer of 2001 Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) of the 
center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) unveiled a project to revitalize 




the time the country’s (and now the world’s) wealthiest citizen. The rescue—as the 
project came to be known—and the prominent participation of civil society as 
represented by Mr. Slim himself were swiftly commended in the press and in the 
electronic media as a long-overdue response to the worrying state of abandonment and 
decay of this emblematic space. Slim’s involvement, I repeatedly heard throughout my 
research, was a key element that could ensure the long-term sustainability and, 
ultimately, the success of the project. 
From the start Slim played a prominent role in the rescue, which put critical 
emphasis on the renovation of residential buildings for middle to high-income housing 
and on public safety. As president of its executive committee (composed of various 
public figures as well as representatives of the federal and local governments) he was 
charged with overseeing the project’s execution. At the same time he created two 
additional bodies to work closely together in the historic center: the Historic Center 
Foundation (henceforth the Foundation), a non-profit organization responsible for 
generating adequate conditions for the settlement of new residents through social, artistic 
and cultural programs, and which proposed the division of the center into various 
“corridors,” each specializing in different activities; and the Historic Center Real Estate 
Company, which buys and restores buildings for both residential and business use, and 
which also works to rekindle the area’s real estate market.4 For its part, Mexico City’s 
government put the Fideicomiso Centro Histórico (henceforth the Fideicomiso) in charge 
                                                 
4 According to the manager of the Historic Center Real State Company they acquired seventy buildings in 
the areas to be targeted by renovation (the financial and cultural “corridors”) before the first phase of the 
rescue started in early 2002. By late 2006 the number of buildings they owned was close to one hundred 





of coordinating and carrying out the public works of rescue, from the renovation of 
streets and sidewalks to the removal of street vendors from certain areas.5  Slim also 
partially funded the massive public security apparatus that was introduced in the historic 
center as part of the project. It consisted of a newly created police unit trained in the 
broken windows model,6 as well as a sophisticated surveillance technology including 
hundreds of short-circuit security cameras and panic buttons connected to the local police 
office.  
In early 2001, before the commencement of the rescue, the historic center was a no-
go area for vast segments of Mexico City’s inhabitants. Although it remained an 
important commercial hub and a tourist attraction (concentrating some of the city’s most 
important museums and cultural institutions), for many middle and upper middle-class 
residents of the city the historic center had acquired the stigma of an abandoned, chaotic 
and dangerous space: filled with street vendors who blocked entire streets to vehicular 
traffic and sold illegal commodities; plagued by petty crime, noise, garbage and 
pollution. Among Mexico’s social and cultural elites there seemed to be a virtually 
unquestioned consensus about the need to “rescue” this space. Take, for example, the 
following editorial, which appeared in the national daily Reforma one day after the 
                                                 
5 In December 2006, Marcelo Ebrard, the new Mayor of Mexico City, created the Autoridad del Centro 
Histórico (Historic Center Authority), led by Dr. Alejandra Moreno Toscano. Since early 2007 this new 
body has followed through with renovation works and has expanded them to other areas of the historic 
center, including the areas north and east of the Zocalo, which were excluded during the first phase.  
 
6 The broken windows model of policing, first proposed by George Keling, claims that preventing minor 
transgressions in urban space, such as loitering or graffiti, may help prevent full-fledge criminality. This 
model was championed and popularized by the ex-mayor of New York Rudolph Giuliani, who 
recommended its implementation in Mexico City in a private consultancy to the local government. For a 
discussion of this model as implemented in New York see: Smith, N. (1998). "Giuliani Time: The 
Revanchist 1990s." Social Text 16(4): 1-20, Feldman, A. (2001). "White Public Space and the Political 






The Historic Center of Mexico City is the heart of the country. I say it without 
exaggerated localism. It is. It is a wonder abandoned in the midst of a pigsty. 
Which is not fair. (…) There is not one well-bred capitalino (Mexico City 
inhabitant) who does not want to recuperate, preserve, make green, beautify and 
love his or her city. You debate and then invite us. We will be there (Dehesa 
2001).7 
As I will discuss throughout the dissertation, the discourse of rescue (an assemblage 
of expert reports, urban planning schemes, public declarations, press articles, artistic and 
cultural projects, and so forth) reproduced this image of the center as a “problem space,” 
afflicted by poverty, disorder, illegality and criminality, and therefore as demanding 
intervention.8 Moreover, it emphasized the fact that the historic center has gradually but 
steadily lost its residential character since the late nineteenth century. The center thus 
appeared in this discourse as a simultaneously “taken over” and “empty” space. Consider 
the following excerpt from an interview with a high executive of the Foundation: 
Besides the buildings, everyday life [in the center] is very important. I mean, the 
history that has passed through it, and, well, if you have been there you have seen 
all the commotion. I do feel that it is very rich. And it was depopulating, it was 
being abandoned, it was becoming an area, well, abandoned. So it definitely 
deserves not to lose that (Interview with author, March 27, 2006). 
Parts of the center did indeed lose their residential character almost completely as 
the city expanded. Others, particularly the lower class areas in the northeast and the 
southwest, experienced some decline of residents but continued to be inhabited. So while 
                                                 
7 All excerpts from fieldnotes, recorded interviews and newspaper materials were translated by the author. 
 
8 This is an excerpt from the report that served as the basis for the rescue plan:  
[T]he Historic Center concentrates all the challenges of the city as a whole: unemployment and 
underemployment, marginality and social exclusion, insecurity and criminality, prostitution, homelessness 
and drug addiction, traffic congestion and pollution, low schooling and income levels, housing shortages, 
deterioration of the urban environment and of heritage, and conflicts between different social sectors. 
(2000). Programa para el Desarrollo Integral del Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México. México, D.F., 





not only the space but also its inhabitants appeared as objects of rescue in this discourse, 
the latter were also to blame for the center’s decay and deterioration, as expressed in this 
excerpt from a press interview with Aldo Flores, a veteran public artist who organized a 
collective artistic “take over” of a colonial plaza in 2002:  
This is a dangerous area, where people were fed up with theft, drug addiction and 
prostitution. It was like a rat’s nest and today the gardens are clean, the murals 
serve as protection to the building and there are no homeless (Ibarra 2006). 
In the discourse of rescue, culture appeared as the privileged tool for redeeming the 
(poor) inhabitants of the historic center, where artistic initiatives would, according to an 
expert’s report, “serve as detonators for change” (2000). At the same time the historic 
center had to, once and for all, be liberated of all the obstacles holding it back in order to 
become an inhabitable—but also a cosmopolitan—space.9  Let us recall the newspaper 
editorial that I quoted above about the rescue project. The editorialist, known for his 
satirical humor, called the historic center “a wonder abandoned in the midst of a pigsty” 
and claimed that all “well bred capitalinos” would want to recuperate this space. While 
responsible citizens valued the historic center as a patrimonial space and worked to 
recuperate it, he seemed to be suggesting, those who had turned it into a pigsty were 
beyond the pale of citizenship.  
The public-private nature of the rescue project, which was celebrated as a most 
natural state of affairs, would have been unthinkable only a few decades earlier, when the 
management of “national heritage” was the exclusive prerogative of the state. Indeed, a 
                                                 
9 The term that I encountered most often in reference to the project was “the rescue” (el rescate), but I also 
came across other terms such as “recovery” (recuperación) and “revitalization” (revitalización). With 
slightly different meanings, these terms all gesture to a particular temporality: not only has the historic 





crucial source of the post-revolutionary state’s legitimacy was that its role as the 
protector of that which belonged to the nation. In sharp contrast, the current rescue 
suggested that it was through a privatization of sorts that “heritage” would be saved. But 
this was a strange alliance in other ways as well. It brought together the center-left mayor 
of the PRD famous (or infamous) for his populist rhetoric and policies and the third 
richest man in the world, famous (or, again, infamous) for his ruthless monopolistic 
capitalism.  
The current rescue project had its roots already in the previous administration 
(1997-2000). In the summer of 1997 Mexico City’s inhabitants democratically elected 
their Mayor for the first time since 1929.10 Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, of the recently 
founded Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), won by a landslide.11 Besides 
promising a more participatory government and a number of redistributive policies, 
Cardenas made the support of arts and culture in public spaces, especially in 
underprivileged neighborhoods and among vulnerable populations (such as youth), a top 
priority (Nivón Bolán 2000). The goal, he proclaimed, was to get people out into the 
streets again. The historic center became an important target of these policies. One of the 
                                                 
10 Until that date, it had been the president’s prerogative to designate this figure, which subordinated 
Mexico City’s policies to the whims of the federal government and allowed the one-party regime to secure 
control of the city. 
 
11 Since their overwhelming victory in 1997 the PRD party has governed Mexico City with a combination 
of neoliberal policies aimed at creating the conditions for international investment and a wide range of 
social policies. They have fostered a redevelopment of the central city (beyond the historic center), by 
creating “corridors” and pursuing a liberalized urban real estate market and have made the fighting of crime 
and insecurity one of their top priorities. The PRD was created by a number of politicians, Cardenas 
included, who broke with the PRI, as well as leftist militants. As I will discuss in other chapters (especially 
Chapters 4 and 6) it has inherited many of the corporatist structures formerly controlled by the PRI in the 
city. Ward, P. M. and E. Durden (2004). Gobierno y democracia en el Distrito federal: Cardenas, el PRD y 
el huevo del parroco. Los ultimos cien anos. Los proximos cien... A. Rodríguez Kuri and S. Tamayo 





new government’s most popular programs consisted in organizing free massive concerts 
in the Zócalo—the historic center’s colossal central square—by famous international 
musicians. These concerts attracted tens of thousands of people of different socio-
economic status to the center and no doubt contributed to its reactivation. Cardenas also 
commissioned a diagnostic study of the historic center to a group of prestigious urban 
planners and sociologists. The study, which included a “participatory” methodology 
(such as conducting workshops with local inhabitants), offered a grim assessment of the 
center and proposed a series of measures to promote its re-population through the 
creation of mixed income housing. It was later to serve as a vague referent for AMLO 
and Slim’s rescue. 
But it would be misleading to assume that the rescue was a set of coherent policies. 
Trying to piece together what the rescue consisted in from a policy perspective was 
among the most exasperating endeavors of my research. Each of the institutions and 
actors involved had their own vision and projects. To begin with, as opposed to his 
predecessor, mayor AMLO significantly reduced the city’s budget for culture, citing a 
need for austerity measures. He all but stopped promoting massive free concerts in the 
Zocalo. Far from a consistent set of economic, social or cultural policies (for example 
low income housing policies),12 the rescue was a “do as you go” project that concentrated 
its efforts on the architectural remodeling of the central, most affluent area of the historic 
center and on the introduction of heavy policing. It included no plan to intervene in the 
                                                 
12 The Instituto de Vivienda del Distrito Federal (Mexico City’s Housing Institute) had a housing policy 
that targeted old dilapidated vecindades in the area, but it was implemented separately from the rescue. 
This lack of a centralized policy has changed since the new administration took charge of the rescue in 





more impoverished and dangerous areas to the east and north of the Zocalo, or to foster 
private investments there. The Foundation, on its part, also lacked a coherent vision. 
When I first met its young director I asked him whether they had anticipated possible 
tensions between new comers and old inhabitants in the southwest of the center, a 
reasonable expectation considering that the area in question was densely populated and 
featured entrenched social problems. He laughed nervously and “confessed” that there 
was a lot of improvising in the rescue.  
Sensuous Space, Monumental Space 
As I strolled through the streets of the historic center in early January 2006, the 
rescue was already in full swing. A freshly arrived anthropologist in the field, I remember 
thinking about Benjamin’s imagery of flanerie, considered by some as the quintessential 
form of urban ethnography (See for example: Mbembe 2004). “How would one be a 
flaneur here?” I thought as I elbowed my way through the crowded sidewalks. I was 
constantly pushed and shoved by a slow-moving multitude of pedestrians as I walked 
past a variety of odorous food stalls and loud vending stands. It was a few days before the 
sixth of January, the Day of the Three Kings, a widely popular holiday in Mexico City 
that includes giving gifts to children. For this reason, some of the recently remodeled 
streets at the heart of the historic center, especially Tacuba, had been inundated with 
street vendors and consumers. I later learned that, as they did every year, the local 
authorities had granted special permits for vendors to sell there during the holidays, on 
the condition that they voluntarily leave the renovated streets (and only the renovated 




These were, then, especially hectic times. But the historic center always impresses 
itself upon the visitor as a crowded, eventful and overtly sensuous space. During the day 
its sidewalks are perennially filled with residents, passers-by, shoppers, tourists and 
office workers. Its streets are hopelessly jammed with traffic. On any given day at least 
one political organization can be found camping on the Zócalo, its emblematic central 
public square, and, quite likely, a protest march can be spotted proceeding through its 
streets as well.  
All this hustle and bustle takes place in a landscape that juxtaposes the most varied 
architectural styles and epochs and that confers a special charm upon the center: from the 
city’s first skyscraper built of steel and glass in 1956, to convents and churches originally 
built in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from baroque palaces made of red 
tezontle (the most widely used stone in the center and which gives its architecture a 
particular texture) to twentieth century art-deco constructions, or to buildings dating from 
the 1950s and 60s and bereft of any determinate style or aesthetic value. Many ground 
floors in the historic center have storefronts dedicated to the most disparate commercial 
activities, from rare and used bookshops to musical instrument shops, from opticians to 
wholesale jewelry stores, from elegant restaurants frequented by senators and high level 
bureaucrats to cheap food joints, and from trendy clothing stores to tailoring shops 
offering custom made men’s suits.  
In the more populated and impoverished areas north and east of the Zócalo, street-
vending activities have taken over entire streets, closing them to vehicular traffic. Usually 
four (though sometimes as many as six) rows of vending stands stretch along the most 




cases vending stands are “semi-permanent”, consisting of tables that are dismantled 
everyday. “Permanent” stands, on the other hand, are made of tubular structures that 
remain in place after the end of the working day. These thoroughfares are densely 
crowded every day (expect for Sundays), saturated by a cacophony of sounds, from the 
sounds of music CDs playing salsa, alarm clocks, or battery-powdered toys to vendors 
advertising their merchandise through the endless repetition of formulaic phrases that 
acquire the sound of chants… 
Over here, over here  
 Take it for ten pesos 
Enveloping all are the murmurs of the crowd. The vendors’ merchandise itself 
ranges from counterfeited brand names—Nike sneakers, Gucci purses, Armani 
perfumes—to illegally copied or “pirate” (to use the local term) CDs and DVDs, mass 
produced cheap garments, school supplies, toys, and cosmetics.13  
Beyond the early confusion that accompanies fieldwork, I remember my first days 
in the historic center as distinctly disorientating. This was a very familiar place for me. I 
had been its most assiduous visitor during my college years—when I lived in Mexico 
City for the first time—and I had spent entire weeks there in preliminary fieldwork trips. 
This, however, was the first time that I actually lived there and it was an entirely new 
experience. As I moved around to buy things I needed for my apartment I was constantly 
                                                 
13 Besides retail shoppers, small merchants from all over the city or from neighboring towns come to this 
area of the historic center on a regular basis to buy wholesale for their businesses. It is important to note 
that the presence of vendors in this area, and indeed in the entire historic center, has nearly disappeared 
since the fall of 2007, when the current government undertook the task of relocating all street vendors in 
the center. See: Silva Londoño, D. A. "Comercio ambulante en el Centro Histórico de la ciudad de México 





overstimulated by the multitudes, the smells, and the cacophony of noises to be heard on 
any given street: all sorts of music fragments, the chants of vendors, the honking of cars, 
the whistles of policemen.  
In those early days, and as I was preparing to embark on full-fledged fieldwork, I 
often remembered a conversation that I had with two executives of the Foundation during 
a preliminary visit a few months earlier. Their ambition, they had told me, was to turn the 
historic center into another Soho, a reference to the chic New York neighborhood that 
was gentrified during the 1980s. On the sixth of January I wrote in my field notes: “How 
do they negotiate their reference to gentrification, their aspiration to turn the center into a 
chic neighborhood, with the density, the ebb and flow, and the messy realities ’on the 
ground‘? How do they ’sell‘ their project?” This struck me as a far more multilayered 
space than the paradigmatic cases of gentrification in cities like New York, London or 
Barcelona. There were too many stakes here. It was a meaningful and important space for 
an enormously wide variety of people; home for tens of thousands. This was a space that 
concentrates, some times within the space of a few blocks, the sharp contrasts and 
inequalities of Mexican society. It was a space of popular and high-end consumption, a 
space of leisure and protest, the biggest street market in the city, a space of underworld 
activities, from prostitution to drug trafficking. And it was, above all, a space that over 
the years has become invested with an enormous symbolic power, a sort of metonym of 
the nation.  
In both official representation and popular imagination the historic center contains, 
in a multiplicity of juxtaposed layers, the nation’s history and heritage. It embodies the 




especially evident around the Zócalo, the massive public square at the heart of the 
historic center and symbolically the most important political square in the country.  With 
an enormous national flag permanently fluttering at its center, the Zócalo is surrounded 
by such iconic buildings as the National Palace, the Supreme Court, the Metropolitan 
Cathedral and, just a few meters to the north east, the excavated ruins of the Templo 
Mayor, the main Aztec temple (See Figure 1). For decades this square was one of the 
main sites for the staging of “post-revolutionary nationalism,” through a multiplicity of 
civic rituals, and it has become the privileged stage for political protest (Alonso 2004). 
The vast and heterogeneous space that is officially called the “historic center” 
consists of roughly eight hundred blocks, the city as it existed until the mid nineteenth 
century. This term, however, was not much in use until very recently. And even today 
many of the city’s inhabitants refer simply to “el centro,” a term whose spatial referent 
varies widely between people. It generally designates a smaller area around the Zócalo, 





Figure 1. View of the Zócalo from the West (the financial corridor), with National Palace behind the flag.  
Photograph by Nitzan Shoshan 
In the late sixteenth century, Mexico City was built upon the ruins of the conquered 
Aztec capital and organized around a central square, the Plaza Mayor, which would later 
become the Zócalo. The Spanish city extended to the southwest of this square, while the 
northeast, more prone to flooding due to its proximity to the lake of Texcoco, was 
reserved for Indian barrios. As the city grew this division expanded and the capital 
entered the nineteenth century—and Mexico’s independent era—with a small elegant 
area (known today as the financial corridor) surrounded by slums. In the second half of 
nineteenth century the elites started to abandon the center for newly developed residential 




1996; Piccato 2001). Often blamed for the center’s decline, vecindades became the 
quintessential form of housing with which the center is associated.14   
As the urban center of a rapidly growing metropolis, the old colonial city 
underwent massive transformations throughout the twentieth century, from the 
destruction of countless “historical monuments” that gave way to new constructions to 
the razing of entire blocks in whose stead wider roads and avenues were built as part of 
the state’s modernizing project (Monnet 1995:268). Yet, as the old city, it retained a key 
economic centrality well into the 1950s and was the foremost arrival place for migrants 
who came en masse to Mexico City after the 1940s (Lewis 1961; Zamorano 2007). After 
the 1985 earthquake wrought havoc in the area (a topic to which I will return below), 
leaving countless buildings destroyed or severely damaged, the center’s depopulation 
hastened exponentially, together with its deterioration.  
The transformation of the center in the name of modernization and its gradual 
depopulation and decline were concomitant with its monumentalization, both through its 
construal as national heritage and through its physical transformation into a visual 
representation of the post-revolutionary regime. Nowhere was this transformation more 
palpable than at the Zócalo. As the central square of the central city, this space had 
historically encompassed a variety of functions, including commerce (through the 
presence of established and informal markets at different periods), leisure (through green 
areas), and transportation (through several tramway stops). It was remade into a 
                                                 
14 With the 1942 freezing of rents these buildings were practically abandoned by landlords and government 
programs alike, reaching unbearably squalid conditions as time passed. The number of vecindades in the 
historic center has steadily decreased since the 1950s, reflecting the wider depopulation trends of the area. 





monumental, empty square suitable for mass displays of state power by the 1940s and it 
has remained so ever since (Monnet: 267).  
 In 1980, following the archeological discovery of an Aztec stone-goddess in the 
northeast vicinity of the Zócalo, President López Portillo issued a decree that designated 
an area of 9.2 square kilometers in the old colonial city as a “zone of historical 
monuments” and officially named it the “Historic Center of Mexico City.” Shortly 
thereafter entire blocks of colonial era buildings were demolished to give way to 
archeological excavations of the Aztec main temple or Templo Mayor, which has 
subsequently become one of the country’s prime archeological sites.  The decree was a 
grandiose gesture that exemplified the excesses of a post-revolutionary regime that would 
soon be dismantled. In an overtly hyperbolic tone it proclaimed the “dignity” of Mexico 
City and its authentically Mexican (that is, mestizo) character, which fused “Indigenous 
and European elements.” The seven-page document provided a lengthy sketch of the 
official history—and chronology—not only of the city but also of the nation, in effect 
fusing the two. It described the area as “a notable expression of the Mesoamerican urban 
tradition;” as the political and social center of New Spain during the period of “Spanish 
domination;” and as the stage of the most important events in national history, “ranging 
from the armed struggles to obtain independence and, later, national sovereignty against 
international interests, to the triumph of the Republic and of the Mexican Revolution” 
(Ibid: 276).  
In accordance with its purported centrality in the nation’s history, the decree placed 
the entire area—and not only individual “monuments,” as with previous legislations—




“perimeters.”  The first, known as perimeter “A,” delimited the city as it existed towards 
the end of the colonial period, that is, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Surrounding it, perimeter “B” included the city as it existed before its outward expansion 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is on a small section of perimeter “A” that 
the rescue project has concentrated its efforts (See Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Map of the historic center with “perimeters.” The rescue targeted two small areas of perimeter 
“A,” which were designated as “the financial corridor” and “the cultural corridor.”  Source: Fideicomiso 
Centro Histórico 
The 1980 decree thus placed the “historic center” within an exceptional regime of 
value and invested it with an aura of authenticity and historical depth.15 In its appearance 
                                                 
15 Previous legislation had catalogued hundreds of buildings as “monuments” to be preserved. A 1934 law, 
for example, catalogued more than 700 hundred buildings, more than half of which were lost in subsequent 
decades, as well as specific squares and streets within today’s Historic Center, including the buildings that 
surrounded them. The first area to be protected was that surrounding the Zocalo, though a law passed in 
1931. In 1938 the National Institute for History and Archeology (INAH) was created as a centralized, 




as heritage, the center is construed and mobilized as a space endowed with an inherent 
dignity that has been, as it were, violated by undignified practices and that therefore must 
be rescued. From this perspective, vecindades and street vending activities appear as 
denigrating heritage.  To be sure, and as we shall see repeatedly in the course of this 
study, the center exceeds its construction as the “historic center.” And yet this 
construction has had profound and lasting effects on its organization and on its place in 
the imaginary of the city’s inhabitants. Its unique status came across in the words of the 
chief of police who, telling me about the difficulties of policing the area, expressed his 
frustration at the many problems that landed at his feet because of the idea that the center 
is, in his own words, a “ceremonial space:”  
There are guys who come all the way from Ciudad Neza (a poor area in the 
outskirts of the city) to smoke joints in the flagpole [of the Zócalo]. I have asked 
them why come all the way [to the center] to smoke up and they reply (he imitates 
the tone of someone under the influence of marijuana) ‘because it feels much 
cooler here’ (porque aquí se siente mucho más chido) (Interview with author June 
2, 2006). 
Urban Lifestyles, Cosmopolitan Aspirations 
Within the rescue project, both the center’s density and monumentality articulated 
well with contemporary trends in urban governance. Several urban scholars have traced 
major shifts in the city and in the urban experience under conditions of late capitalism 
(Low 1996; Smith 1996; Harvey 2001; Brenner and Theodore 2002). They have pointed 
to the transformation of an urbanism that included redistributive social policies (such as 
public housing) to another form based on a service and finance economy. These trends 
                                                                                                                                                 
since, the INAH has held great power over the historic center. See: Melé, P. (1995). "La construcción 
jurídica de los centros históricos: patrimonio y políticas urbanas en México." Revista Mexicana de 





have been accompanied by the privatization of urban services (such as transportation), 
the re-commodification of central spaces and an increased participation of private and 
global capital in urban redevelopment schemes, including gentrification (especially 
through public-private partnerships). If in this context the state has “retreated” as a social 
arbiter and service provider, becoming more of a “facilitator” or “partner” of private 
capital, it has at the same time heightened its presence in the field of policing and control. 
This is a process that Neil Smith (2002) has called “making the city safe for 
gentrification” through the introduction of tough policing measures and the 
criminalization of the urban poor (See also: Wacqant 2001).  
The shifting urban landscapes visible across the world, from the post-industrial 
cities of the north to the growing megalopolises of the south, are inscribed within that 
larger context of changing ideological commitments and political horizons (i.e., an 
unflinching “faith” in the “free market”) that has been subsumed under the umbrella term 
of “neoliberalism” (Rose, Barry et al. 1996; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). But, as 
Brenner and Theodore (2002) have cautioned, “neoliberal” urbanism must be understood 
less as a unified ideological or political field and more as a set of disparate processes 
always embedded in particular contexts, local political configurations and specific 
regulatory regimes that impact particular spaces and populations in distinct ways. This 
caveat no doubt applies to the rescue of Mexico City’s historic center. 
As I have already mentioned above, the rescue has by no means formed a coherent 
project or set of public policies. It has been, rather, an uneasy blend of different visions of 
the city, varied political and economic interests, incongruent policies and “do as you go” 




partnership (of sorts); it entails the commodification of the city’s central space (and of 
national heritage) and the mobilization of globally circulating imaginaries and aesthetics 
of the urban; it involves aggressive policing and the criminalization and displacement of 
the urban poor, especially the center’s “informal” dwellers. Moreover, the rescue reflects 
shifting ideological commitments and forms of governance, and in particular the receding 
political horizon of social welfare, a point to which I shall return below.  
While the literature on neoliberal urbanism provides insights for understanding the 
rescue as inscribed within changing economic, political and cultural landscapes across the 
world, it falls short of grasping the subtleties of the urban experience and the aspirations, 
desires and contradictions of urban dwellers. For lived experiences always exceed and 
thus destabilize such rigid categories as “exclusion” or “resistance” that tend to pervade 
the literature on neoliberal urbanism and gentrification (Fennell 2009).  In this 
dissertation, I have aimed to capture the lived experience of the subjects who are the 
rescue’s protagonists “on the ground,” of the men and women who have made their 
homes in the historic center over the past several years, while taking into account as well 
the center’s significance as a multilayered, symbolic and national space. What, I ask in 
the chapters below, are the new residents’ aspirations and motivations? How do they 
make sense of their urban experiences? How do they navigate the contradictions of their 
positions?  
What interests me, then, is not so much whether or not gentrification is taking place 
in Mexico City’s historic center, but rather how it serves as an important reference (a 
model to aspire to and emulate) for planners and consumers alike, from Foundation 




constantly came across evocations of New York, London or Barcelona in the historic 
center, and the fact that I lived and studied in New York was often a conversation starter. 
This provenance, as it were, positioned me as belonging with the social milieus that I was 
studying, a belonging that entailed methodological and ethical complications upon which 
I will have more to say later in the introduction. But the point to be made here is that New 
York and other major advanced capitalist cities provided a crucial reference within a 
particular cosmopolitan imaginary that was an important driving force behind the rescue. 
Crucial to the rescue plan as a real-estate operation was the possibility of 
mobilizing certain contemporary imaginaries of the urban through the juxtaposition of the 
authentically vintage with the ultra-modern. The Foundation advertised the majority of its 
rentals as “loft-style apartments,” a telltale reference to gentrification. Ranging from 
nineteenth century neo-classic constructions to twentieth century art-deco former office 
buildings, they included studios, one and two bedroom apartments whose sizes and 
architectural finishes varied widely between buildings. Some were ample and luxuriously 
renovated and were directed to young and affluent professionals. Others were modest 
studios or single rooms in old hotels directed to students of limited economic resources.  
The term loft originally referred to spaces previously used for manufacturing and 
converted to residential use, particularly in cities in the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, Europe. Its ascendance was concomitant with the de-industrialization of urban 
centers and the transformation of the urban from manufacturing to service functions. It 
also designated a move “back” to the city first initiated by artists in search of urban 
experiences, affordable rents, ample spaces to work, and a revalorization of “historical” 




material conditions of its emergence. It became a central symbol of contemporary “urban 
lifestyles” (Zukin 1998). From New York to Buenos Aires, from Tokyo to Mexico City, 
lofts and “loft-style” apartments have sprawled. The flagship of urban redevelopment 
projects and gentrification processes, they bear associations of cosmopolitan 
sophistication, a specific urban aesthetics imbued with neo-bohemian undertones, 
historical “depth” and preservation, luxury and cultural capital. 
With the reference to the “loft-style” the Foundation mobilized these associations, 
including the value of living in “historical buildings” and in the historic center itself. In 
press conferences, public appearances and informal conversations, Foundation executives 
expressed their aspiration to transform the center into another Soho. To this end they also 
promoted the opening of particular consumption spaces, especially restaurants, bars and 
art galleries. Security was equally central to this venture. As I mentioned before, Slim’s 
representatives were crucially involved in the design and implementation of security 
operations and the Foundation advertised its security arrangements to new and 
prospective residents and investors.   
The Foundation catered to and attracted mostly young professionals, members of 
the  “creative industries” (architects, graphic designers, publicists, people working in the 
advertisement or music industry) and, to a lesser extent, bureaucrats and investment 
bankers working on nearby Reforma Avenue, as well as artists, students and cultural 
entrepreneurs. Many among the new residents with whom I conducted my fieldwork, 
whose ages ranged from the mid twenties to the mid forties, had previously lived in cities 
such as New York, Paris or Barcelona. Others had traveled extensively. International art 




because it promised the kind of urban experience that these global references implied.  
Consider for example Armando, a thirty two year old freelance film producer. He 
lived in a loft-style one-bedroom apartment on the sixth floor of a meticulously renovated 
art deco building that, like other similar buildings nearby, housed many single or recently 
married young professionals.  The son of a Mexican father and a German mother 
Armando grew up in an upper middle class neighborhood west of the historic center and 
attended the prestigious German school. As a teenager he moved with his family to a 
small city in the interior and only returned to the capital in time to study communication 
and design at a small private university. Upon finishing college he began work in 
Mexico’s advertising industry, eventually founding his own film production company, 
which mostly specialized in commercial advertising and television programs.   
Armando moved to the historic center in the summer of 2003 after learning about 
the rescue and the availability of housing options from a childhood friend. A very 
sociable and committed person who liked to boast about his many accomplishments he 
was an avid promoter of a sense of community among new residents, continuously 
organizing social events and public meetings to discuss common concerns. Armando 
eventually made himself into a sort of unofficial mediator between new residents, 
Foundation executives and the local authorities, a position of power that he carefully 
cultivated by closely guarding his “contacts” and “connections.” The following is an 
excerpt from an interview conducted with him in September 2006: 
The people I met in [my] building, they were people who had travelled, who had 
lived in other countries (…) I don’t know if you’ve had the chance to be in a great 
city, in other countries, but that feeling that the smells and the sounds, that 
everything is new (…) I had that feeling every day when I moved [to the historic 




New York, that although you know it, at least your neighborhood, you still 
discover things, and every day is something new. (…) All this I experienced—and 
I agree with a lot of people who also lived abroad. It is like living in New York, or 
living in London, or living in Paris, in another city, great city, with old buildings. 
(Interview with author, September 27, 2006). 
Armando expressed a cosmopolitan imaginary that I encountered over and over 
again throughout my fieldwork among the historic center’s new residents: a desire not 
only for the city as such but more precisely for an urban experience associated with 
“other great cities” in Europe and the United States. London, Paris and New York were 
imagined as exemplary of such cosmopolitan places: dense, dynamic, socially mixed, 
public, fit for pedestrians, worldly, and with a sense of beauty and aesthetics. Entangled 
with these images was another sense of the urban cosmopolitan, namely that these cities 
were well planned, orderly and safe. For new residents the rescue promised to foster the 
cosmopolitan potentials of Mexico City’s historic center, to bring this space into the 
global cosmopolitan present. It was the figure of Carlos Slim that provided them with a 
powerful guarantee for this promise.  
In the same interview Armando proclaimed his cosmopolitan credentials by 
bragging about the ease with which he negotiated the social heterogeneity of the historic 
center, the densest of the city’s spaces, where different social classes have traditionally 
mingled as they went about their business, shopping, strolling or demonstrating:   
The experience of meeting people of different socio-economic backgrounds, of 
different cultures, one already had that previous experience [having lived abroad], 
and one adapts very fast to any environment, because one no longer has 
prejudices, one sees people as human beings, regardless of their color, their 
socioeconomic status, because one has already lived it before, although one 
comes from a privileged cradle, right? (Interview with author, September 27, 
2006). 




fascination with the social heterogeneity of the center stemmed from his daily encounters 
with what he called its “characters” (personajes), for example the shoeshine outside his 
building, the street musician nearby, the kids from the vecindad, or the corner shop clerk. 
These charismatic figures also included those belonging to the center’s underworld, such 
as the lowlife or the transvestite. But hand in hand with such attraction to the center’s 
“characters”—romantic remnants of a supposedly bygone era—and to the possibility of 
developing a certain intimacy with them, Armando repeatedly stressed that the historic 
center ought be rescued from people who lacked the basic rules of civility and denigrated 
public space, especially street vendors and others who engaged in informal or illegal 
activities:  
If you live here, you are bothered by noise, from the saxophonist that plays the 
same out of tune song ten times in a row, to the street book vendor screaming for 
hours on end, in the same block, or the little three-peso stores; they are also a 
cancer for the center, because they make noise and they don’t respect the law 
(Interview with author, September 27, 2006). 
Like many urban dwellers, new residents oscillated between two horizons of desire. 
On the one hand, they were attracted to the historic center for the urban experience that it 
offered, which included the possibility of encountering the unfamiliar, even the 
dangerous. On the other hand, they aspired to a domesticated experience of the city, with 
heavily policed spaces and the eradication of people and practices perceived to be 
threatening. The cosmopolitan (imagined as a location, a temporality and a state of being) 
provided a link between these two horizons while at the same time keeping them in 
tension. In this sense the new residents embodied the contradiction of the artist—or of the 
bohemian of old—caught between his fascination (and often also proximity) with the 




fascination with the center and aversion towards its disorder, its dangers, and the people 
who dwelled in its (often intimate) spaces. These “characters,” then, certainly formed an 
important part of the center’s charisma, of that which provided its distinctly urban flavor, 
and at least for some artists and cultural producers, of a landscape to be intervened upon 
(through public art as well as cultural projects). And yet, those same “characters” were a 
constant source of fear and anxiety.  
Throughout the dissertation, I argue that the contradictions embodied by new 
residents, their particular suspension between two horizons of desire, must be located 
within the specific history and affective registers of class distinctions and hierarchies in 
Mexico and their particular reconfigurations in the present. I approach these relations 
through the figure of the “patron-client.” Class distinctions, I submit, are produced and 
experienced in relations of hierarchical dependency and ambiguous intimacies. These, I 
show, become destabilized in the historic center in the context of residential contiguity 
between social classes and within a national project to “rescue” the symbolic heart of the 
nation. While new residents view themselves as members of global cosmopolitan elites, 
they are also embedded in the here and now, a reality that demands constant and situated 
negotiations, informal arrangements, and the mobilization of personal relations. But I’m 
getting ahead of the argument. Let me continue, instead, by turning to consider what the 
figure of the crowd might tell us about the relation between the urban cosmopolitan and 
class distinctions.  
The City, the Crowd, the Stranger 




planning) laments the loss of urban public space, or at least its decline in recent decades 
through the proliferation of “gated communities,” security apparatuses and heavy 
policing (Caldeira 2000). A central concern that runs through this literature is that “public 
space” no longer serves as a site of anonymity and democratic encounter, and that instead 
it has become “privatized.” Take, for example, Teresa Caldeira’s argument in City of 
Walls (2000), an ethnography of urban segregation in Sao Paolo, Brazil: 
The idea of going for a walk, of naturally passing among strangers, the act of 
passing through the crowd that symbolizes the modern experience of the city, are 
all compromised in a city of walls. People feel restricted in their movements, 
afraid and controlled; they go out less at night, walk less on the street, and avoid 
the forbidden zones that loom larger and larger in every resident’s mental map of 
the city, especially among the elite (p. 267).   
Caldeira stresses a normative urban ideal of openness and accessibility for all. She 
argues that the encounter with social alterity made possible by an open, diversified and 
densely populated public space is conducive to democratic politics. This assumption in 
turn rests upon a clear separation between the “private” domain and the “public” one. The 
latter, where strangers come together in anonymity, forms according to Caldeira a crucial 
condition for democratic politics and citizenship. In her own words: “This ideal of the 
open city, tolerant to social differences and their negotiation in anonymous encounters, 
crystallizes what I call the modern and democratic public space” (Ibid: 303). A normative 
modern “public space” appears in Caldeira’s argument in a descriptive register. In its 
architectural dimension, that is, as the streets and plazas of the city, public space is used 
here as isomorphic with the Habermasian “bourgeois public sphere,” where strangers 
come together to engage in rational deliberation and where a similar tension between the 




Caldeira rightly insists upon the significance of the material dimension of public 
life, or how the built environment enables (and hinders) certain forms of sociability. And 
yet I would argue that attention to the figure of the crowd destabilizes the democratic 
ideal of public space as a place of anonymous bourgeois civility, suggesting instead that 
it is constitutively traversed by boundaries and anxieties. Indeed, images of metropolitan 
modernity are inseparable from ambivalent images of the crowd. The latter appears in 
them both as the nascent mass public of liberal democracy—as exemplified in the figure 
of the Parisian flaneur—and as an incontrollable force, the intermittently riotous urban 
mob that must be kept at bay. It is potentially emancipatory and an atomized, mechanized 
collection of individuals.  It is the condition of possibility of the modern citizen and its 
very antithesis.   
Raymond Williams identifies a new and powerful image that contrasts with the 
urban as a place of bourgeois accomplishment and civilized industry already in late 
eighteenth century writings about the rapidly expanding London. This is the mob and its 
dangerous potentials. “The ‘mob’,” writes Williams, “was often violent, unpredictable, 
capable of being used for reaction” (Williams 1973: 144). In the late eighteen hundreds, 
and after a century of industrial mechanization, observers of the city (such as Engels in 
The Conditions of the English Working Class) pointed to the confusion, indifference and 
atomization that characterized the urban crowd. To be sure, images of the latter as a 
menacing force persisted. The crowding of cities was thus seen “as a source of social 
danger: from the loss of customary human feelings to the building of a massive, 
irrational, explosive force” (Ibid: 217). By the late nineteenth century the city was simply 




rabble and the dangerous mob.16  
But the crowd, as Caldeira points out, is first and foremost a collection of strangers. 
It was perhaps Edgar Allan Poe who first captured the experience of walking among 
strangers in the nascent modern city in “The Man of the Crowd” (1965), a short story 
originally published in 1840. The story is narrated by a man who, having recovered from 
a long illness, observes the rush hour London crowd, heterogeneous and dense, through 
the window of a café. An enigmatic figure exercises upon him a force that he cannot 
control and draws the man to leave the café and join in with the crowd. He spends hours 
upon hours wandering aimlessly in the footsteps of the mysterious stranger through the 
crowded London streets.  
Without elaborating on the details of the narrative, I would like to highlight 
something about Poe’s rendering of the crowd that is important for my discussion here. 
Poe’s story vividly captures how the strangers who encounter each other “in public”—
and here I’m referring to the architectural dimension of public space—inevitably bear 
marks of status, class, gender, provenance, or region. The strangers in Poe’s crowd 
display particular “accents” and styles in a way that is reminiscent of the social location 
of voices in Bakhtin’s heteroglosia of language (Bakhtin 2004). From the bourgeois 
interior of his London café, his gaze rising above the daily newspaper and through the 
smoke of his cigar, Poe’s narrator classifies and deciphers the people outside by looking 
carefully at their clothes, their demeanors and their faces. He also describes other forms 
of looking, like the fleeting and anxious glances exchanged between strangers in the 
                                                 
16 Such concerns had everything to do with the obsessive scholarly preoccupation during that time about the 





crowd: passers-by gaze at each other; ruffians stare at girls; beggars look intently at 
pedestrians’ eyes, as if seeking some consolation. But the narrator’s way of looking at the 
crowd is influenced by the crowd itself, by some force within it. As he becomes gradually 
possessed by the allure of the crowd and later on by the enigma of the man of the crowd, 
his mental disposition steadily slides towards delirium.  
Poe’s narrator seemed to lack what Simmel would later call a particular training of 
the senses in the modern city, that particular subjectivity that emerges with urban 
modernity and that would defend itself effectively against such delirium (Simmel 1995). 
What characterizes the metropolitan man according to Simmel, based on his own 
experiences in early twentieth century Berlin, is a “blasé attitude”, a noticeable 
indifference to people and things that results from the peculiar conditions of the 
metropolis. The unprecedented intensification of stimuli in the big city—the complexity 
and multiplicity of activities, the tempo of life, the fleeting and constant contact with 
strangers—is confronted by the metropolitan man with intellectualist rather than 
emotional reactions, a protective psychological response of the mind to these new 
conditions. This indifference is for Simmel nowhere more perceivable than in the urban 
crowd: “the bodily closeness and lack of space make intellectual distance really 
perceivable for the first time” (Simmel 1995: 40). 
The urban dweller’s sensorial training and “blasé attitude”—the only possibility of 
living in a world of constant stimulation—suggests that, in contrast to the case of Poe’s 




threatening in the modern city.17 This is indeed how Richard Sennett reads Simmel’s 
insights in his own reflections on public space: “The notion would be that in the public 
realm you would always identify yourself in such a way that the anxiety about the other 
was damped down by giving them clues about who you are” (Sennet 2000: 382). 
Whereas Simmel emphasized the gaze as crucially mediating urban interactions, Sennett 
stresses not only observation but also public performance and self-presentation.18 The 
stranger is called upon to enact a determinate, identifiable identity in order to render 
himself legible to others. But Simmel’s point is in fact subtler, for the stranger of the 
crowd is never fully domesticated and recognizable, and the possibility of disruption 
always remains. Simmel develops this theme further in his essay “The Stranger” (1971), 
which I will discuss in some detail in Chapter 2.19 
Contemporary cities north and south are far larger and denser than the city of 
Simmel’s theorizations, and between early twentieth century Berlin and twenty first 
century Mexico City there are no doubt stark contrasts. While Simmel, for example 
insisted that the city provides intense stimulation to all the senses—let us think of the 
noises, the smells, the touches—he did not theorize the ways in which interaction “in 
                                                 
17 This theme is central to Benjamin’s writings on the urban crowd. Rather than mysterious and menacing 
as it appeared in Poe, the crowd becomes for him the very condition of possibility for the modern urban 
dweller, epitomized by the literary figure of the flaneur. Benjamin, W. (1968). On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire. Illuminations. Essays and Reflections. H. Arendt. New York, Schocken Books: 155-200. 
 
18 Benjamin too privileges the eye over other senses in discussing the urban experience. He notes that the 
eye of the prostitute scrutinizes passers-by while at the same time remaining attentive or on its guard 
against the police. Benjamin argues that the use of the eye is more central to the city dweller than other 
senses. He relies on Simmel, who explains this with the introduction of public transport, where people must 
stare at each other without exchanging a word (Ibid.). 
 
19 For an interesting take on Simmel’s essay on the Stranger see: Siegel, J. T. (2001). "Kiblat" and the 






public” is mediated by all the senses, and not only the eye. The urban crowd is always 
embodied and sensuous. Consider, for example, Camille. She was a new resident in her 
late twenties who, after getting married to a man named Daniel and in defiance of her 
family’s disapproval, moved to the center from one of the wealthiest neighborhoods in 
the city. The new couple invested in several food-industry ventures in the renovated 
center, until they finally settled in one restaurant-bar. These are her reminiscences of her 
first impressions of the center: 
It would drive me crazy, to go out on the street with so many people, and the first 
times that they harass you and stuff, and to touch... I got a kind of phobia of 
touching things, during the first few months. I had always been indifferent to dust 
and things, suddenly I had this thing of washing my hands a hundred times a day, 
and blowing my nose and showering many times. Terrible (...) And people, and 
noise, everybody on top of each other, and the smell of the vending stands, and all 
those things. I was like dazed (Interview with author, December 7, 2006). 
The crowd thus appears as a material reality that urban dwellers navigate, decipher 
and attempt to locate socially. In other words, urban interaction always entails an attempt 
to locate the other, sometimes with a glimpse, and to place him or her within certain 
social categories (See also: Goffman 1990). At the same time interaction always carries 
the possibility that location will fail or, in other words, of the potential for 
misrecognition. In Chapter 2, for example, I examine a trope of “standing out” that I 
encountered over and over throughout my fieldwork among new residents. This was a 
particular apprehension about not blending in and disappearing into an anonymous crowd 
but being marked, as it were, as an outsider in the historic center.  More worryingly from 
the perspective of new residents, it meant that they were visible as “rich”, and thus 
became vulnerable to social resentment and even attack. But such anxiety over “standing 




of the historic center and the new residents’ inability to (properly) locate them.  
Throughout the dissertation I thus explore how new residents’ desire for urban 
cosmopolitanism is inseparable from their ambivalent desire of the crowd. But what is 
“the crowd” in the historic center? My inquiry reveals several different incarnations of 
the figure of the crowd and, moreover, exposes slippages between these incarnations. 
First of all, with the crowd I refer to the undifferentiated masses of people that, on any 
given day, jostle their way through the streets of the historic center, the legions of people 
coming together “in public,” a dense and amorphous mass. This first incarnation of the 
crowd is well illustrated by Carlos Monsivais’ suggestive opening image in Los rituales 
del caos (The Rituals of Chaos), a chronicle of mass culture in Mexico City: “In the 
visual terrain,” writes Monsivais, “Mexico City is, above all, an overabundance of 
people” (Monsiváis 1995).  
The crowd is also a number of different publics (Warner 2002), from the spectators 
of mass concerts in the Zócalo to the consumers of art events. And it is equally the 
organized masses of political demonstrators that continuously “take over” the historic 
center’s streets and squares. At the same time the undifferentiated mass of the center 
constantly slides into a different form of the crowd, that is, the scores of vendors and 
consumers of the center’s “informal” economy. Here the crowd begins to bear the 
connotations of the masses of the urban poor, the “dangerous classes,” which are also 
represented by the figure of the vecindad and its inhabitants.  
I will attend throughout the pages that follow to how the figure of the crowd 
emerges in quotidian interactions, in the stories that people tell about these interactions 




different social categories: between the “neighbor” and the “criminal,” the “citizen” and 
the “client,” the “mestizo” and the “Indian,” or between an innocuous stranger and a 
dangerous one. These are all also slippages of the figure of the crowd: an undifferentiated 
mass slips into a menacing mob, a potential public into a bunch of clients. I argue that 
what gets destabilized in these slippages is a certain temporal orientation toward or 
investment in a cosmopolitan present. It is a temporality that also imbues a particular 
notion of citizenship, especially inasmuch as the latter is experienced as the opposite of 
the client. 
The Citizen, the Mass, the Criminal 
One important concern of this dissertation has been to trace the links between this 
simultaneous fascination with and suspicion toward the urban crowd on the one hand and 
new residents’ affective investments in (particular forms of) citizenship and legality on 
the other. For, as I mentioned above, I approach the rescue and the imaginaries of urban 
cosmopolitanism that it mobilizes as inscribed within a changing landscape of 
governance and ideological commitments across the world. With the conclusion of the 
cold war and the global triumph of capitalism and the “free market,” scholars have 
charted across this landscape a great number of “dismantlements:” from the end of mass 
utopias and of collective forms of political belonging (Buck-Morss 2000) to the 
disavowal of class as a meaningful social and political category that organizes interaction 
and experience (Zizek 1989), or from the reconfiguration of state/society relations and 
the concomitant spread of neoliberal forms governance (Mitchell 1991; Rose, Barry et al. 




other forms of social and political belonging (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001).   
What interests me in these disparate yet interrelated developments is a discursive 
activation of a particular figure of “the citizen” and the concomitant emergence of a 
counter figure of sorts, namely, “the criminal.” Influenced by the late Foucault and 
writing about a very different context (the “advanced liberalism” of Europe and the 
United States), Nikolas Rose has described these emergent figures and their relation to 
novel forms and rationalities of governance over the past several decades. 20 According to 
Rose, in the wake of “social liberalism” and the twentieth century welfare-state demands 
for citizenship rights have become inseparably linked with projects to reform individuals 
at the levels of their personal skills, competencies and conducts. The idea is that, as they 
become proper, responsible citizens, individuals will be able to thrive without state 
interference (Rose, Barry et al. 1996). Particular forms of governance, argues Rose, 
depend upon specific regimes of intelligibility and enunciation, which are in turn always 
traversed by conflicts over who can speak, from what place and according to what criteria 
of truth and authority (Rose 1999). The question that arises, then, is what commitments 
do contemporary idioms of citizenship make possible and for whom? Around which 
networks and circuits do these idioms circulate? What passions and affects do they 
mobilize? How, and to whom, do these idioms become intelligible and meaningful in the 
Mexican context?  
                                                 
20 Rose argues that specific policy shifts, for example Thatcher’s reforms in 1980s England, were not 
realizations of particular philosophies, but rather practical ad hoc responses to specific problems. Certain 
rationality emerged in the process that provided a linkage between these different responses until they 
appeared to be part of a coherent logic. For Rose, then, neoliberalism designate less an epoch than a 
rationality of particular styles of government and “the instruments, techniques and practices to which they 
become linked.” Rose, N. S. (1999). Powers of freedom: reframing political thought. Cambridge, United 





I find Claudio Lomnitz’s reflections on the history and politics of citizenship in 
Mexico helpful for thinking about new residents’ affective commitment to (particular 
idioms of) citizenship in the historic center. In “Modes of Mexican Citizenship” (2001) 
Lomnitz explores the cultural dynamics of citizenship in Mexico while tracing the 
transformations of its definition and political significance since the early nineteenth 
century. He argues that the experience and practice of citizenship in a context of non-
universal access to rights and services have depended upon the mobilization of personal 
relations and informal (i.e., non institutional) arrangements. The bureaucrat therefore 
emerges as a sort of powerful gatekeeper. But Lomnitz insists that the social terrain 
where personal negotiations and arrangements take place is not neutral or immutable. It is 
always shaped by people’s theoretical relationship to particular rights, that is, by the very 
definition of who can claim the position of the citizen, a definition which, it goes without 
saying, has varied historically (p. 60-61).  
As was the case elsewhere at the time, in nineteenth century post-independence 
Mexico the definition of who could claim the position of the citizen was entangled with 
elite anxieties about the crowd, especially as incarnated in that most elusive of modern 
concepts, “the people.” An intrinsically ambivalent concept, “the people” is both the site 
of popular sovereignty, the foundation of the state, and that which threatens the very 
order established in its name (the dangerous crowd) (Ranciere 2001). The Spanish 
translation, el pueblo, has similarly dual connotations. But while the English term has a 
certain class inflection (i.e., the common people), it also refers to the nation and the 
citizenry, as in “we the people.” El pueblo, on the other hand, has never been entirely 




salient. (Consider, for example, a group of Indigenous protesters in Chiapas appealing to 
the soldiers summoned to subdue them: “ustedes también son pueblo” (you are also part 
of the pueblo).21 El pueblo, then, has a more distinct sociological content and thus a 
clearer resemblance to the potentially dangerous mob.  
Allow me to briefly sketch Lomnitz’s discussion of the politics of Mexican 
citizenship and of the position of el pueblo in order to historically situate the 
contemporary transformation of this figure. Elite representations of el pueblo (la chusma, 
el populacho, la canalla, la plebe) in nineteenth century post-Independence Mexico 
oscillated between, on the one hand, images of a “good pueblo,” which referred to the 
lower classes that, despite their abject status, were non-threatening and in need of state 
protection (a sort of proto-citizen), and on the other hand a “bad pueblo,” a criminal, 
violent and irredeemable force that included both the urban rabble and rebellious Indians 
at the frontiers of the young republic. As the central state consolidated itself towards the 
end of the nineteenth century (and particularly under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz) the 
ideological emphasis shifted from the problem of the expansion of citizenship to the 
challenges of modernization and progress as preferred ways of consolidating the 
country’s stability and international standing. The bad or dangerous pueblo was 
neutralized as the “abject pueblo” and effectively excluded from the national project (p. 
73). 
After the revolution of 1910 the pueblo again came to occupy central stage, though 
now in the protagonist role of the quintessential Mexican, a reversal that I will discuss in 
                                                 
21 This formulation is taken from an image that circulated extensively during the first months of the 
Indigenous Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1994. However, it is a recurrent image during 





some detail in Chapter 3. The post-revolutionary state incorporated the revolutionary 
masses in the form of corporations—or what Lomnitz has called a massified form of 
citizenship—that nonetheless accorded several social rights and protections (for example 
the right to education, the right to land for peasants, or the right to a minimum wage). In 
this regard, the pueblo was neutralized not (or not primarily) through relations of 
hierarchical dependency with the elites, but most crucially through an inclusive 
corporatism that saw its incorporation into the state as the ultimate patron and as the 
quintessential modernizing agent. In the narrative of the post-revolutionary state the 
pueblo would be transformed into a full-fledged modern citizenry, but anxieties over the 
dangerous pueblo, now invested with revolutionary potentials, remained.  
To be sure, the pueblo did not remain unchanged over the seventy years of the post-
revolutionary regime. My interest in presenting this abridged history, however, is to 
situate a shift in its fate over the past thirty years, in the context of Mexico’s 
“democratization” and the gradual dismantlement of the post-revolutionary state as well 
as in the context of larger transformations across the world. Within what I will call a 
liberal democratic narrative, Mexico’s transition has been construed as a slow awakening 
of individual citizens (especially epitomized by the figure of civil society), which contrast 
with the massified citizens of the old regime (I discuss this topic at length in Chapters 4 
and 6).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the discourse of the “bad pueblo” has regained traction in 
this context, and as insecurity and the informal economy have increased and mass 
protests have appeared less clearly controlled or controllable. As could be expected, this 




a way of policing class boundaries at a moment in which class mobility and a utopian 
revolutionary future have become foreclosed. In this too Mexico’s developments have 
been entangled with global processes, namely, the increasing criminalization of 
populations that have become residual within present economic and political landscapes 
(Wacqant 2001).  In Chapter 3 I explore how in Mexico such criminalization has also 
referenced the racialized figure of the Indian and with it, the possibility of exclusion and 
incommensurability. I argue that the cosmopolitan class position is predicated upon and 
the same time undone by this possibility. I will also approach this topic through the 
analysis of particular idioms of legality and the concomitant criminalization of informal 
street workers in Chapter 6. 
The twentieth century revolution was for a long time a national obsession. It gave 
rise to a copious historiography and to a wide variety of interpretations, from popular 
revolt to bourgeois revolution, from national event to scattered upheavals, from radical 
break to a continuation of the old regime (See: Joseph and Nugent 1994). For decades 
“The Revolution”, a more or less official, more or less unified rendering of this event 
(which, it goes without saying, has changed over the years), provided legitimacy to the 
Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) that emerged in its wake and that governed the 
country for seventy-one years. The revolution’s salience in the political rhetoric of the 
regime, however, began to wane in the early 1980s. The government began to favor other 
idioms of “modernization” such as “transparency”, “efficiency” and “democratization” 
(Escalante Gonzalbo 2006). In turn, over the past few decades a wide range of public 
intellectuals, and political commentators from a variety of political positions have 




authoritarianism. In these by now dominant interpretations there is nothing to be salvaged 
from the “event” itself or from the regime that stemmed from it.  
Without for a minute disavowing the corruption, repression and violence that were 
central to the post-revolutionary state (in its different incarnations) throughout the 
twentieth century, the point I want to make is that the post-revolutionary rhetoric (which 
was no doubt stronger at certain moments and weaker at others) was effectively rendered 
legible and meaningful within the context of larger social and political horizons in the 
twentieth century. In other words, there was an ideological and an institutional dimension 
of the revolution that was firmly inscribed within twentieth century politics worldwide: 
the image of a strong state and the promise of universal prosperity and the future 
incorporation of the masses. It is within the global shift away from this form of politics 
that I locate the fate of the masses in contemporary Mexico. 
In this context, citizenship, or better yet the lack of citizens, has become an 
obsession for Mexico’s liberal intellectual elites.22 Commenting on this obsession 
Fernando Escalante has written: 
The model is usually the United States or France, but the idea we have of the 
citizen doesn’t really correspond to any concrete reality: it is an imaginary 
creation with chimerical attributes. The citizen is responsible, tolerant, honest, 
truthful, attentive to public interest, respectful of authority; he can be critical 
when necessary but also unselfish and obedient; a liberal individualist like no 
other who shows solidarity to an heroic extent; rational and reasonable, capable of 
sacrificing his personal interest. And he always abides by the law, regardless of 
how demanding and awkward the law might be. In other words—let us be 
serious—we should not be surprised that there are no citizens. In Mexico or 
anywhere. And nonetheless it is very difficult to renounce to this fantasy, even to 
see it as a fantasy (Escalante Gonzalbo 2010). 
                                                 
22 With this term I refer to a wide spectrum of political commentators, public intellectuals, academics and 
“pundits” from different political positions who regularly write in national newspapers and appear in 





As I mentioned before, this idealized, impossible citizen has as its opposites 
allegedly outmoded forms of political participation and belonging such as clientelism, 
corporatism and populism—all remnants of the ancient regime and all especially 
epitomized by the urban masses. Citizenship, then, appears in this ideological 
configuration as a title only a select few can hold and thus as a status marker, the 
converse of which appears as that object of desire and of horror that the masses incarnate 
for the cosmopolitan urbanite.   
How, then, do (neo) liberal idioms of citizenship become legible and meaningful in 
this context? They are instilled, for example, through government poverty alleviation 
programs that assert co-responsibility. They are found in the ways in which people talk 
about the vices of a paternalistic state that creates a lazy population (Cahn 2008). In the 
historic center, these idioms appear in discussions about whether workshops for the local 
“community” should be free; or in pleas to respect the law or to file police reports when 
witnessing transgressions. Indeed, the citizen has been construed as the main protagonist 
of rescue. Take, for example, the public declarations of an executive of the Foundation: 
Citizens have the most important role, because this is an endeavor for everyone, 
because the particularity of this rescue is that it is the first focusing on people. 
Before the priority was to fix the buildings, but they remained empty, and after a 
few years they started to deteriorate again. When things have life, they are well 
kept. If you live in your house, you make sure that everything is in order. That’s 
why we are very focused on people, first of all, on those who are already here, so 
they will have better living conditions, and secondly, bringing more people to live 
in those buildings, to work in them (Centro Histórico Guía para Caminantes, 
#1, 2002). 
 At the same time, and to draw again on Lomnitz’s argument about the quotidian 
negotiation of citizenship, these idioms are embedded in a context in which personal 




it were, negotiated on the ground. They circulate in a setting in which, far from clear-cut 
(as certain liberal democrats would want to believe), the distinction between the citizen 
and the client is rather illegible, a topic that I will discuss in detail in Chapter 4. 
Elite anxieties over the lack of “citizens” in Mexico, such as the ones I mentioned 
before, gained spectacular expression during the presidential election of 2006 and the 
mass protests that followed. These events had a significant impact on the rescue, on the 
forms of sociability that I was studying and on my own ways of looking at them. AMLO, 
the former mayor of Mexico City and the man who initiated the rescue was at the center 
of these events. At once a widely popular and reviled figure, AMLO had resigned from 
his position in early 2005 in order to prepare his presidential bid as the candidate of a 
center left coalition. At that point he was tipped as a favorite among all possible 
candidates. His tenure as mayor was highly contentious: from his open and reciprocated 
antagonism with president Fox, to his controversial social programs or the extensively 
publicized corruption scandals involving some of his closest associates. He was deemed a 
populist and offended the sensibilities of the (neo) liberal orthodoxy in the country. His 
social spending and his emphasis on “the poor” were represented as a residue, an atavism 
and a change of course—back to the past—for a country that had finally started to march 
forward.  
After the election took place on July 2, 2006 AMLO contested its unfavorable 
results, claiming that a fraud had been committed. He summoned a series of mass protests 
and mobilizations in the historic center that culminated in a sit-in (plantón), which 
disputed not only the center but also the entire city for more almost two months. Like 




and antidemocratic. Newspaper articles, blogs, and TV programs ferociously criticized 
his protests. Denunciations of anti-democracy, of deliberatively shattering the 
advancements of the country and of sabotaging its institutions dovetailed blogs that 
decried the takeover of public space by the gullible masses. AMLO’s masses thus 
constantly slipped into the old trope of the dangerous pueblo, the criminal class, or the 
dangerous mob.  
The initial momentum of the rescue had started to subside in late 2005, but for new 
residents the post election mass-protests spelled a new and crucial moment of decline, as 
I will discuss in Chapter 6. “How can [AMLO] now turn against his own project,” a new 
resident perplexedly (but rhetorically) asked me during the protests. By late 2006, new 
residents’ disillusionment with the rescue seemed to have become endemic. Some artists 
felt that the Foundation had deceived them, since promises to create a culturally vibrant 
quarter in the southwest of the historic center through support for the arts and through the 
opening of galleries and other cultural spaces had not fully materialized. Moreover, 
security was again deteriorating. The perception was that things had gotten better only to 
get bad yet again: from a renovated pedestrian square deteriorating again into a state of 
disrepair, or street vendors returning to areas that had already been recuperated, to 
robberies occurring once more in the affluent financial corridor or rising tensions 
between old and new residents in the center’s southwest, as I will discuss throughout the 
dissertation.  
Ethnographic Context, Fieldwork and Ethical Dilemmas 




to the southern state of Oaxaca to conduct preliminary fieldwork for what at the time I 
thought would be my dissertation project. I stopped in Mexico City for a few days to visit 
friends on my way there when two developments attracted my attention and made me 
doubt my prior research plans. First, on June 27th, 2004, a few days before my arrival, a 
massive demonstration against insecurity took place in the city. Hundreds of thousands of 
people marched down Reforma Avenue to demand more effective measures against 
crime, and especially against kidnapping. As opposed to most protest marches, which are 
routinely denounced on television and many newspapers as a nuisance, this 
demonstration was presented as a citizens’ march or as civil society voicing its discontent 
and was actively endorsed and promoted by the main TV and radio stations in the 
country. A great number of people belonging to the middle and upper classes who had 
perhaps never participated in public protests took to the streets that day, chanting slogans 
such as “death penalty to kidnappers”. 
Second, Mexico City’s congress had recently approved a controversial law known 
as the Civic Culture Act. Based on the recommendations of New York City’s former 
mayor Rudolph Giuliani about how best to fight crime and insecurity in the city, the law 
criminalized several “informal” activities in the city’s streets, such as vending or 
windshield cleaning. As the act would go into effect the following month (August 1st) it 
was receiving heightened coverage in the press during my visit. Many of my friends, too, 
were obsessively talking about it. While some denounced the Act as “repressive” others 
complained about the excessive presence of street vendors on the sidewalks and the lack 
of a culture of legality in the city.  




discourse on crime and illegality and the construal of the demonstration as an initiative of 
citizens. It was clear that insecurity had become unbearable for broad segments of the 
population and that many wanted “mano dura” (a firm hand). But there was also an 
implicit dimension of class and race to these discourses that was disavowed under the 
rubric of “the citizen”. A dual picture of society seemed to emerge from them: on the one 
hand, the masses of the urban poor, now criminalized by new legislation, and on the other 
hand a sanitized version of civil society demanding tough penalties on criminals.  
I decided to spend some time in Mexico City in order to explore the possibility of 
developing a research project there after spending several weeks in Oaxaca conducting 
preliminary research with bureaucrats and lawyers defending indigenous prisoners. A few 
days after my return to the city I met a good friend who worked at a private university in 
the historic center. Until that day I was only vaguely aware that a plan to revitalize this 
area was underway and that Carlos Slim had been involved in it. My friend, who had 
been conducting research on cultural policies in the city, filled me in on the rescue, and 
especially on the art and cultural scene emerging in the southwest of the center. She 
mentioned a guided tour of the “security program” that she had attended the previous 
week. I was fascinated.  
I spent three weeks visiting the center every day, talking to people, taking note of 
my friends’ impressions of the rescue, learning more about Slim’s involvement, 
collecting media representations, and visiting the police command center. What was 
going on in the historic center seemed to me to reflect the earlier developments that 
caught my attention: an obsession with crime, the introduction of tough policing, new 




complicated them, for the people who were moving to the historic center were artists, 
intellectuals, and students who wanted an intense and vibrant urban experience that 
included living in a dense and socially mixed space. Moreover, the majority of these 
residents would surely oppose such harsh measures as the death penalty and would likely 
align themselves to the left of the political spectrum. I returned to New York determined 
to make the rescue, and especially the experiences of those who were moving there, the 
focus of my dissertation.  
I designed my project and my fieldwork methodology to capture the urban 
experiences and contradictions of new residents in the historic center by looking at the 
interface between rescue and security in their daily routines and interactions. My work 
thus also encompassed an institutional dimension, with a particular focus on the police 
and on the Foundation. My research with new residents took place in the two areas of the 
historic center where Slim’s real estate company had remodeled buildings for residential 
use, the more affluent and monumental “financial corridor” and the more dilapidated 
“cultural corridor”.  
When I arrived in the field in January 2006 the first phase of the rescue had already 
been completed (2002-2006). The historically affluent heart of the historic center known 
as the “financial corridor”, composed of approximately thirty-five blocks between the 
Alameda Park to the west and the Zócalo to the north, had been entirely renovated. The 
pavement on the streets had been substituted with cobblestones; all sorts of wiring that 
formerly hanged from sidewalk poles had been re-installed underground; sidewalks had 
been widened and their surfaces remade; all the facades had been cleaned and re-painted. 




residential use, targeting young professionals like Armando and Camille. Trendy brand-
name clothing stores had opened, as well as restaurants and bars catering to a young 
affluent clientele of newcomers, but such venues remained relatively inconspicuous. Far 
more eye-catching was the heightened police presence in this area. Besides officers 
belonging to the newly created Citizen’s Protection Unit who were walking in pairs on 
every block, there were surveillance cameras on almost every street corner in this area.  
There were almost no street vendors there during my fieldwork, excepting the 
occasional food sellers who would station themselves at rush hour and who were 
frequently removed by the police. Even before the rescue the presence of street vendors 
in the financial corridor was relatively meager when compared with the street markets 
behind the National Palace and the Cathedral. But now they had been removed altogether 
and positioned themselves a few blocks west of this area, on the edges of the rescued 
zone. The fact that they kept returning as toreros23—placing their products on red carpets 
that could easily be removed when the police approached—was a constant source of 
anxiety for new residents. My entry point in the financial corridor was a tenant’s 
association created by newly settled residents in order to get to know each other and to 
address their common concerns, from insecurity or traffic to the presence of street 
vendors, noise and garbage. Through this association I established contact with several 
new residents in this area, mostly affluent young professionals.  
Slim’s company had also acquired several buildings in the less monumental and 
more neglected area south of the financial corridor, which the rescue plan designated as a 
                                                 
23 Meaning matadors or bullfighters, the term refers both to the red clothes that vendors use to place their 





“cultural corridor” where the settlement of artists and the proliferation of galleries and 
cultural spaces would be promoted. Here every street specialized in a different 
commodity market: musical instrument shops on one street; electronics stores in the next; 
computers and software stores in another. Street vendors clustered at certain 
intersections, their merchandise coinciding with what was offered inside the stores. 
Further south, a few blocks with numerous vecindades seemed to stand apart from the 
hustle and bustle that surrounded them.  
Early divergences between Foundation executives and government officials 
impeded plans to renovate this area. But the Foundation nevertheless went ahead with the 
restoration of several buildings, provided support for arts and culture, and also financed a 
visible policing operation in the area. At the time of my fieldwork in addition to renting 
commercial spaces bars and cafes as well as to galleries and other art venues, the 
Foundation had renovated approximately ten apartment buildings for housing, offering 
apartments at below-market prices to artists and people belonging to Mexico City’s art 
scene, such as Pedro and Monica. 
Shortly before my arrival the Foundation opened Culture Space, the cultural center 
that I mentioned in my opening scene, on a street named Regina, which became the 
central axis of the “cultural corridor” and the focus of my fieldwork in this area. Most 
people working there were artists or cultural promoters who also lived in renovated 
buildings owned by Slim’s company in the area. This cultural center thus became a fertile 
entry point into the social networks and personal lives of new residents, their activities 
and their routines. I eventually narrowed my focus on one residential building near 




experienced particular tensions and violent encounters with older inhabitants of the block. 
Like most new residents, I moved constantly between the financial corridor and the 
cultural corridor during my fieldwork. My daily activities consisted in attending art 
openings and events, frequenting social gatherings and meetings at local bars and cafes or 
at peoples’ homes, documenting public art projects, and going to neighborhood 
assemblies and to meetings of the residents association. I collected the life and residential 
histories of new residents and documented their interactions with other inhabitants of the 
center, from tenement dwellers to street vendors, as well as with Foundation executives, 
security authorities and the police.  
In addition to working with new residents, I conducted interviews with several 
earlier inhabitants of Regina Street and its surroundings, with many of whom I 
established close relations. However, I did not conduct long-term ethnographic research 
in the vecindades there. This reflected my research priorities. I was interested in the 
experiences, perspectives, fears and anxieties of new residents and in their own 
figurations and imaginations of other dwellers of the area. While I considered it crucial to 
hear and document the perspective of other inhabitants, I did not make these the focus of 
my ethnographic inquiries.  
As for the densely populated and more traditional neighborhoods east and north of 
the Zócalo, which did not benefit from the rescue during its first phase, they only appear 
in this dissertation as imagined by new residents, many of whom referred to these areas, 
mostly unknown to them, as “Calcutta” (See Figure 2). Take for example’s Camille’s 





[The] center that exists in our imagination is this center. What’s there behind the 
National Palace, well, it is Calcutta. It’s different. And also around 
Independencia, that’s where electricians live and where one shops around. But it 
is not the center. Those are the barriers that everyone has, aren’t they? The center 
is the touristy, pretty, nice part. That is the nice center, and all the rest of the 
center is like a thing of the third world, in which no one from here is involved. I 
mean, our priorities are this part of the center. Maybe it is because we cannot 
comprehend the other part of the center. It isn’t—it has never been—part of our 
experience. And it is not something we can understand (Interview with author, 
December 7, 2006). 
Parallel to these fieldwork activities I conducted ethnographic research at the police 
command center, the office that coordinates the entire security program in the historic 
center. During preliminary research in the summer of 2005 I befriended Bety, a smart and 
funny mid-level bureaucrat at this institution in her late 20s. Bety generously explained to 
me the (public) details of the security program, answered my questions and promised to 
support me upon my return. But it was clear to me that conducting participant 
observation research at this secretive institution would necessitate a special authorization 
from “above,” which I arranged upon my return to the field with the help of a close friend 
who worked at the local government 
The “boss,” as the civilian director of the security program was known among his 
subordinates, welcomed me with a mixture of interest, suspicion and indifference. He 
more or less left it me to negotiate my access to the different departments under his 
command: the monitoring center, charged with watching the surveillance cameras and 
responding to emergency calls, the statistics department or the customer service office. 
This was a mixed blessing. It granted me room for maneuver and a certain freedom of 
movement within the command center, but it also conditioned my research upon the 




a retired army captain whom others described as a bitter man, aggressively guarded the 
secrecy of his work (and clearly feared that I was there to evaluate him) and granted me 
only very limited access to his dominion.  
I spent most of these four months observing the daily work at the command center 
and chatting with its bureaucrats, who seemed always eager to share their concerns and 
frustrations. I explored the production of statistics about crime in the area; the 
“monitoring” of the center’s daily life and the management of disruptive events such as 
demonstrations; the dissemination of information about security to the general public 
through the customer service office; and the organization of community meetings with 
new residents. On several occasions I accompanied managerial executives on their daily 
walks through the streets of the center. This was the closest I got to actual police officers 
on the ground. 
Albeit in a very different way, my research with new residents also required a 
constant negotiation of my role as an anthropologist. They often seemed to have forgotten 
(or repressed) the fact that I was studying “them.” Ever since the reflexive turn that 
engulfed the discipline of anthropology in the 1980s, anthropologists have been carefully 
aware of the conundrums of representation and voicing in ethnographic work (Marcus, 
Clifford et al. 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986). The emphasis on the remote and the 
exotic, on the radical other, as the proper object of anthropological inquiry has been 
relativized in the wake of the discipline’s process of self-critique, and more and more 
anthropologists conduct fieldwork “at home” (Peirano 1998). And yet making the 
familiar strange and the strange familiar remains not only a defining quality but also a 




methodological and ethical conundrums for those studying their own societies. 
Mexico features a long and well-established anthropological tradition, which has 
been inextricably bound with national (and nationalist) concerns. Its privileged object of 
study has traditionally been “the Indian,” that ambivalent figure who is at once the 
foundation of the nation and the foreign (I will develop this argument in Chapter 3). 
Urban anthropology, when it has not dealt with indigenous populations in the city, has for 
the most part focused on migrants from the interior, on the urban poor and on other 
disadvantaged populations. Anthropology, then, is a recognizable field for the general 
educated public, including the historic center’s new residents. But the latter do not expect 
the anthropologist to study people like themselves.  
For this reason, and especially at the beginning of my fieldwork, my presence and 
my inquiries were sometimes met with discomfort. But another aspect of my presence 
there weighed more heavily upon both my fieldwork and the writing process. In a way I 
belonged to the social networks of the people I was studying, and especially to the artists 
and intellectuals living in the southwest of the center. I formed part of these milieus also 
in terms of my social position. I once wrote in my diary that at times I felt as if I were 
doing an ethnography of myself.  
At the same time I was also an outsider. The many years I have spent abroad have 
left their marks on my sensibility to forms of sociability in Mexico City, and particularly 
to its accentuated class hierarchies. It is precisely my own position as insider/outsider that 
drew me to this project—my own embeddedness in the very same contradictions that I 
observed in my “informants.” My social proximity to the people I was studying 




seem all too familiar. I had to repeatedly remind my “subjects” that I was an 
anthropologist interested in their experiences in the historic center, not (or not only) a 
friend.  
The same conundrum took on a different form as I embarked upon the process of 
writing. How was I to explain social phenomena in which I am implicated? How was I to 
write about the aspirations, fears, anxieties and contradictions of my subjects, many of 
which could have just as well been my own, without making them appear too exotic? 
Would the people I was writing about recognize themselves in my descriptions? Was I 
being fair in my rendering of their experiences? I have aimed to capture the complexities 
of people whose lives are “informed and constrained by the hierarchies in which they find 
themselves embedded” (Goldstein 2003: 5). I hope my attention to ethnographic detail 
and to the complexities of everyday interactions has done justice to the predicaments of 
the historic center’s new residents.  
Mapping the Chapters  
In this introduction I have attempted to map out the main themes of this dissertation 
and the theoretical commitments that have motivated it. As I have explained, its 
ethnographic focus consists in moments of encounter that slide into suspicion, 
uncertainty, instability and misrecognition. The dissertation traces a desire for 
commonality, for an “all of us” in the historic center (a recognition as urban dwellers or 
as fellow citizens), and the perpetual doubt about the possibility of this commonality. The 
interactions that I will explore below, I argue, are informed by a long history of elite 




national project, and, crucially, by the imagination of a temporal and spatial “elsewhere” 
against which the “here and now” is to be measured.  
The second chapter, titled “Standing Out” traces the contradictions that face artists 
and cultural promoters living and working in the cultural corridor. Discussing different 
interactions between new residents and the people whom their cultural projects aim to 
incorporate, I trace how the form of sociability of the neighbor, someone whom one can 
recognize or whom one can love as oneself, slides into different social figure, namely, a 
resentful and menacing other.  
“Racial Imaginaries and (Neo) Liberal Sensibilities”, the third chapter, situates this 
core contradiction historically, providing a brief introduction to the history of racial 
imaginaries in Mexico and to their inseparability from a certain temporal imagination. I 
show how the figure of the Indian is at once projected to an outside, an incommensurable 
other holding back a progressive, forward looking nation, while at the same time it 
traverses social relations between mestizos. 
The fourth and fifth chapters take the discussion to the terrain of contemporary 
idioms of citizenship and new residents’ affective investment in these idioms. Titled 
“Clients of Slim” the fourth chapter explores how new residents navigate their position as 
citizens partaking of a national public project of rescue and as clients of Carlos Slim. 
Exploring their ambiguity vis-à-vis what they view as residues averting their 
contemporaneity with an imagined cosmopolitan present, namely a daily reality of illegal 
street vending, a labyrinthine bureaucracy and corporatist politics, I argue that while 
invested in a particular form of citizenship these new residents also remain fully 




In the fifth chapter, “The Rescue of Law,” I explore the expectations, hopes and 
desires that new residents place upon the rescue of law in the historic center, the promises 
that it holds for them and the threats that it poses to them. I analyze how locally situated 
understandings of law and legality intersect with broadly circulating discourses about 
“the rule of law” (el estado de derecho) and explore how the figure of the police appears 
as crucial for guaranteeing the rescue while at the same time locating new residents in the 
here and now. 
Finally, the last concluding chapter explores the mass post-election protests that 
took place in the summer of 2006 and paralyzed the historic center and the entire city for 
weeks. Looking at how new residents experienced these protests as residents of the 
historic center and as concerned citizens of the country I tie together the quotidian 
anxieties triggered by the urban masses in the center with broader concerns about 











To our neighbors and visitors, 
to all users in general: 
 
As you all know, the new pedestrian square 
was made with much effort for the enjoyment  
of all of us. 
 
To keep it clean is to respect the community and this institution. 
 
Don’t litter and don’t make this area dirty intentionally. 
 
If you catch anyone damaging this  




In February 2007 I encountered several copies of this notice hung next to each other 
in a formerly dark and derelict callejón (narrow street) at the southwestern edges of 
Mexico City’s historic center. Less than a year before, and under the sponsorship of 
Carlos Slim’s Foundation, this space had been transformed into a pedestrian square. With 
paving stones and brand-new street lamps the callejón now served as an extension of 
Culture Space, the cultural center also sponsored by the Foundation. It was near 
lunchtime when I arrived, and some kids returning from school were congregating in the 
square. A boy who appeared to be around ten years of age was boasting about his new 




poet and cultural promoter whom we met in the Introduction, was sitting alone at his bar 
located on the ground floor of the cultural center, at the corner with Regina Street. He 
was nervously glancing at the pieces of paper that displayed the urgent notice and at the 
people walking up and down the square, some stopping to read the message, others 
entirely oblivious to it.  
When I sat to join him, as I frequently did upon arriving at the bar, Pedro explained 
that he had written the notice in an attempt to communicate with the neighboring 
community and to raise awareness about the rapid deterioration of the callejón. He was 
uncertain, however, whether the tone of the notice was appropriate and how it would be 
received. Already for months Pedro had complained about women and children from 
nearby vecindades throwing trash in the callejón, which he took as evidence of their 
disrespect for the newly renovated space and attributed to poor education and little civic 
awareness. Lately, however, he had mentioned more worrying occurrences, most notably 
teenagers painting graffiti on the doors and walls of the cultural center and intentionally 
urinating at its entrance after dark, which he saw as an alarming indication of growing 
hostility against the space and its staff from the local community. 
Pedro’s notice was an amicable invitation to a community of users—“all of us,” 
neighbors and visitors—for whom the callejón had been renovated, requesting proper use 
of a common, public space. It asked everyone to partake in its preservation by practicing 
basic civic values, such as not littering or calling the police to report transgressions and 
damages to public property. Despite its amicable tone, however, the notice was fraught 
with anxiety and threat. It expressed Pedro’s growing concern over the square’s 




surmounted through physical renovation and through the new life that art had infused on 
it. The notice also hinted at the elusive nature of the menace and threatened with the force 
of law. In doing so, it destabilized the “all of us” to whom it was addressed and captured 
a move all too common for people like Pedro: a constant oscillation between proximity 
and distance with the lower class inhabitants of the historic center, an oscillation 
traversed by misrecognition.  
The notice partook of a pedagogical discourse underpinning the rescue, namely, to 
inculcate civility and respect for public space among the historic center’s inhabitants. 
While echoing longstanding tropes of modernization the notice’s pedagogical message 
also expressed contemporary concerns about individuals taking responsibility for their 
own actions. At the same time, it expressed doubt about the viability of the rescue’s 
pedagogical mission. In other words, the notice was an inclusive and welcoming address, 
referring to an open space renovated for the enjoyment of all, where darkness had been 
replaced with light and where kids played and artists experimented. And yet, its civility 
was punctured by anxiety. It gestured towards commonality and recognition between “all 
of us” while at the same time raising doubts about the very possibility of this 
commonality.  
This chapter examines the predicaments of people like Pedro, young, emerging 
artists living and working in the southwestern edges of the historic center. Through a 
detailed analysis of their perceptions and experiences of the area and their interactions 
with the center’s old inhabitants, and tracing how these perceptions and interactions 
changed over the course of my fieldwork, I explore how new residents navigate their own 




where recognition slides into threat, I argue that a double sense of misrecognition 
transpires in everyday interactions on the street, at the corner store or at the cultural 
center. On the one hand, new residents seem unable to properly locate the old inhabitants 
of the area, who slip from the position of neighbors—people with whom they aim to 
engage in new forms of sociability—to the position of menacing others, a dangerous and 
ultimately irredeemable group. On the other hand, those very same artists fear being 
mistaken as affluent or as too close to Carlos Slim, and thereby becoming targets of crime 
and class resentment.  
A “Rich and Intense Lifestyle” in the Historic Center 
Culture Space was part of a plan to transform a run-down area in the southwestern 
edges of the historic center into a hub for artists, where they could find spaces to live, 
work and exhibit. The executive committee of the rescue had divided the area to be 
renovated into several different corridors, each with a distinctive characteristic. Citing the 
presence of prominent cultural spaces where students, intellectuals and artists convened, 
this committee designated a section of approximately twenty blocks in the southwest, an 
area with high rates of criminality as a cultural corridor.1 But as I mentioned in the 
                                                 
1 The cultural corridor was delimited by the Eje Central Lazaro Cárdenas to the west, Mesones street to the 
north, 5 de Febrero street to the east and Izazaga avenue to the south. The plan to introduce art and culture 
as tools for the revitalization of the historic center’s southwest was first conceived by a group of urban 
planners, architects and sociologists in the “Partial Program for the Urban Development of the Historic 
Center,” a document they produced for Mexico City’s government in the year 2000. The aim of this Partial 
Program was to provide an overview of the area’s socio-economic profile, to identify its most pressing 
problems and to offer a general guideline for future urban planning. Accordingly, the Partial Program 
defined the population of the historic center’s southwest as “lower-middle class families”, and identified a 
trend of growing physical and social decay in the area, evidenced by the poor condition of many of its 
buildings, the presence of criminal activities and the high levels of pollution. At the same time, it 
acknowledged a potential for “the rescue of public space” to counter such decline, considering that the area 
featured three important colonial public plazas as well as a private university that offered cultural 




Introduction, the rescue was not a coherent plan, much less a set of social or cultural 
policies (such as promoting mixed income housing or multiclass sociability). In fact, after 
Slim had acquired and renovated several buildings in this area, some for residential and 
others for commercial use, the local administration decided not to expand the physical 
renovation of streets and facades to the center’s southwest. The public/private 
collaboration continued, especially in regards to extending the security apparatus to this 
area, or to granting substantial tax breaks to Slim and other private entrepreneurs. But the 
creation of a cultural corridor was left in the hands of the Foundation alone and, very 
importantly, to their own resources and priorities. As we shall see, this absence of state 
policies (and of programs softening the impact of rescue) had important repercussions on 
the local sociability of the center’s southwest and on the conflicts and tensions that 
ensued there. 
The task of creating a cultural corridor fell on a young relative of Mr. Slim, an 
enthusiastic man in his late twenties trained as both engineer and art historian. Towards 
the end of 2003 he began working on creating the conditions for attracting creators, art 
students, cultural promoters and young professionals to live and work in this area. 
According to the Foundation’s website, the goal was to “create a rich and intense 
lifestyle” in the historic center.  This is how this executive described his vision in an 
interview conducted in March 2006:  
All the elements were here in the cultural corridor. (…) The buildings were there, 
                                                                                                                                                 
neighborhood’s social fabric” the document proposed the creation of a “cultural corridor” along the axis 
created by the three plazas, which would include a comprehensive renovation and the permanent 
organization of cultural and entertainment activities. (2000). Decreto por el que se aprueba el Programa 
Parcial de Desarrollo Urbano del Centro Histórico del Programa Delegacional de Desarrollo Urbano para la 





the institutions, the spaces. Then I came up with the idea of generating a hub 
where people or artists or creators could find a place to live, produce, exhibit and 
sell, and that things could happen in this hub. (…) You have a hotel, you 
transform this hotel into residencies, these residencies cause people to come live 
here, and because they live here, they come into contact with each other, and 
because they come into contact, they generate new projects, and the Historic 
Center Foundation welcomes these new projects and gives them an outlet. So it is 
magnificent, because the musician guy who wants a place to play comes 
downstairs and meets with the guy in the lobby, and it turns out that the lobby guy 
presents videos, and so on Friday the musician is going to play with some video 
projections (Interview with author March 14, 2006). 
Overlooking the complicated economic and social conditions that prevailed in this 
area, and especially the fact that a lot of people already lived there, this executive 
recruited creators, promoters and other people involved in Mexico City’s arts and culture 
scenes to conceive and implement art projects. Bernardo, a self-described performance 
artist in his early thirties proved to be ideal for this task. He was very familiar with the 
historic center. During the early nineties he had attended a liberal arts university in the 
vicinity and had been actively involved in a series of independent art projects in the 
center through which he had become interested in performance. He enjoyed cultivating 
an image of transgression. I often heard him tell stories about his youthful wanderings in 
the toughest corners of the center, expressing a fascination for its aesthetic of decay and 
what he called its bizarre characters and sordid places, where he claimed to have found 
constant inspiration for his performances.  
Bernardo had built a good reputation as a producer of cultural events as well as 
extensive networks in the art world, and when he was invited to collaborate in the 
Foundation’s cultural project, he jumped at what he saw as a great opportunity. He was 
offered freedom to design and implement his own artistic projects, for which he could use 




free housing in a loft-style apartment in a recently renovated building in exchange for 
bringing other artists or art promoters to move to the Foundation’s renovated buildings, 
from student residencies to one and two-bedroom apartments. “Imagine, he said when 
telling me this story, they let me live there for free and give me carte blanche to bring my 
friends to live there as well!”2  
The vision and resources made available by the Foundation attracted a 
heterogeneous group of artists to work and live in the area. For the most part, and 
especially during the first stages of the project, it proved appealing to young, emerging 
artists and students with little financial resources and no access to state grants and who 
were excluded from the well established and hermetic art circuits in the city. But despite 
devastating criticisms from respected art critics, who dismissed the Foundation’s project 
as a business venture, it attracted people with well-established trajectories and good 
connections. With all its flaws and limitations, the Foundation and, crucially, the fact that 
it was an initiative of Carlos Slim, the richest entrepreneur in the country with countless 
resources and immense power, seemed to offer an alternative to the fast disappearing 
state support for the arts.3  
                                                 
2 With the collaboration of Bernardo and other artists the Foundation sponsored a number of massive and 
highly visible public art projects in the area since the end of 2002, some of which received significant 
media publicity and attracted thousands of spectators, if not praise from established art critics. Among the 
most visible projects were “The takeover of El Señorial” in February 2004, a series of artistic interventions 
that targeted an old hotel later transformed into student residencies and “From Here and There: The 
takeover of Vizcaínas” in August of the same year, which consisted of interventions by various artists in 
the Vizcaínas plaza and in the ex-convent of the same name. The Foundation also produced several 
“collective circuits” throughout 2005 and 2006: 24-hour events during which several cultural spaces were 
activated to attract new visitors to walk along the cultural corridor. See: Ibarra, M., Ed. (2006). Centro. 
Zona Sur: Gente, Calles y Arte. México, D.F., Fundación del Centro Histórico, Mantarraya Ediciones.  
 
3 For a discussion about the changing relation between the state and the arts in Mexico see: Medina, C. 
(2002). Mutual Abuse. Mexico City: An Exhibition about the Exchange Rates of Bodies and Values. K. 





But the Foundation’s corporate, profit-oriented logic of developing the area, renting 
spaces and seeing results converged with the artist’s needs and desires in other ways as 
well. People like Pedro, Bernardo and others were not only attracted by institutional and 
financial resources, spaces to live, work or exhibit and the possibility of being in a 
community of creators, they were also lured by the urban imaginaries that I discussed in 
the introduction. Indeed, the role of young emerging artists as the “urban pioneers” of 
gentrification has been widely documented (Deutsche 1988; Smith 1996; Smith 2002). 
With their higher mobility, limited financial resources and aesthetic interest in the urban 
landscape, artists have been crucial protagonists of gentrification. As I mentioned in the 
Introduction, allusions to cities like New York and Barcelona, and to gentrification 
projects there, were recurrent. Take for example a party in the roof of a gallery promoting 
the work of young curators and conceptual artists, one block south of Regina Street. A 
common acquaintance introduced me to the curator in residence as an anthropologist 
studying in New York and doing research about the rescue. He gave a most welcoming 
smile and said, as the preamble to a long conversation that followed, that his party that 
night “was a little piece of New York.”  
Together with the circulation of such international references among people 
involved in the rescue, there were other very forceful imaginaries of the historic center at 
play. In a recent and greatly suggestive article Hansen and Verkaaik have argued that 
“some urban spaces are so heavily mythologized and enframed through circulating 
images and narratives that they suffuse, if not overdetermine, any empirical or sensory 
experience” (2009: 6). The historic center is such an overdetermined space. People like 




strange, the chaotic and the excessive and thus containing innumerable possibilities for 
sensuous pleasure and for artistic creation. But such fascination was inseparable from 
another imaginary of the same place as frightening and threatening. Let us recall that, as 
thousands had moved out of the historic center after the earthquake of 1985, and as street 
commerce had multiplied, political demonstrations had become daily affairs and criminal 
rates had skyrocketed, the historic center had become a no-go area for vast segments of 
the middle classes, who came to associate it with unpleasant crowds, disorder, pollution, 
dirtiness, noise, illegality and crime. These two imaginaries were, as it were, two sides of 
the same coin. It was precisely the chaotic nature of the historic center that made it a 
particularly alluring and threatening space for the artists with whom I worked.  
Moreover, the artists’ simultaneous fascination and disgust with the particular 
eventfulness of the historic center was entangled with their aforementioned cosmopolitan 
imaginaries and desires in particular ways. As art critic Cuauhtémoc Medina has noted 
since their triumphant irruption in the international and cosmopolitan art scene in the 
early1990s, Mexican contemporary artists have engaged in new ways of consuming their 
environment, namely the social, economic and political realities of Mexico in general and 
Mexico City in particular. But their engagement with underground cultures, inequality 
and urban violence has not been a form of social denouncement. Rather, argues Medina, 
artists have “wagered to extract from [such “underdevelopment]” some form of residual 
charm.” Through a cynically detached and depoliticized engagement with the world 
around them, artists have manifested a new cosmopolitan sensibility: their refinement as 
“modernized” and the display of a sublimated bad taste. In other words, the “relative 




Mexico’s neo-liberal transformation has opened up a wide range of critical and cynical 
possibilities: 
If the neo-liberal agents of globalization describe a country’s lack of economic, 
tax or labor regulations as investment incentives, why should we be surprised that 
artists broach topics such as the conditions of inequality, cultural clashes, 
merciless modernization, and social paradox in their environment as sources of 
refinement, which allow them to participate in the games of contemporary art? 
(Medina 2002: 41) 
The artists living and working in the cultural corridor among whom I conducted my 
fieldwork navigated the different logics and imaginaries that inform and traverse the 
rescue, which rendered their location in the historic center ambiguous. Nowhere was this 
ambiguity more forcefully experienced than “on the ground,” in the complex realities that 
they encountered in their everyday lives, and especially vis-à-vis the old residents 
inhabiting the area. 
“The Situation” 
A tall man of robust constitution and a child-like face covered by a copious beard, 
Pedro had a solemn and taciturn demeanor that often put people off when they first met 
him. For those who knew him better he was affable and funny and an exceptional 
storyteller who regularly seemed preoccupied or deeply absorbed in his own thoughts. He 
grew up in a highly educated upper-middle class household in the northern periphery of 
the city. A series of misfortunes in the 1980s compromised the socioeconomic status of 
his family, and he was forced to take odd jobs in order to put himself through college, the 
same liberal arts university attended by Bernardo. Before joining the staff of Culture 
Space in early 2005, he made a living by writing book and art reviews for cultural 




effort into opening a bar on the ground floor of the cultural center, after receiving a 
subsidized rent deal for the premises from the Foundation.  
Pedro’s bar opened its doors in the fall of 2005, at the same time as Culture Space, 
and it soon became the unofficial hang out place for its staff and the site of many of its 
activities. For all these reasons, Pedro was not only highly invested in the rescue, but he 
also had a unique perspective as both cultural promoter and small entrepreneur. 
Moreover, the corner location of his bar, and especially its layout, which featured four 
wide and always-open roll-up doors offered him a privileged vantage point from which to 
observe the comings and goings of the street, to receive all sorts of gossip and rumors, 
and to witness the gradual but dramatic changes brought about by rescue. 
When I started frequenting the area in early 2006—one year before Pedro placed 
his URGENT NOTICE in the renovated callejón—Regina was a nondescript, relatively 
quiet and predominantly residential street. With little pedestrian or vehicular traffic, it 
contrasted greatly with the hustle and bustle of most surrounding streets, characterized by 
intense street-vending activities, masses of people on the move and constant traffic jams. 
Regina’s architecture juxtaposed disparate styles, periods and origins, and with the 
exception of a seventeenth century church and its adjacent convent, fine examples of the 
baroque style, it lacked significant landmark constructions. Most buildings had been 
erected in the late 1800s and the first decades of the twentieth century. There were 
several large two or three-story houses originally built for single families, some made of 
tezontle, the reddish purple volcanic rock of coarse texture widely used in colonial 
constructions. There were also some examples of modernist architecture—five or six 




middle classes. Almost all of these buildings had followed a pattern of deterioration and 
substitution of tenants. As their more prosperous inhabitants had moved out, especially 
during the second half of the twentieth century, they had become vecindades, low quality 
housing for the lower classes.  
Like most of the historic center, with the exception of its more affluent and 
monumental core a few blocks north, this street looked old and neglected. Its nearly 
treeless sidewalks were worn out and its buildings appeared in bad shape, some with 
minor cracks or faded painting and others about to fall apart. For the most part these 
buildings combined housing on the upper floors with commercial uses on the ground 
floors, mostly small businesses such as crammed grocery stores, a shoe-repair, a 
barbershop, a tailor and a butcher that catered to the local population. There were also 
various fondas—cheap restaurants serving lunch to nearby office workers and 
bureaucrats—as well as several machine repair workshops. The narrow street that 
connected Regina with the next street to the north, and which some months later would 
become the pedestrian square where Pedro placed his URGENT NOTICE, highlighted 
the impression of abandonment. It was the neighborhood’s dumping ground, as many 
people threw their trash at one of its corners, where it could remain uncollected for days. 
Local drunkards were its frequent inhabitants and it was also the site of the area’s small-
scale drug dealing operations. In such context, Culture Space, as well as the two 
residential buildings near the east side end of Regina that had recently been renovated, 
with their neatly painted facades and restored doors, windows and ledges, visibly stood 





Figure 3. Detail of Regina Street with renovated building on the left and vecindad on the right. Photograph 
by author. 
During one of my first encounters with Pedro in February 2006, he asserted his 
knowledge of the street to me, the recently arrived anthropologist interested in crime and 
security in the context of rescue. He gave me a lengthy description of the “situation”, as 
he called it, while we stood below one of the open roll-up doors of his bar facing the 
street, partially inside and partially on the sidewalk. Pedro spoke at length of “the twenty-
seven,” a dilapidated, two-story building located near the western corner of the block, 
which he described as the most aggressive vecindad in the area and as the center of 
operations of the local drug dealers, a group of guys in their teens and early twenties.  




never to arrive to the cultural center from that direction, as they were particularly 
aggressive towards women. He mentioned a couple of incidents of theft as well as violent 
attacks on the visitors of the cultural center and, especially, on residents of the few 
renovated buildings nearby, but these occurrences were diminishing (I paraphrase from 
my fieldnotes): 
These guys haven’t made a formal presentation, they haven’t revealed their 
identities, they don’t approach [my bar] or Culture Space, but I think that they 
have done us an initiation rite without our noticing, I think they have accepted us 
as part of the street.  
Pedro believed that such acceptance was related to the increasing police presence in 
the area. “They surely dislike having so much surveillance in the street,” he said. But he 
also expressed doubts about the efficacy of the policemen guarding Culture Space and the 
renovated buildings property of Slim, which as we will see letter, occupy an ambiguous 
position between public police and private security. “They might be young and 
handsome, the policemen hired by [Slim], but they lack the tools to handle this situation,” 
Pedro asserted. Together with his references to the police, he insisted that the guys from 
the twenty-seven were getting used to the new comers: “I think they identify us (nos 
ubican),” he said, “and so they don’t do anything to us.” 
 According to Pedro negotiating with the neighbors was key to becoming accepted 
as part of the street. As the owner of the bar he made an effort to be respectful towards 
them, keeping the music’s volume down and closing the roll-up curtains if events or 
parties were getting exceedingly loud or continuing until the small hours and he happily 
reported that some neighbors were entering his business. He wanted acceptance and 




would redeem the historic center and its inhabitants. In his opinion, the opening of 
cultural spaces would not solve the problems of the street, the lack of opportunities and 
the social resentment. He continued: 
The reality is that the center is changing. The Oxxos and seven eleven’s will 
proliferate. Starbucks will be opened in the area, rents will increase and the 
people that live there will have to move to the periphery. We are a very interesting 
phenomenon for anthropologists. 
It is, of course, after an extended period of fieldwork and after the area has indeed 
changed dramatically,4 that Pedro’s remarks that afternoon about the dangers and 
complexities of living and working in the historic center attain a particular significance. 
They touch upon a number of issues that I encountered over and over throughout my 
fieldwork. To begin with, Pedro’s words expressed anxiety about the always-present 
possibility of being attacked. Such anticipation of danger, and more precisely of theft or 
assault is, to be sure, part of life in a megalopolis like Mexico City and not particular to 
the historic center, although the latter, particularly its vecindades, is commonly associated 
with violent crime.5 But in this particular case the anticipation of danger was not 
predicated upon anonymity and chance encounter. On the contrary, it was linked to 
sporadic violent occurrences, from street muggings to aggressive trespasses into 
renovated apartment buildings, carried out by people who lived on the same street.6 So 
                                                 
4 In the Fall of 2008 the Autoridad del Centro Histórico (See Introduction, footnote five) converted Regina 
in its entirety into a pedestrian street, consolidating the “cultural corridor” project. 
 
5 For an analyzes the figure of the cortico (a tenement house similar to the vecindad) in imaginaries of fear 
in Sao Paulo, Brazil see: Caldeira, T. P. d. R. (2000). City of walls: crime, segregation, and citizenship in 
São Paulo. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
 
6 Here I conceptualize threat as always predicated on the latent possibility of violence and, as such, as 
inhabiting a temporality of anticipation. As opposed to uneventful urban contexts, such as those discussed 
by in Brian Massumi’s edited volume (the United States) as well as by Marilyn Ivy (Japan), Mexico City’s 




while in the city at large people navigate symbolic geographies that assign danger to 
generic places or characters that do not necessarily correspond to concrete physical 
locations, the source of danger was spatially locatable for Pedro. It came from “ the 
twenty-seven.” And yet it was unknowable.7  “They haven’t revealed their identities,” he 
said, implying that he couldn’t know who they were or what were their intentions. While 
he thought and hoped that he had been accepted as part of the street, he could not be sure. 
If there had been indeed an initiation rite, it had eluded his powers of observation.  
But Pedro’s explanation of “the situation” suggested that there was something more 
to his feeling of vulnerability. While he could not know “them,” the opposite was not 
true. Nos ubican, he said, which can be translated as both “they locate us” or “they 
identify us” and “they don’t do anything to us.” This statement, however, signaled the 
possibility that the opposite might be the case: because they locate us, they could (and 
maybe would) do something to us. In other words, Pedro’s anxiety stemmed from feeling 
observed by an unlocatable “them” and not being able to know (much less to control) 
what they saw or projected onto him.  
The “they” in question was a rather slippery pronoun. It referred to the tough guys 
that Pedro described as hostile, dangerous and, at the end of the day, criminal – involved 
in robberies, assaults and drug dealing operations. As such “they” seemed to stand apart 
                                                                                                                                                 
poverty) is widespread. In this context threat emerges from the disavowal of violence and, at the same time, 
from the impossibility of this disavowal. In other words, threat signals to the inescapability of urban 
violence and to people’s own embededness in it. Massumi, B. (1993). The Politics of everyday fear. 
Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis Press, Ivy, M. (1996). "Tracking the Mystery Man with the 21 
Faces." Critical Inquiry 23: 11-36, Masco, J. (2008). ""Survival is your Business:" Engineering Affect and 
Ruins in Nuclear America." Cultural Anthropology 23(2): 361-398, Kernaghan, R. (2009). Coca's gone: of 
might and right in the Huallaga post-boom. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. 
 
7 For a discussion of urban geographies of fear see: Reguillo, R. (2004). "The Oracle in the City: Beliefs, 





from another crucial figure in Pedro’s ruminations: “the neighbors” (los vecinos). These 
were people with whom he could talk and negotiate, people whom he would welcome in 
his bar and who would participate in Culture Space’s activities. But in fact, as will 
become clearer in the course of this chapter, the distinction between the friendly neighbor 
and the menacing other turned out to be rather porous and unstable for him. The “tough 
guys” were not mere strangers but were actually an integral part of the neighborhood’s 
social fabric. They had mothers and fathers and siblings and friends, some of whom 
might very well have been involved in Culture Space’s activities. The neighbor, then, 
kept sliding into the dangerous, criminal other, and vice versa. This oscillation seemed to 
heighten Pedro’s sense of out of placeness and vulnerability. 
Before I proceed further, a few words about my use of the tern “neighbor” are in 
order. The term “neighbor” designates a special relation and a particular form of 
sociability. The neighbor is someone who is near and far; someone who lives next door 
and whom one doesn’t know. Being a good neighbor entails engaging in certain forms of 
intimacy while respecting certain rules of civility. But it is also a potentially fraught 
relation. As Kenneth Reinhardt has written, the figure of the neighbor “materializes the 
uncertain division between the friend/family/self and the enemy/stranger/other” (Zizek, 
Santner et al. 2005: 18). The artists and cultural promoters who worked in Culture Space 
used the term the neighbors (los vecinos) in reference to the old inhabitants of the historic 
center, collapsing together a heterogeneous group of people into a more or less 
homogeneous, more or less cohesive lower class “community”, as I will explain in more 
detail below. As such, the ambivalent figure of the neighbor captured new residents’ 




this form of sociability. 
What I’m suggesting in my reading of my conversation with Pedro is that he 
expressed a double anxiety over misrecognition. First, his words conveyed an anxiety of 
not being able to properly locate the other in its doubled appearance as neighbor and 
criminal type, which turned out to be a rather slippery distinction.  
Who was at home in the historic center? Who was a neighbor? Who was a 
menacing and resentful other? How was Pedro to know the difference? This anxiety can 
be traced back to a long history of elite and middle class fears of the popular classes in 
Mexico, crystallized in the context of Mexico City, and at different historical moments, in 
iconic figures such as “the Indian” “the lépero”, or “the pelado”, all alluding to the urban 
poor.8 These figures have been at once the target of multiple reform efforts and the sites 
in which both the elites and the middle classes have elaborated of their own social 
identities, as I will discuss in the next chapter.   
But the manner in which Pedro talked about the inhabitants of Regina and the 
callejón and the dangers that he faced suggested that the gaze of this elusive other 
triggered in him a different anxiety: the possibility of his—the artist—being 
misrecognized by “them,” which made him feel more vulnerable to attack. This 
preoccupation resonates with the ambiguous location of the bohemian/artist within urban 
modernity.  While the artist constitutes his identity in opposition to bourgeois values and 
                                                 
8 For discussions of these figures at different historical moments see: Viqueira Albán, J. P. (1987). 
Relajados o reprimidos? Diversiones públicas y vida social en la Ciudad de México durante el Siglo de las 
Luces. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Piccato, P. (2001). City of suspects: crime in Mexico City, 
1900-1931. Durham N.C., Duke University Press, Prieto Hernández, A. M. (2001). Acerca de la 
pendenciera e indisciplinada vida de los léperos capitalinos. México, D.F., Consejo Nacional para la 





sensibilities, celebrating his autonomy and l’art pour l’art, he is at the same time deeply 
embedded in the logic of the market. As Susan Buck-Mors has argued in her reading of 
Benjamin’s Arcades Project, the bohemian/artist has historically sustained an ambivalent 
relation to the masses of the poor in the modern city. The poor are a figure of fascination 
and disavowal for the bohemian/artist, of fleeting solidarity but, ultimately, of social 
distance (Buck-Morss 1986). Pedro’s anxiety over misrecognition, then, must be 
understood both in relation to the position of the artist and in relation to his ambiguous 
location within Mexico’s class and socio-ethnic hierarchies, including   the discourses 
and practices of rescue.  
Standing Out 
Concerns about danger and especially about the subtle hostility and resentment of 
the historic center’s inhabitants, such as those expressed by Pedro, surfaced quite often 
when people who were involved—either by working at the cultural center or by living in 
renovated buildings—talked about the urban renovation project. In fact, I was repeatedly 
told that the Foundation created Culture Space in response to such hostility and in an 
effort to heal a hostile and violent neighborhood.  That is how Bernardo, the performance 
artist that I mentioned above, described its mission when I first met him in January 2006. 
And he added in a tone of complicity, as if making a most intimate confession, that when 
he was working on conceptualizing the project and the space he had serious doubts 
whether such an endeavor was a good idea at all. “I remember telling a friend, he said, 
that I feared that they would kill me,” and he narrated a couple of` stories of intimidating 




I’m going to tell you the truth, there are guys who have been assaulted and have 
left immediately, or they just have been intimidated and they leave. Living in the 
Center is a matter of attitude, you cannot pretend that you are at la condechi,9 I 
mean if you bring three Argentinean women and make a lot of noise on the street, 
you’re calling attention upon yourself and you’re not respecting the territory. (…) 
Or they walk in fear, and of course they are assaulted. (…) Robberies are not 
violent; they’re to intimidate. My neighbor was robbed outside our building; he 
was told: “let’s see güerito10 give me your jacket”. Another arrives home with his 
laptop and they tell him something like: “Where are you from, [this renovated 
building] or [that renovated building]? Don’t even say a word because we’re 
protected by the police, and we’ll be watching you güerito”. He left the next day.  
Bernardo’s retelling of these incidents echoes Pedro’s concern over being observed. 
His words suggest that in Regina one cannot hide. Just like the buildings that one 
inhabits, one stands out. Indeed, the trope of “standing out” repeatedly figured in stories 
as well as in conversations that I witnessed throughout my fieldwork, and it appeared as 
ambivalently desired. After all, the artist’s lifestyle entails a certain aestheticization of the 
self, a certain being seen or “standing out.” Precisely the opposite of going unnoticed. 
But for Pedro and Bernardo “standing out” slipped into insecurity and vulnerability. A 
very common statement was that one stands out because one has arrived to a barrio11 
where everyone knows each other and is suspicious of newcomers. But references to 
“standing out” also suggested that there was more to it than being new. Bernardo seemed 
to be saying that the people in his stories were a particular type of newcomer. The man 
walking down the street with “three Argentinean women” brought unwarranted attention 
                                                 
9 A neighborhood in Mexico City that was “gentrified” throughout the 1990s. Featuring a variety of cultural 
venues, consumption venues and an intense nightlife, it is a privileged area for young professionals, artists, 
and intellectuals. 
 
10 A term with both racial and class connotations, it designates people with fair skin and middle-class 
demeanor. In the following chapter I will engage in an extensive discussion of how this term saturates daily 
social interactions in Mexico City. 
 
11 A term with multiple associations often used to refer to rough neighborhoods, where people have a sense 





upon himself. But so did others just by the way they walked or by their appearance, 
which made them vulnerable to attack. 
A complicated image of “public space” emerges from the trope of “standing out.” 
Bernardo’s anecdotes suggest that one cannot disappear into the urban landscape and 
preserve the anonymity that the historic center supposedly offers. One cannot get lost in 
the crowd, without betraying a certain social identity. In other words, the historic center 
appears in Bernardo’s rendition less as a space of anonymity and chance encounter, the 
commonly accepted understanding of “public space,” than a barrio, where social 
relations are based on intimate knowledge. This reverberates with Pedro’s view that 
threat in Regina is neither anonymous nor abstract. In other words, the misrecognitions in 
Regina happen within a particular type of social relation, that of neighborliness, which 
combines intimacy and anonymity, nearness and remoteness. The trope of standing out 
then throws into question the very idea of anonymity that runs through the literature on 
public space (as I discussed in the introduction). For it locates new residents within a 
dense web of spatial and social relations where one can never be entirely “anonymous.”  
Stranger sociability—that particular form of being in common enabled by mass 
mediation—is not only central to the Habermasian public sphere, but also to the imagined 
community of the nation. As Povinelli and Gaonkar write (following Benjamin Lee and 
Michael Warner), the reading practices implicit in the semiotic forms of specific printed 
texts, such as novels and newspapers, “make it possible for persons to imagine and 
recognize themselves as constituting a non-copresent body of people/citizens of a modern 
nation—as strangers who are no longer strange, exotic, or unexpected” (Povinelli and 




availability and circulation of particular textual forms but, quite crucially, on the 
domestication of the stranger or, more precisely, of the difference that he entails.  
In a footnote to “Publics and Counterpublics’ (2002) Michael Warner rebukes 
Simmel’s understanding of the stranger in his famous 1908 essay because, according to 
Warner, “he fails to distinguish between the stranger as represented by the trader or the 
Wandering Jew and the stranger whose presence in modernity is unremarkable, even 
necessary, to the nature of modern polities” (fn, p. 56). But what Simmel’s essay suggests 
is precisely that the distinction between the unremarkable stranger (in whom I can 
recognize traces of myself) and the unexpected, mysterious and, ultimately, menacing 
stranger is never definite and unambiguous.  
To be sure, Simmel posits the sociological form of “the stranger” as designating a 
positive relation, that is a “form of being together, a form of union based on interaction” 
(Simmel 1971: p. 143). What characterizes this relation is the simultaneous nearness and 
remoteness of the stranger:   
[He] is close to us insofar as we feel between him and ourselves similarities of 
nationality or social position, of occupation or of general human nature. He is far 
from us insofar as these similarities extend beyond him and us, they connect us 
only because they connect a great many people (p. 147).  
The difference of the stranger is thus disavowed in the “great many people” with 
whom we share our commonalities. In other words, “strangeness” designates precisely 
these general commonalities that enable interaction and being together. The stranger 
appears unremarkable in this rendition, as in the “imagined community” of the nation.  
But earlier in the essay Simmel hints at another trait of the stranger, his difference not 




and at the same time he comes from elsewhere: “The stranger is the potential wanderer, 
so to speak, who, although he has gone no further, has not quite got over the freedom of 
coming and going.” (143) The stranger, in other words, cannot be permanently fixed 
either spatially or socially. Precisely as the trader or the Wandering Jew, he is 
unlocatable. The differences that he entails can thus be menacing.  
What I want to suggest is that the figure of the stranger as discussed by Simmel 
bears close resemblances to the figure of the neighbor that appears in Pedro’s 
ruminations. As we will see below, it is precisely in the tension of the stranger that I 
locate Pedro and Bernardo’s anxiety over “standing out” and, inseparable from this 
anxiety, the slippage from neighbor to menacing other in quotidian interaction. Let me 
elaborate on this point by further exploring how new residents construed and experienced 
the figure of the neighbor and how it continuously slipped into the figure of a menacing 
other. 
Healing the Neighborhood through Art 
Robberies and violent events such as those mentioned by Pedro and Bernardo were, 
to be sure, few and sporadic. What people like Eduardo, a visual artist in his late twenties 
who moved into the first renovated building on Regina in the early stages of the rescue, 
talked about was a general atmosphere of aggression, hostile looks, occasional 
murmurings as he walked down the street, which was for him intensified by a general 
state of decay, uncollected trash, lack of street lighting at night. However, constantly re-
narrated, the violent incidents had acquired quasi-mythical dimensions among those 




historic center and its inhabitants.12 Thus Bernardo and other artists received the task of 
conceptualizing a cultural space that would mitigate the impact of the renovation while at 
the same time bringing together two different publics: the “neighbors” of the historic 
center and the artistic elites. The strategy, as Bernardo explained during our 
aforementioned first interview, was to offer a variety of arts and crafts workshops 
primarily targeting local children, because, he said, “once you win the children the 
families will follow,” while simultaneously supporting experimental art projects and 
exhibitions.  
To carry out the goal of attracting multiple and heterogeneous publics, Bernardo 
brought together a collection of disparate people with a wide variety of interests and 
stakes in the project. Among many others there was Lucas, a disheveled and permanently 
broke visual artist and engraver who for years had run an independent art collective in a 
nearby semi-abandoned building that once belonged to his late grandfather and was the 
object of a fierce legal battle. He ran a variety of arts and crafts workshops for local 
children. There was also Omar, a stylish actor and theater director and an old friend and 
colleague of Bernardo who had moved to a renovated building across the street from the 
cultural center. He organized a wide range of activities, from drama workshops to 
alternative fashion shows. From a very different background, there was Sebastián, a 
conceptual video-artist and curator in his late 30’s with a well-established trajectory and 
reputation in Mexico City’s contemporary art scene. Severely criticized by friends and 
colleagues in the art world for both joining a project with an ill reputation and for selling-
                                                 
12 For a discussion of crime stories and their effects on how people inhabit the city see: Caldeira, T. P. d. R. 






out to Carlos Slim, he had decided to take the risk. He curated art installation projects, 
ran an international artist in-residence-program and hosted acoustic improvisation gigs. 
Pedro, for his part, was interested in organizing book and poetry readings as well in 
taking poetry to the streets. The space itself was informal and disorganized, with a variety 
of adults and children entering and leaving throughout the day, always under the gaze of 
a police officer permanently standing at the entrance, and multiple disparate activities 
taking place simultaneously: a yoga class in one room, a talk by a transdisciplinary artist 
in the next.  
From the start there were multiple conflicts between these people, arising from 
contrasting aesthetic sensibilities as well as from competition over funding. Yet the most 
contentious issue, which was constantly discussed in staff meetings and one-to-one 
conversations, was how to work with the neighbors or the community. Some found the 
cultural center’s eclecticism appealing—Omar called it a vecindad for the arts where 
everyone could do their own work. Others, like Sebastián wanted to position Culture 
Space in the city’s contemporary art circuit and dismissed as naïve the idea that culture 
would redeem the neighborhood. This issue gave rise to a cacophony of voices, often 
talking past each other: 
We should offer more workshops?   
I feel like a Franciscan monk, doing the work for the colonizers. 
The activities should cost something, even if it is only a symbolic amount, 
otherwise the neighbors won’t appreciate them. 
 They should cancel the workshops. 
The workshops should be free and open to all. 





The neighbors will associate us with a paternalistic state. 
The neighbors are opening up. 
 There should be more clarity about the mission of [Culture Space]. I cannot 
invite serious artists to exhibit here. There are kids doing macramé! This is an 
embarrassment. 
The neighbors are angry. They feel invaded. 
 We have to understand that these are very different worlds. It is very difficult to 
bring them together. There’s mutual distrust. 
There was something that seemed to go without saying in such cacophony: the 
“neighbors” appeared to be a homogeneous group of people, who knew each other and 
were hermetic, hostile and aggressive to strangers, were generally poor and uneducated 
and lacked opportunities. But the inhabitants of Regina and the callejón were a collection 
of people of disparate social classes and backgrounds. According to census statistics the 
residents of Regina and surrounding streets were “lower middle class families,” which is 
a generally accurate if necessarily incomplete description (2000). The area was inhabited 
by a wide variety of people. There were families who owned small businesses in the area, 
such as cheap restaurants, small convenience stores, or shoe repair workshops. There 
were truck drivers, construction workers, cleaning ladies, food market sellers, 
seamstresses. There were many engaged in informal street activities, especially food 
selling. For example, there was a family that sold quesadillas every evening in a street-
stand; others sold tropical juices every morning; a man who had recently lost his job as a 
janitor now sold corn nearby. Most local kids attended public schools in the vicinity and 
many dropped out after secondary school.  




could be roughly mapped onto a hierarchy between buildings. The clearest distinction 
was drawn between vecindades with clear legal status, renovated during the program that 
followed the 1985 earthquake and that had granted ownership to those who could prove 
long time residency, and other buildings, crumbling and partly squatted, that lacked 
judicial certainty and had not been renovated in decades.13 This distinction mapped onto 
another one, drawn between long time residents nostalgic for the long gone respectability 
of the neighborhood and relatively recent migrants. There was also a marked distinction 
between Regina and the callejón, whose inhabitants, together with those of “the twenty 
seven,” occupied the lowest status in the neighborhood’s hierarchy. Moreover, the area 
lacked cohesion or robust neighbors’ organizations and was far from being a 
“community”, in contrast to other neighborhoods to the east with strong local identities.14  
This heterogeneity of the neighborhood, moreover, was expressed in how different 
people reacted to the rescue and to Culture Space. Some appreciated the new lighting, 
police presence and cultural activities organized by Culture Space and established 
amicable relations with the artists and cultural promoters working there.  Others were 
skeptical about the renovated buildings and its occupants, and emphasized their own 
                                                 
13 The earthquake that shook Mexico City in 1985 causing significant damage and destruction in the 
Historic Center affected many vecindades, including those on Regina and the callejón, which were at that 
point severely run-down and overcrowded. Many of them were reconstructed through the Popular Housing 
Renovation Program, a major relief effort launched in the wake of the catastrophe and partly in response to 
massive demonstrations. The state expropriated and rebuilt hundreds of buildings in the historic center, 
giving ownership to those who could document previous occupancy. In this way, many residents changed 
from inhabitants of rudimentary vecindades to proud condominium owners of newly renovated housing. 
See: (1987). La reconstrucción de vivienda en el centro histórico de la ciudad de México después de los 
sismos de septiembre de 1985/ Renovación Habitacional Popular en el D. F. Nairobi, Kenya, United 
Nations Centre for Human Settlements Habitat: 71. 
 
14 While the mass social mobilizations of the late 1980s that followed the earthquake had generated a high 





exclusion from cultural and artistic events and from the new consumption spaces. Many 
homeowners celebrated the increase in the value of their apartments, in contrast to renters 
or people whose housing conditions were legally tenuous and who feared eviction.  
But the point to be made is that even if the old residents were the focus of all the 
voices in the cacophony that I presented above, all their complexities, differences, 
hierarchies and tensions, seemed to go unnoticed. They became visible only as “the 
neighbors,” that is to say, they became visible as lower class people to be reached and 
redeemed by art, or as resentful figures reacting to their neighborhood’s transformation. 
To be sure, many of the artists working in Culture Space had an uncomfortable, or even 
openly antagonistic, relation to the cultural center’s pedagogical or redeeming vocation, 
as indeed a pedagogical project appeared to them as very different from an aesthetic one. 
Some were reluctant to speak in a pedagogical voice, which they associated with a 
paternalistic state. However, in their very refusal they repeated the logic that they 
disavowed, as they seemed unable to imagine approaching the center’s old inhabitants in 
a way other than a pedagogical project.  
It was precisely as “the neighbors” that old residents slipped into the position of 
menacing others. While it was clear that not everyone was engaged in criminal activities, 
and indeed many in Culture Space enjoyed amicable relations with many families in the 
vicinity, what preoccupied artists such as Pedro was a more diffuse violence and 
aggression; a powerlessness to understand the unwritten rules and codes of the street and 
to know were threat originated. Moreover, there was anxiety over being observed without 
being able to control what “the neighbors” saw. In the next section I will explore these 





Neighbors in the Callejón 
In the early months of 2006, the upcoming renovation of the callejón was the talk 
of Culture Space. There was a lot of anticipation as to how this change would affect their 
work as well as their standing in the neighborhood. People were looking forward to a 
renovated space, where they would hold their activities. Others were hopeful that the area 
would be safer and that the callejón would cease to be the dumping ground for the 
neighborhood’s trash. Alongside this positive anticipation, however, there was a growing 
sense of paranoia surrounding the renovation, which grew as the actual renovation works 
began in late March. On any given day, Bernardo could be seen standing outside Culture 
Space, surveying the progress and looking preoccupied, as if anticipating how the 
neighbors would react to such a visible project. One afternoon as I was sitting in a 
callejón with Omar, the theater director, when the renovation works were in full swing a 
young man murmured something as he walked in front of us. “Did you hear what he 
said?” Omar asked me. I had not heard. So Omar repeated the young man’s words: “rich 
assholes, they think they can privatize the street.” It was in moments like this that the 
vulnerability of the artists, and especially the fact they were caught, as it were, between 
different interests and sensibilities—the interests of the Foundation, their own aspiration 
to a beautified space and their imagination of what the “neighbors” perceived—came to 
the surface. 
Such paranoia was connected to rumors that “the neighbors” were angry and 




organize a rally to demand a public meeting where the proposed changes would be 
openly explained and discussed. The problem was that there had been no public 
announcement or discussion about the renovation plan. Bernardo had been busy 
negotiating budgets, permits and timelines with the various institutions implicated in the 
project. Once he received approval, Bernardo moved to garner support among local 
residents, and especially among the owners of the few businesses in the callejón, whose 
work would be directly impacted by the changes. The absence of public discussion about 
the renovation works also captured the new residents ambivalent relation to the 
neighbors. When I asked Bernardo why he had not held a public meeting to discuss the 
project he replied that he was not sure he would have been able to handle such a meeting, 
as probably there would have been too much hostility.  
All negotiations, that is, the gathering of the neighbor’s consent, had been indirect 
and informal. Pedro, for example, remembered the night when they got the approval of 
the tortilleros, the owners of a tortilla shop adjacent to the cultural center who were 
particularly hostile to new residents and vehemently opposed to the closing of the 
callejón to vehicular traffic. It happened one evening as a Foundation executive, 
Bernardo and Pedro were drinking at the bar. They invited the tortilleros to join and kept 
buying them drinks until they were absolutely trashed. “They would go out to vomit and 
return,” Pedro recalled, “it was very uncomfortable.” At around 4 in the morning los 
tortilleros finally acquiesced to support the project: “If you want to close the callejón, go 
ahead and do it.”  
While marking a moment when tensions between new and old residents receded, 




out of placeness of this interaction. What remained unclear was whether discomfort 
aroused because of the type of consent he received from the brothers, one given at a point 
of severe intoxication, or from their very proximity (and their vomiting). For even as he 
invited them to sit and drink at his table, to talk about a project of public interest, the 
difference of the tortilleros appeared irreducible, even a bit disgusting, in Pedro’s 
recollections. In a sense, the brothers’ street-smart demeanor and appearance, their 
idiomatic expressions and their hostility towards new comers positioned them as 
belonging to the center’s underworld. Indeed, Pedro sometimes referred to them as los 
Corleone, in reference to the most famous mafia family. Even if the nature and extent of 
their supposedly illicit activities was unclear, los tortilleros stood for the criminality and 
disorder afflicting the historic center. And yet, while embodying the atavisms from which 
the historic center had to be recovered, they were also “the neighbors.” The brothers were 
part of the local inhabitants whose living conditions were supposed to improve by rescue. 
After the renovation was completed there was an official inauguration ceremony, 
with representatives from Mexico City’s government and the Foundation. The artworks 
produced by local children in the workshops were exhibited during the event but people 
from the neighborhood were not invited, despite Bernardo’s argument that such exclusion 
would send the wrong message to an already mistrustful community. While the guests sat 
around tables that had been placed in the newly renovated square, making it look like a 
terrace of Pedro’s bar, drinking champagne, there was tension among the staff of the 
cultural center. Bernardo, donning a suit for the occasion, divided his time talking to state 
functionaries and walking to the other end of the callejón, to chat with the tortilleros, 




approached Bernardo to complain for what he considered an affront to the neighbors. 
“They know—he said-- that they would be arrested if they drank [alcoholic beverages] on 
the street, which is forbidden, but not the rich, they can do whatever they want.” As it 
unfolded, this inaugural event gestured towards the boundaries of the “all of us” in 
Pedro’s URGENT NOTICE. It crystallized a long history of inclusion and exclusion of 
the lower classes. At the same time, it forcefully captured the artists’ particularly 
ambiguous locations within that history and, more precisely, its particular reenactment in 
the context of rescue. 
The new pedestrian square marked the inauguration of a new era. The renovated 
square dramatically changed the atmosphere of the space. The local drug dealers 
relocated to another street one block south. Also gone were the drunkards and the 
homeless. The trash on the corner disappeared, even if only for a few months. And under 
the constant watch of Culture Space’s police guard, the pedestrian square became the 
playground for local children and a preferred spot for nearby office workers to eat lunch. 
It also became the site of many of Culture Space’s activities, from family oriented events, 
such as a treasure hunt to celebrate children’s day to video-art projections and 
performance pieces. Even when events took place indoors, such as art exhibit openings, 
which happen almost every other Wednesday evening, it became an extension of both the 





Figure 4. Music performance at the callejón. Photograph by author. 
Tensions appeared to have subsided and the staff of Culture Space talked about the 
rescue of the square as an accomplished undertaking. Indeed, they referred to it as a most 
enjoyable space. Yet the anticipation of threat as well as the elusive distinction between 
neighbors and menacing other remained. Take for instance an opening night a few 
months after the inauguration. The exhibition consisted of visual and audio records of a 
series of artistic interventions in neighboring public squares by a group of Austrian 
artists. The display of photographs, videos and objects throughout the cultural center 
continued outside the building, into the callejón. Here, arranged as a living room of sorts, 
there were three sofas and a coffee table upholstered with plastic tablecloths commonly 




the cultural center showed the same furniture placed as an installation in various other 
public squares, as well as passersby reactions to it.  
The mostly young and stylish audience moved between the interior of the cultural 
center and the square, with some people sitting on the sofas, drinking wine, while others 
sat at the bar. A police car was parked at the corner, with two police officers looking 
distractedly at the crowd or at times chatting with their partner who occasionally left his 
post at the entrance to Culture Space to approach them. On the opposite side of the square 
a bunch of kids and teenagers from the surrounding vecindades played a soccer match. 
Someone in the audience mentioned that she felt as if they were in a “little town” and 
commended the social life the square was taking and expressed her appreciation of the 
kids and teenagers using it as a playground and a soccer field. A while later, Pedro was 
furious at the bar, since he had just realized that the ball with which the kids were playing 
was the same one that had been stolen from his bar a few days before. In that moment, 
the image of the kids playing, hailed as illustrating the rescue’s success in the callejón 
and the forms of sociability that it enabled slipped into an image of danger and threat: 
kids loitering, amounting to nothing good, dirtying the space, or even plotting to assault 
the visitors of the square the cultural center and the bar.  
These interactions moreover, were saturated with anxiety about the artists’ 
perceived proximity—at once desired and dreaded—to Carlos Slim himself, who was 
viewed by many as an all-powerful force (see Chapter 4). Pedro expressed it quite clearly 
during the incidents with Manuel that I discussed in the introduction. Pedro thought that 
it was better to leave things as they were, in a tacit agreement of non-aggression. He 




to the guys from that particular vecindad. They could think that there was a lot of money 
in his bar, when in fact sometimes he barely made enough to pay the rent. “How would 
they know”, he said, “that I’m not Slim’s nephew?” In the next section I will explore how 
another crucial figure of the rescue, the police, calmed new residents anxieties while at 
the same time making them more vulnerable by heightening their “standing out” in the 
neighborhood.   
Of Yuppies and Policemen 
Eduardo, a talented visual artist in his late twenties, was among the first to move to 
a renovated building in the cultural corridor. He learnt about the availability of apartment 
rentals for artists while living in a southern working class suburb of Mexico City and 
working odd jobs to pay the rent and meet the alimony payments for his two children. 
Although at five thousand pesos per month the rent in a recently renovated nine-unit 
building far exceeded his budget, he saw living there as an opportunity to gain access to 
art networks. Despite much effort and after years of showing his work in small cultural 
centers and marginal museums, Eduardo had not been able to access Mexico City’s 
gallery circuit. He moved in the summer of 2003 and quickly befriended the residents of 
other already occupied apartments: Alex and Nancy, a young couple of emerging visual 
artists who like him were craving recognition; Omar, the theater director who would later 
work in Culture Space; the editor of a minor arts magazine. A strong social bond formed 
among these tenants, with intense social activities and late night visits to each other’s 
places happening on an almost daily basis. A hostile and aggressive environment on the 




In the summer of 2005 Eduardo hosted a party in his apartment. It unfolded as 
many others before it, with considerable flows of people between several different 
apartments and the rooftop, which functioned as a common terrace for the building. He 
was in this terrace at around two in the morning when the music coming from his place 
suddenly came to a stop and indistinct loud screams were heard. He ran downstairs. Five 
guys form the vecindad down the street had entered Eduardo’s apartment and were 
attempting to rob his guests. One of the intruders tried to break a beer bottle by smashing 
it against a wooden table. He failed. In the midst of the confusion Eduardo’s brother 
punched the guy in the face. A fight broke out. Eduardo reminisced (I paraphrase from 
my fieldnotes): 
They thought they would find only helpless yuppies in my party, but what they 
didn’t expect is that there would be a bunch of very rough people. I had guests 
from really tough hoods and they didn’t expect that. The guys fled as fast as they 
could (los chavos salieron por patas) and we chased them all the way to the 
vecindad. 
But by the time Eduardo and his friends arrived at the vecindad their assailants had 
already entered. Several angry women, blocking the gate, prevented their access. 
Someone called the police and they quickly showed up. Unable (or unwilling) to enter the 
vecindad they stationed their police car at the entrance to Eduardo’s building, where they 
remained day and night for an entire week.  
We have already encountered the conspicuous presence of the police in this area. 
They appeared in Pedro’s notice and in the excerpts from conversations with him and 
with Bernardo. We also encountered them standing guard at the entrance to Culture 
Space, watching local children play in the renovated callejón, or parked at the corner of 




constitutive element of the rescue. In the area of the cultural corridor the security 
apparatus involved patrols from the Industrial and Banking Police (PBI), a supplementary 
force originally created to provide indoors security for private entities at their own 
expense. Partially sponsored by Carlos Slim, the PBI performed public policing duties in 
this area of the historic center. While they were originally limited to the policing of 
public space —patrolling the streets on foot during the day and by car during the night—
the PBI were introduced into the Foundation’s residential buildings following the assault 
on Eduardo’s building and the ensuing threat of leaving from several of its tenants.  
This arrangement continued for over a year. However, towards the end of my 
fieldwork, residents in these buildings, most of whom had moved in after the break in, 
were distressed at the Foundation’s plan to discontinue security services altogether, citing 
the need to reduce costs. A few months earlier, the PBI had been substituted with civil 
security guards, to the dismay of tenants. Omar, the theater director referred to their 
security services as “a pension program for the elderly.” But the news of a complete 
termination of security services or even their decrease to one shift a day appeared simply 
unacceptable for the building’s residents. They believed that safety in the area continued 
to be rather precarious and the building still stood out from the surrounding environment. 
The police thus appear as a crucial figure in the complex dynamic of location and 
misrecognition that I have been discussing in this chapter. In Eduardo’s retelling of the 
break-in he imagined being seen as a “yuppie” and didn’t recognize himself in the other’s 
gaze. He came from a barrio and his friends were tough, he said. Another tenant in the 
same building who gave me her version of the same event emphasized that the intruders 




between that building and the rest of the street. But in reality, she asserted, “we don’t 
have much more that they do.” The point I wish to make here is that, faced with the 
possibility of being mistaken for “yuppies” or “rich,” Eduardo and his neighbors relied on 
the protection of the police—the particular police introduced to guarantee their safety in a 
hostile neighborhood—and thus effectively emphasized their “standing out.”  
Pedro’s notice, with which I opened this chapter, performed this same move. “If 
you catch anyone damaging this public space report it to Culture Space’s security,” he 
wrote, asserting that he possessed the power to conjure the force of the police. In fact, 
both Eduardo’s story and Pedro’s notice disclosed that the police enabled the rescue as 
well as new residents place in it. Their invocation of the police appeared to be at once the 
condition for the “all of us” of Pedro’s notice and the betrayal of its impossibility. It 
fragmented the “we” between those who can mobilize the police, those who don’t posses 
such power, and those against whom the police can be mobilized.  
And yet it seems that the artists were incapable of properly locating the police, just 
as they were incapable of properly locating the neighbor and the menacing other. Let us 
recall the references to police ineffectiveness and corruption that we have encountered 
throughout the chapter. In my first conversation with Pedro, he talked about them as 
insufficiently or improperly trained to handle “the situation.” In Bernardo’s recollection 
of various attacks on and robberies of residents of renovated buildings the police 
appeared to be complicit with the criminals, indeed, to be offering them protection. In 
Eduardo’s story they were unable, or unwilling, to enter the vecindad. In the eyes of the 
artists, then, the police’s relation to both the neighbors and the rescue appeared to be 




anticipation of threat. 
Graffiti and Urine 
During one of my last visits to Eduardo’s building, around the time when Pedro 
placed his NOTICE in the callejón, I found scribbles of undecipherable graffiti on the 
entrance door. I was there to visit Omar, who had been dismissed from Culture Space a 
few months before due to an internal restructuring of the organization. Omar saw the 
graffiti as a clear sign that the hostility towards his building was resurging after having 
significantly receded in the previous months and, like his fellow tenants, believed that his 
building could not do away with security services. But he attributed this sudden 
reappearance of hostility to Culture Space’s decision to discontinue providing workshops 
for local inhabitants.  
In the year and a half since its opening, the cultural center had undergone a gradual 
but drastic transformation. Most of the artists whom Bernardo had invited to work there 
had been dismissed and Bernardo himself had resigned. The eclecticism of the space had 
gradually given way to a more formal exhibition space, and some of its staff’s goal of 
positioning Culture Space within the city’s contemporary art circuit seemed to have 
triumphed. The community program had also changed in this restructuring. It had moved 
from a wide array of handcraft, theater, writing and music workshops at very low prices 
to a one yearlong, twice weekly and more expensive art workshop for children, to none at 
all, when the program was reduced to monthly field trips and special events for 
neighboring families. Pedro, partly responsible for this restructuring, interpreted the 




similar manner. The “neighbors” were angry. 
But Omar and Pedro’s concerns over such manifestations of anger and resentment 
captured a deeper anxiety that saturates all the fleeting and not so fleeting interactions 
that I have discussed in this chapter, an anxiety about the unredeemable nature of the 
inhabitants of the historic center, which destabilized the “all of us” of Pedro’s notice. 
Such concerns seemed to express that “they” could not be proper subjects capable of 
inhabiting a modern, cosmopolitan public space, which in turn undermined the artists’ 
own claims to a cosmopolitan present. Moreover, Omar and Pedro’s concerns over 
graffiti, urine and trash captured the dual sense of mis/recognition that I have suggested is 
taking place in the historic center. It is as if the weight of history that bears upon the 
social interactions I discussed allowed for only two positions, crystallizing an unstable 
“us” and a “them”. Let us recall one of the voices in Culture Space’s cacophony: “I feel 
like a Franciscan monk doing the work of the colonizers”. This voice suggests that since 
“we”—the artists—are not the “colonized”, we must be the “colonizers” (of the historic 
center). But it also suggests a profound disquiet with such a position. “We” should not be 
the “colonizers”. “We don’t have much more than they do”, said someone in relation to 
the break-in in Eduardo’s building. “I come from a barrio and have tough friends”, said 
Eduardo, dismayed to be mistaken for a yuppie. Mis/recognition, then, appears to slide 






Racial Imaginaries and (Neo) Liberal Sensibilities  
Introduction 
Shortly after moving to the historic center, Bernardo hosted a party in his 
apartment, located on a busy and heavily traveled street near the cultural center where he 
worked. The party, however, ended abruptly before midnight, after an unexpected turn of 
events. This is how Bernardo narrated the story: 
The day of my birthday party, I’m going to tell you why people left. There was an 
open bar and plenty of food.  
And suddenly I’m told: “hey”—I was on the rooftop (…)—“the alcohol is 
finished, all of it.”  
And I say: “no! It can’t be, there were like a thousand bottles! Everything?”  
“And besides there are some veeeery suspicious looking dudes with very bad 
vibes.”  
I arrive [downstairs], and yes, there were like fifteen tough guys IN MY 
APARTMENT! Like that, looking at everyone like that, [each] holding a full 
bottle.  
[A friend says:] “Enough Bernardo, throw them out, what’s going on?”  
And I tell them: “No! Why am I going to throw them out?”  
And someone says: “but who invited them?”  
And I say: “look my friend, I invited twenty and there are more than two hundred 
people here. They have the same right to be here as the curator [of an important 
Mexico City museum] who is over there and whom I didn’t invite. I’m not going to 
throw them out. What if they’re friends with the guy playing the music? (…) What 
if they come—because they do look darkish (morenitos) and kind of poor 
(pobretones)—but what if they’re friends with the DJ and I kick them out? No 
way! No!”  
So all my friends left—because there was no alcohol, not for any other reason. 




[And one said:] “What? You’re the owner of the house, right, man?”  
“No. Well yes. So what?”  
“Cool!”—they were from eleven-year old kids to forty year old guys,  and the 
guy speaking was twenty-something. “Look we live in the two vecindades right 
next door. No one invited us. We heard music, came up, took your alcohol and 
you didn’t do anything. Instead, every time you walked in front of us you smiled 
and said cheers”—I swear Alejandra! —“Cool man, welcome to the barrio, 
that’s the attitude. (…) I’m respected around here. I’m el Giovanni. If one day 
someone does something to you just tell them, I’m Giovanni’s friend, because you 
are now my friend, man.”  
He hugs me and says cool. And they leave. Any reasonable being would have 
said: “Who are you? Get out.” Not me.  
And from then on, every time I walk by them they whistle or nod. But I keep on 
walking. I’m not interested in stopping to have beers with them, because surely 
they would [start to] come up [to my place] whenever. I’m not an asshole. But no. 
The trial by fire, which was that I arrived with an open doors attitude, you steal 
my alcohol and I even say cheers, made me enter (Interview with author, 
September 14, 2006). 
Like other interactions with vecindad dwellers that I discussed in Chapter 2, 
Bernardo’s story exudes concern over location and mis/recognition. The problem is not 
that his party is permeable. The fact that he invited twenty people and more than two 
hundred showed up appears as taken-for-granted, almost banal. Spreading the word about 
a party and showing up with friends and friends of friends is neither uncommon nor 
objectionable in his social circles; in fact, it is often the norm. But some of the uninvited 
guests appear to be out of place: they are aggressive, they have taken all the alcohol for 
themselves and they look “darkish and kind of poor.” They stand apart. Thus Bernardo’s 
friends ask him—as the host and presumably as someone who by living in the historic 
center knows how to handle the situation—to throw out the intruders. But he refuses to 
occupy the position to which his friends appeal, namely, that of the one who excludes. At 




knows how to handle such difficult, potentially explosive situations, even if in quite a 
different manner than the one they had perhaps foreseen.   
To be sure, parties in Bernardo’s social circles are generally thought of and talked 
about as open events. But of course, such openness inevitably rests on the assumption of 
social exclusion or, in other words, on the presupposition that people like Giovanni will 
not show up (as guests).1 Yet while Bernardo’s friends would defend these boundaries 
against transgression, convinced as they are that the intruders should be thrown out, 
Bernardo seems to conflate the inclusiveness of the party with the ostensible openness of 
public space: he declares that Giovanni and his entourage should be as welcome as an 
important curator who showed up uninvited. It is in fact their “right.” In other words, 
Bernardo presents his refusal to throw the intruders out as an imperative not to 
discriminate: either he applies the same treatment to all uninvited guests or he accepts all 
in the party. Evoking a right as actually distributed equally among all members of 
society, he positions himself as a restrained and tolerant subject.2 And yet, Bernardo is 
far from establishing social equivalence between the curator and the crashers, and his 
openness runs into its limits. While welcoming the latter into his home Bernardo 
simultaneously marks them as “suspicious looking” and as “darkish and kind of poor,” 
indexing not only the perception of lower social status but also of menace and, as we 
shall see, incommensurability.  
                                                 
1 This openness encounters its limits at the same place where the inclusiveness of the Habermasian public 
sphere, with its bourgeois space and sensibilities and its ultimately situated rationality, also comes to a halt. 
 
2 Here I follow Povinelli’s discussion of the limits of liberalism in Australia. See: Povinelli, E. A. (2002). 
The cunning of recognition : indigenous alterities and the making of Australian multiculturalism. Durham, 





But besides a logic of non-discrimination, there is another logic traversing the 
story, one of patron-client relations, where people are bound to each other in intimate 
relations of hierarchical dependency. In order to understand how this logic also pervades 
Bernardo’s rendering of the party as an inclusive yet highly differentiated space we must 
first locate it in the context of the unusual residential contiguity between different social 
classes brought about by the rescue, which made the interaction possible in the first place. 
For Bernardo’s appeal to inclusion is informed by his perception of the historic center as 
a barrio—a space of intimate social relations where everybody knows each other—as 
well as by his own uncertain position within this socio-spatial universe. Indeed, as I 
discussed in Chapter 2, Bernardo and other artist’s who lived and worked in this area, 
viewed the barrio as a homogeneous, close-knit community with unwritten rules and 
codes of conduct that were seemingly unknown to outsiders. 
Bernardo, a performance artist and cultural promoter working for Slim’s 
Foundation, liked to cultivate a self-image of transgression. An excellent storyteller, and 
always a performer, he often told anecdotes about his encounters with the “marginal 
characters” of the center, and insisted that, in order to live there, one must command a 
particular attitude. During the same interview Bernardo illustrated this point through an 
incident that took place a few months before the party. An art curator who used to live 
across the hall from his apartment was assaulted and robbed one night right outside their 
building. Despite the man’s disheveled appearance (“he was always wearing torn jeans, 
glasses; he came in and out, without luxuries, good vibe…”) his aggressors called him 
“pretty boy” (niño bonito), an expression with class as well as racialized connotations. In 




years that he had worked and (more recently) lived in the historic center. Why? Because 
of his attitude: 
The barrio immediately knows what the deal is. They might see me wearing a suit 
and a tie and I might speak with a lot of refinement, but I radiate [the right 
attitude]. I don’t pretend. It is not a mask, as in yes, I’m super tough. No! I’m like 
that. I love it and people perceive it (Interview with author, September 14, 2006). 
Bernardo suggests that despite his disheveled appearance his neighbor could not 
hide the social identity that his attitude betrayed. In contrast, verbal refinement and 
formal clothes notwithstanding, he knows how to conduct himself in the barrio and thus 
he manages to be welcome there. He claims to possess an ability to talk to and negotiate 
with Giovanni, the latter understood as a local character or social type, not merely a 
particular individual. This renders him an apt mediator who can move across social 
boundaries. In other words, Bernardo enacts a patron-client relation of proximity and 
distance that connects him to Giovanni while reasserting their social differences. We 
shall see shortly that this spatial relation reflects a temporal one. For now, let us 
emphasize that in maintaining this tension, Bernardo oscillates between a discourse of 
anonymity and equal rights and a discourse of personal relations and negotiation 
(DaMatta 1991). Bernardo welcomes Giovanni into his home and in return Giovanni, 
who knows the barrio, its characters and its rules, a knowledge precluded from Bernardo, 
offers protection and “friendship,” though preferably from a distance.  
That Giovanni keeps on nodding when Bernardo walks by, however, appears at 
once as reassuring recognition, indeed, securing Bernardo’s place within the space of the 
barrio, and as the menacing possibility of the distance between them collapsing. 




difference between the suspicious and menacing characters and himself. This 
incommensurability is construed not only in terms of class position—they are “kind of 
poor”—but also of skin color—they are morenitos. The characterization of the intruders 
as “darkish and kind of poor” thus becomes a significant marker of difference. In fact, as 
I will argue in this chapter, this interaction is saturated with racial anxiety and haunted by 
the racial imaginary of the Indian, a highly charged and ambivalent figure in Mexico. As 
such, the interaction reenacts long-standing racial tensions that, while disavowed by the 
dominant national narrative of mestizaje and national belonging, have been inscribed at 
the heart of the nation and have long saturated everyday social relations in Mexico City.  
In this chapter I explore two interrelated historical trajectories that coalesce in the 
racial tensions that, I will show, saturate Bernardo’s narrative. The first concerns the 
ambivalent location of the Indian in the national imaginary: at once the very essence of 
the mestizo nation and that which hinders progress and modernity. The second concerns 
relations of proximity and distance between social classes in the unequal urban landscape 
of Mexico City. These relations, I argue, have been informed by a dialectic of inclusion 
and exclusion epitomized in the “good” and “the bad” urban masses (Lomnitz 2001).  
Race, Racism and Racial Imaginaries 
Like many other scholars, Deborah Poole has argued that race is an inherently 
unstable and ambiguous concept, with wide variations across academic disciplines and 
national histories. According to Poole it is precisely this ambiguity that gives the concept 
of race “its singular power to mobilize older social prejudices and modes of 




political landscapes—always present but never quite the same” (Poole 2004: 39). In 
Mexico, as we shall see, the ambiguity of race goes even further, to the point that it is 
often unclear whether “race” is at all present. I propose to use the term racial imaginary 
to grasp the multiple and elusive meanings of race in Mexico, which exceed notions of 
innate biological difference and phenotypic characteristics. My approach draws on 
Marisol de la Cadena’s argument that “race” antedates its emergence as a modern 
category of differentiation or, in other words, that it is composed of  “multiple pasts and 
many conceptual memories,” as well as on her insistence that “race” comes to life in 
translation, that is, “in relations where meanings only partially coincide, but where 
excesses, even if disturbing, continue to circulate” (De la Cadena 2009: 12, my 
translation). 
While the racial imaginaries that interest me encompass “visual” traits like physical 
appearance and skin color, they involve “non-visual” elements as well, such as cultural 
dispositions, intellectual capabilities or moral attributes and sensibilities. Far from 
unusual, as Ann Stoler (1997) has argued, the interdependence between “visual” and 
“non-visual” criteria in understandings of race is in fact central to all racial systems. 
Based on research in the archives of Dutch colonialism, Stoler claims that the emergence 
of race as a modern, scientific concept that organized biological difference into 
evolutionary schemes was inseparable from ideas of race as a set of moral attributes. It 
provided European imperial powers with a scientific language with which to classify and 
govern the “morally inferior” natives. Therefore, Stoler stresses the centrality of “non-




psychological dispositions, in the definition of racial membership.3 Moreover, Stoler 
argues that the force of the non-visual rests on “the political effectiveness of a system of 
social classification that appears fixed, permanent, and commonsensical while it remains 
porous and pliable” (p. 104).  
Stoler’s argument sheds light on how dominant understandings of race as a 
primarily biological and visual system of differentiation silence other trajectories of race 
and, it follows from this, other forms of racism. A commonsensical observation in Latin 
America, for instance, is that “racism” is not a problem in a region where discrimination 
is based on other criteria of social difference, such as culture or class.4 Indeed, as 
opposed to the United States, where race is popularly perceived as a set of innate and 
immutable biological differences and, moreover, as a white/black dichotomy, in Latin 
America “race” is only loosely associated to biology. As de la Cadena has argued: 
[A person’s] assigned racial “color” does not necessarily correspond to [his or 
her] skin [color]. It also depends on the quality of the individual. (…) In Latin 
American categories phenotype comes in and out; whiteness can be attained by 
social processes. It is obvious that the logic is not the same for all “colors.” They 
have a history and the association between color and quality depends on this 
history (De la Cadena 2009: 24).  
In this regard, understandings of race in the region oscillate between “biological 
essence, historical genealogy, cultural identity, and national foundation” (Poole 2004). In 
this chapter I aim to elucidate, again following Stoler, the manner in which racial 
                                                 
3 In this regard Stoler’s article challenges academic debates that have posited that “new” forms of racism 
rely on “cultural” distinctions (or on the racialization of culture) whereas “old” forms of racism relied on 
beliefs of fixed somatic traits, and hence the assumption that “new” racisms are more subtle and yet more 
pervasive. 
 
4 For a discussion of the disavowal of racism in Latin America see: De la Cadena, M. (2001). 
"Reconstructing Race. Racism, Culture and Mestizaje in Latin América." NACLA Report on the Americas 





imaginaries in Mexico inform how people “affectively distinguish themselves from 
others in the world.” In other words, I aim to analyze how, in pervading everyday, 
sometimes intimate encounters between social groups, such as the interaction narrated by 
Bernardo, racial imaginaries—and specifically the imaginary of the “Indian”—inform 
people’s senses of self and of social and political belonging.  
Mexico as a Mestizo Nation, or, the Racial Imaginaries of Mestizaje 
Let me start this genealogical inquiry from the present. Leon Krauze, a popular 
young newspaper commentator and host of a radio talk show, recently wrote a piece in 
his weekly column that provides an illuminating introduction to how racial imaginaries 
circulate and permeate quotidian interactions in Mexico City, as well as to the ways in 
which racism is discussed in public discourse. In what he described as a “painful” 
incident, while playing a friendly soccer match against a team of teenagers, and after a 
rough move, a boy from the rival team loudly and resentfully yelled “fucking Indian!” at 
one of Krauze’s teammates. After the tension receded, Krauze approached the young 
man’s coach to express his concern about such reprehensible behavior, to which the 
coach replied that it was common—and no big deal—to use those words in the soccer 
field. Dismayed, Krauze later posed a question to the audience of his talk show: “Since 
when is the word Indian used as an insult in our country?” (Krauze 2009) 
Never, he wrote, had the show received so many phone calls and electronic 
messages. Most among the audience expressed indignation at such a racist slur, but some 
showed resignation, arguing that the phrase was quite common and no cause for alarm. 




connotation since the conquest, and that instead of diminishing, the derogatory 
associations of the term have increased over time. “I immediately made a reference to 
mestizaje as a counter argument,” wrote Krauze. “How to explain the attenuating effect 
that the incomparable (and undeniable) racial mixture in Mexico should have had  [on 
racism]?” The interlocutor, in turn, replied that mestizaje continues to have a most 
interesting “sociological effect:” it seems to be valued only when the result is “a blond 
person with white skin… very sad.” 
The “Indian” that appears in Krauze’s piece exceeds any particular sociological 
group, as well as the significations of its academic and political iterations. In fact, when 
the teenager yells “Fucking Indian” in the soccer field, or perhaps more importantly when 
Krauze and his audience discuss the incident in the radio show, they mobilize a racial 
imaginary that evokes different and interlacing conceptual memories (De la Cadena 
2009). The “Indian” indexes a negative and violent nature in the other player, a latent 
attribute that becomes apparent at a particular moment during the interaction.  That is to 
say, by failing to play properly and to follow the rules of the game, the other discloses the 
“Indian” in him. Shocked by such a construction, Krauze expresses a widespread 
understanding of mestizaje as a long-term historical process through which distinct racial 
groups, especially Spaniards and Indians, have mixed to become mestizos, that is, modern 
and racially unmarked Mexicans.5 Moreover, he voices a normative dimension of this 
national narrative, namely, that by integrating “the Indian” Mexico has effectively 
                                                 
5 According to Mexico’s official history the country lived an extraordinary and successful process of 
mestizaje throughout the 19th and especially the 20th centuries. Indians and Europeans gradually melded 
into a new racial and cultural type that embodies the greatness of the pre-Hispanic civilizations while at the 
same time partaking in Western modern culture. For a discussion on mestizaje and racism see: Navarrete, F. 





eliminated racism.  
Indeed, Mexico has long prided itself on being morally superior to other countries 
with regards to racial issues. As opposed to the United States, so goes this conventional 
wisdom, Mexico didn’t exterminate or segregate its indigenous population but instead 
successfully integrated them into the national whole (Lomnitz 2005). Moreover, to the 
extent that racism has started to be recognized as a problem in public debate since the 
turn to “multiculturalism” in the early 1990s—and especially in the aftermath of the 
Zapatista indigenous rebellion—it has largely been discussed in relation to indigenous 
populations (Dawson 2004). But the “racism” that pervades social relations between 
mestizos, as evident in Krauze’s piece, has only recently become a matter of public 
debate.6  
While reproducing these normative assumptions about mestizaje and race in 
Mexico, Krauze’s editorial also exposes their limits. First, he presents his question about 
the derogatory use of the term Indian in a rhetorical manner, inasmuch as what prompts 
his reflections in the first place is precisely the pervasive and commonplace use of the 
negative associations of the Indian, of which he is no doubt aware. Second, he lets his 
interlocutor present his counterarguments as self-evident or common knowledge: the term 
Indian has always had negative connotations and although we are all mestizo, 
“whiteness” continues to be a privileged position and an aspiration, seemingly what we 
would all like to be.  
                                                 
6 In recent years several Mexican films have addressed the violence of class and racialized difference in 
Mexico, focusing particularly on Mexico City’s landscape of inequality. See, for example: Fernando 
Sariñana’s “All the power” (1999); Luis Estrada’s “A Wonderful World” (2006); Carlos Reygadas’ “Battle 





Undeterred, Krauze finishes his text with a pedagogical note: 
¿Who should bear the responsibility to end the tendency to discriminate and to be 
intolerant at the dawn of the twenty-first century? I suppose that it must be the 
parents. But in the meantime, tomorrow I have another match. I will bring this 
article and the recording of the radio show to the young man. Perhaps, one day, 
far from the heat of the soccer field, he will reconsider [his position]. Part of 
Mexico’s future, a future anchored in tolerance and equality, depends on it 
(Krauze 2009).  
Krauze’s piece thus reveals the endurance of the national narrative of mestizaje as 
well as its contemporary fissures and “multicultural” re-articulations. In his rendition, 
mestizaje should not exclude difference. Quite the contrary, for him tolerance of 
difference in a framework of equality is an indispensable prerequisite for Mexico to fully 
inhabit the twenty-first century. The persistence of intolerance, he argues, is a 
preoccupying impediment for Mexico’s arrival to the future. But Krauze’s pedagogical 
ending also discloses another crucial shift in contemporary Mexico, namely the fact that 
it is not the responsibility of the state to inculcate such civic, modern virtues, but of the 
family as well as of people like Krauze himself, enlightened intellectuals, a task that he 
would undertake with the racist and intolerant teenager. And in this shift we find traces of 
three decades of neo-liberal transformations, in the context of which the state has ceased 
to be the quintessential modernizing agent and instead has been construed as an obstacle 
to be overcome, a topic to which I will return in Chapter 4.  
Krauze’s call to fight discrimination and intolerance resonates with Bernardo’s 
appeal to Giovanni’s right to being in his party. For it is my argument that both Krauze 
and Bernardo share a political subjectivity that is informed by the circulation of 
(neo)liberal idioms of citizenship and political belonging in contemporary Mexico. As I 




traditional liberal ideals of individual liberty and equality, these idioms emphasize 
personal responsibility and an ethical commitment to actively participate in the life of 
one’s community.7 At the same time, Krauze and Bernardo partake of an age-old elite 
anxiety that something intrinsically wrong with Mexico has prevented liberal values and 
modernity from firmly taking root, that “underdevelopment” in fact constitutes a chronic 
national disease.  
In other words, Mexico’s cultural elites again agonize over an image of el pueblo as 
being unfit for the demands of the present. Krauze’s editorial piece indeed partakes of 
these anxieties. The notice addressing the deterioration of the callejón, which I discussed 
in Chapter 2, expressed similar concerns. It captured Pedro’s preoccupation over the fact 
that, by using a newly renovated space as their dumping ground, the “neighbors” of the 
historic center showed themselves as lacking the civic virtues necessary for properly 
inhabiting public space. For Krauze the un-modern kernel of Mexican subjectivity is not 
the “Indian” but the bigotry that this figure condenses, as represented by the intolerant 
teenager. It is the intellectual’s task to instruct the latter into the virtues of civility and 
respect. And yet the figure of the “Indian” also appears as an obstacle in Krauze: perhaps 
some day the teenager will understand, but perhaps he cannot, as there might be 
something intrinsically wrong with him. In the case of Bernardo’s narrative the racial 
imaginary of the Indian pervades both the moment of recognition (that is, the gesture of 
hospitality that is reciprocated by a gesture of protection) and the assertion of an 
incommensurable difference between himself and Giovanni. In other words, both 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of 19th Century Mexican liberalism see: Hale, C. A. (1972). El liberalismo mexicano en 





Krauze’s editorial and Bernardo’s narrative reveal enduring racial tensions and 
conflicting temporalities—for, as we shall now see, they are highly temporalized—at the 
heart of the mestizo national subject.  
The Temporalities of the Mestizo, or, Can Mexicans Become Modern?  
The mestizo became the ideal national subject after the revolution of 1910-1917. A 
particular racial category that existed since colonial times to designate mixed bloods, and 
more concretely the offspring of Spanish and Indian parents, it was placed by late 
nineteenth century intellectuals and by revolutionary and post-revolutionary ideologues at 
the very center of Mexican nationalism and, inseparably, of Mexican history.8 What 
distinguished this post-revolutionary mestizo was that he was neither European nor 
Indian, but rather embodied a racially and culturally unified and forward-looking nation, 
one that would be capable of fully inhabiting a cosmopolitan present and thus of playing 
as equal in the international field (Lomnitz 2001). 
Post-revolutionary intellectuals saw the “Indian problem,” which had preoccupied 
liberal elites throughout the previous century, as an unresolved and enduring challenge to 
national integration (Knight 1990: 84). Indeed, the Indian continued to trigger deep-
seated anxieties about racial and cultural difference, which became ever more salient 
against the specter of revolutionary violence.9 According to Manuel Gamio, one of the 
                                                 
8 There were, of course, multiple positions within what I’m conflating into the term “revolutionary and 
post-revolutionary intellectuals,” and, moreover, their positions and levels of influence changed over time. 
Instead of presenting a detailed discussion of these different ideas my aim is to present a general picture of 
two important themes that pervade post-revolutionary (and also 19th century) debates about national unity 
and the national subject, namely, the “Indian problem” and Mexico’s standing in the international scene. 
 
9 This at a time when, by official estimates, only one third of the population continued to be “pure” Indian 




main architects of post-revolutionary nationalism: 
The problem is not in avoiding the illusory collective aggressiveness of certain 
indigenous groups but in channeling their energies, which are currently dispersed, 
attracting their members towards the other social group that they have always 
considered as enemies, incorporating them, building on them, tending finally to 
create a coherent homogeneous national race, unified in language and convergent 
in culture” (Quoted in Buffington 2000: 141).   
While prevalent racial theories propounded the degenerative tendencies of 
miscegenation (Gustav Le Bon was the most famous representative of this view), Latin 
American elites made of racial mixing the basis for their own integration into proper 
historical time. Influenced by the cultural relativism of Franz Boas, Gamio advocated the 
revalorization of Indians as a constitutive part of the nation.10 But the “Indian” who 
entered the national equation after the revolution was an ambivalent figure, and his 
ambivalence echoed nineteenth century scientific racist views and colonial imaginaries 
alike. The Indian was at certain moments construed as belonging to a degraded and 
servile race and therefore as standing in need of salvation, and at other moments as 
dignified, proud, industrious and naturally “pure.” He was at the same time 
                                                                                                                                                 
indigenous groups, and to a lesser extent blacks. These statistical estimates were, to be sure, highly 
contested, and Gamio himself advocated the classification of the peasant inhabitants of Central Mexico 
who had played an important role in the Zapatista movement during the revolution as Indian. What such 
statistics also reveal, as pointed out by Alan Knight and as already implied by Ann Stoler, is that “racial” 
identification was not only based on “biological” attributes, but on a wide array of elements such as 
language, dress, religion, and social organization. Navarrete, F. (2004). Las relaciones interétnicas en 
México. México. D.F., UNAM. Knight, A. (1990). Racism, Revolution and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910-
1940. The Idea of Race in Latin America 1870-1940. R. Graham. Austin, University of Texas, p. 73-74 
 
10 The positing of things Indian as the authentic source of the nation was not a post-revolutionary invention. 
Since early colonial times a specifically Creole, that is American born Spaniard, collective identity began to 
take shape around the glorification of the land and the great pre-Columbian civilizations, especially the 
Aztecs. By the beginning of the 19th century this pre-Columbian past had become a sort of “classical 
antiquity,” but it was not viewed as bearing any connection to living Indians.  Gamio himself played a 
crucial role in establishing such a connection. See: Lopez Caballero, P. (2008). "Which heritage for which 
heirs? The pre-Columbian past and the colonial legacy in the national history of Mexico." Social 





“incommensurably other,” the past that prevented progress, and the embodiment of 
Mexico’s very essence (Poole 2004: 37-38). 
At the center of the post-revolutionary project to domesticate both racial difference 
and the threat of popular violence were questions of temporality and modernity. Indeed, a 
temporal relation between past and future has been spatialized in Mexico as elsewhere in 
terms of inwards (the Indian) and outwards (the international scene or, more precisely, 
the global North). A crucial preoccupation of nineteenth century elites had been how to 
attain the level of evolution of the United States and Europe, that is, how to participate as 
equals and contemporaries in the international theater and thus become subjects of 
universal history. But Mexico inhabited an interstitial space, outside of universal time and 
history and yet not fully “other” vis-à-vis Europe and the United States, that is, vis-à-vis 
“civilized” nations. Race, then, provided these elites with a vocabulary for measuring 
their region’s proximity and/or distance to “Europe.”11 In this sense, evolutionary 
temporality of the racial question has been mapped onto spatial relations of North and 
South, outside and inside, distance and proximity.  
But the advent of race as a scientific, measurable datum in late nineteenth century 
Mexico interwove with earlier colonial imaginaries where “race” (which was based on 
decent and not on biological attributes and hence could not be read out of the body) 
referred to the moral quality of persons and their (in)ability to be civilized (De la Cadena, 
2009, p. 26).12 Indeed, nineteenth century liberals blamed the backwardness of Mexico 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of 19th Century scientific racism in Mexico see: Tenorio-Trillo, M. (1996). Mexico at 
the world's fairs: crafting a modern nation. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
 
12 Laura Lewis offers an illuminating discussion of colonial racial hierarchies, part of the conceptual 




and the impossibility to “catch up” partly on the Indian as an inherently inferior race and 
partly on Spanish colonialism, which, they claimed, with its centuries of oppression, 
exploitation and obscurantism had created a servile, indolent and vicious population 
(Lomnitz 2001). For some, the only solution was to counter the negative traits of Indians 
by importing European immigrants. For other liberals like Juárez, of indigenous origin 
himself, who succeeded in unifying the country in the face of French imperialist 
occupation in the second half of the nineteenth century and subsequently served multiple 
terms as its president, Indians could and indeed should ascend to the level of Europeans 
through education, universal rights and equality.13  
The “Indian” thus condensed the anxieties of Mexican elites about their own spatial 
and temporal place in modernity, understood as essentially European-American, and 
hence foreign.14 However, the European foreign represented not only an unachievable 
ideal but also a threat in the form of colonialism and (American) expansionism. Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
in New Spain. Its meaning prefigured modern notions of race, as it referred to descent as well as to 
distinctions determined by blood and skin color. But unlike race as it came to be defined in the “Anglo-
West,” the term casta did not refer to supposedly unambiguous biological differences. Lewis defines caste 
as an integrated system of relations and dispositions, and colonial society as a “fluid pyramid” with 
Spanishness most associated with the Spanish elite at the top, Indianess most associated with the masses of 
Indian commoners at the bottom, and interstitial spaces most fully inhabited by blacks, mulattoes and 
mestizos at various points in between.” Lewis, L. A. (2003). Hall of mirrors power, witchcraft, and caste in 
colonial Mexico. Durham, Duke University Press: xiv, 262 p. 
 
13 In effect, however, indigenous communities lost the communal rights they had enjoyed during colonial 
times. Toward the end of the 19th century, and especially under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and the 
influence of scientific racism, modernization became the self-professed objective of the regime, indicating 
not only capitalist industrialization but also the dispossession of Indian communities and the waging of 
wars against rebellious Indians. See: Knight, A. (1990). Racism, Revolution and Indigenismo: Mexico, 
1910-1940. The Idea of Race in Latin America 1870-1940. R. Graham. Austin, University of Texas , 
Lomnitz, C. (2001). Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism. Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
14 Here I echo Chakrabarty’s use of the term in its “hyper real” sense, that is, as a figure of the imagination, 
the scene of the birth of the modern, whose geographical correlation remains somewhat indeterminate. 
Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton, 





much like the Indian, the European foreign has had ambivalent connotations as 
simultaneously desired and dreaded in Mexico.15 If for nineteenth century liberals the 
threat of the foreign was to be domesticated by disavowing Mexico’s Indian—atavistic 
and backward—elements and fully embracing Mexico’s European roots, post-
revolutionary elites posited a similar domestication in the imagined synthesis of the 
mestizo. Modern Mexican time would be neither “European” nor “Indian” but mestizo.16 
Yet the mestizo too appeared as an inferior racial subject vis-à-vis the European. His 
power instead rested on his adaptability to the particular conditions of his environment. 
More than anything then, as Mauricio Tenorio has argued, the positing of the mestizo as 
the national subject, especially in the writings of Andrés Molina Enriquez, reflected, so to 
speak, a coming to terms with an already established national reality. Whether they 
wanted it or not, Mexican elites had to contend with the fact that Mexico was, at best 
from their perspective, a mestizo nation (Tenorio, 2009: 48-49). 
The simultaneously dreaded and idealized Indian was thus displaced to the 
outside—forever the excluded other—and at the same time inscribed at the very heart of 
                                                 
15 Ana Maria Alonso has argued that the racialized identities of Mexican elites—and of Latin American 
elites more generally—cannot be reduced to “European” or “white,” as they have in turn been racialized as 
“non-European” in Europe and the United States. Alonso, A. M. (2004). "Conforming Disconformity: 
"Mestizaje," Hybridity and the Aesthethics of Mexican Nationalism." Cultural Anthropology 19(4): 459-
490. 
 
16 Critics of post-revolutionary racial ideologies argue that people like Gamio and Vasconcelos failed in 
their efforts to break with the blatant racism of their predecessors as well as with the influence of European 
racist thought, especially social Darwinism and Spencerian evolutionism, which posited the Indian as an 
inferior race and linked it to a degraded moral character. Although they restored—or rather created—a 
connection between living Indians and pre-Hispanic civilizations, positing them as an equal or at times 
better “race,” critics stress that Gamio and others held on to the idea that races are discreet biological 
entities associated with particular moral attributes. See: Dawson, A. S. (2004). Indian and nation in 
revolutionary Mexico. Tucson, University of Arizona Press, Navarrete, F. (2004). Las relaciones 
interétnicas en México. México. D.F., UNAM, Tenorio Trillo, M. (2009). Del Mestizaje a un siglo de 
Andrés Molina Enríquez. En busca de Molina Enríquez: cien años de Los grandes problemas nacionales. E. 





the mestizo national subject, which remained constitutively split between conflicting 
temporalities. The Indian emerged as the quintessential other against which the contours 
of a modern national collective were drawn, while at the same time it continued to haunt 
mestizo aspirations to modernity.17 One is indeed reminded here of Roger Bartra’s 
argument in The Cage of Melancholy (1992) that post-Revolutionary intellectuals 
“created a formidable myth in which the Mexicans carry the Indian, the barbarian, the 
savage, or the child like a homunculus within them. But the homunculus is shattered” (p. 
77). For example, in 1934 Samuel Ramos, the foremost representative of a literature 
concerned with defining the national character, discussed the disquieting proposition that 
traces of the Indian were indelibly inscribed at the very heart of the mestizo national 
subject:  
It must be supposed that the Indian has had an influence on the soul of the other 
Mexican groups (the mestizos and whites living in the city); of course, because he 
has mixed his blood with them. (…) The Indian is like those substances called 
“catalytic,” which provoke chemical reactions just by their presence. No Mexican 
thing can be subtracted from this influence, because the indigenous substance 
(masa indígena) is a thick element that covers everything in the country (Ramos 
1934: 78, my translation). 
Recasting the figure of the Indian, Ramos claimed that the pelado—the urban 
rabble—was the exemplary Mexican, a primitive, violent and resentful figure, not quite at 
home in urban modernity (Ibid: 71-72). But the Indian that endured in Ramos’ pelado 
                                                 
17 In “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead” Zizek argues that more than a series of shared values, national 
unity involves the myths, practices and forms of identification—which he calls the Nation-Thing—around 
which the members of a national collectivity organize their enjoyment (in Lacanian terminology). The 
contours and contents of the Nation-Thing are always drawn in relation to an Other, which personifies a 
threat to “our” enjoyment. But according to Zizek what is at stake in this fear of the Other is the traumatic 
fact that “we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack (castration) is original.” Zizek 
thus moves the discussion of the Lacanian constitutive lack of the subject and the fact that desire is always 
desire of the other to the level of the nation and to the problematic of national belonging and identification. 





had forever lost its moorings in local traditions and in an idealized countryside. Indeed, 
the mestizo as pelado was quintessentially an urban figure. According to Bartra:  
“[The pelado] is really a figure that has lost its traditions and lives in the context, 
still unfamiliar to him, of the urban industrial world. (…) He is trapped and 
therefore potentially violent and dangerous. His traditional spirit has been ruined, 
and in his heart modern cadences are not yet heard. (…) Hence the violence 
energy that he generates, which must be harnessed to create the cosmic race, to 
fortify the impoverished nation, to destroy the colonialist, to mold the 
revolutionary proletariat” (Bartra 1992: 91). 
Ramos’ representation of the pelado as a racialized other, indeed, a fallen Indian, 
resonates with a long history of racialization of the urban poor in Mexico City (expressed 
in such iconic figures as the lépero in the nineteenth century, or the contemporary naco), 
about which I will have more to say in the next section. But as national subject the pelado 
was to be redeemed by a modernizing state. While he stood for the urban rabble, the 
dreaded masses, he also represented el pueblo emerged from the revolution, and the 
utopian fantasies that it had unleashed. He stood as the subject of a strong, corporatist and 
modernizing state, which would channel, civilize and control him, while at the same time 
correcting persistent social imbalances and inequalities (Knight, 1990). In other words, 
through the tutelage of the post-revolutionary state the pelado would eventually be able 
to domesticate his “Indian” impulses and become a fully-fledged modern subject 
(Lomnitz 2001: 74). 
Tenorio (2009) has argued that the translation of this ideology of mestizaje into a 
post-revolutionary welfare state crucially disavowed the strong racial content—and the 
racial anxieties—that had saturated debates about national unity and the national subject. 
But mestizaje entailed not only the incorporation of the Indian into the mestizo national 




cosmopolitan lifestyle. Indeed, to paraphrase Monsivaís, the elites no longer saw 
themselves as criollo (of Spanish descent) but as “developmentalist” (Monsiváis 1995). It 
was precisely such disavowal, enabled by the post-revolutionary state’s capacity to 
integrate different class interests into its corporate structures as well as by its social 
programs—from land redistribution to popular education to social housing or a national 
public health system—that made a national “we” viable in the post-revolutionary era.18 
Tenorio indeed claims that the social history of mestizaje, which remains to be written, is 
a history of the welfare state, that is, of public health and social security. For the post-
revolutionary state, as I discussed in the Introduction, was inscribed within the twentieth 
century political horizon of social citizenship. Public universities, for example, were 
spaces of interclass sociability, that is, mestizo spaces. All this provided meaningful 
content to the idea that “we are all mestizo,” despite entrenched class inequalities and 
pervasive racialized discrimination.  
In other words, despite profound and persistent inequalities, post-revolutionary 
nationalism held the promise that the masses would eventually be “modernized,” that 
inequalities would, if not disappear, at least be reduced and that “we” would finally arrive 
at the future. But, as Lomnitz has argued (2001), starting in the 1980s—that is, in the 
context of Mexico’s turn to neoliberal policies and the state’s attenuation and eventual 
renouncement of its revolutionary rhetoric— such a model has gradually lost its viability 
and important fissures began to emerge. Two aspects of Lomnitz’s argument are 
especially important for my discussion. First, entrenched class (and racialized) 
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differences and inequalities could no longer be disavowed or contained by the state. In 
other words, a rift emerged between the nation and the state, “creating an image of a state 
that is controlled by and used for the benefit of a thin and unpopular Americanizing elite 
that is overlain on a popular, Mexican nation” (p. 119). Second, in a context of economic 
crisis, shrinking state protections, increased labor precariousness, a proliferation of street 
“informality,” and heightened criminality, especially in large cities, the racialized masses, 
the urban nacos, began to again be represented by the elites as a threatening force, no 
longer redeemable by modernization. But, Lomnitz adds, there is yet another shift: While 
post-revolutionary nationalism posited the pelado/naco as not yet modern, indeed as in 
need of state tutelage and guidance, what transpires today is a racialized image of the 
Mexican as a whole “as not fully at home in modernity:”  
[L]ike the colonial Indians, today’s nacos have not fully internalized their 
redemption, they are therefore unreliable moderns in the same way that Indians 
were unreliable Christians, and so the whole country is dyed with Indianess” 
(Ibid:114). 
Racism without Race, or, Güeros, Morenos and Nacos 
It is in light of this historical trajectory that we ought to analyze the subtle yet 
pervasive idioms of race that saturate quotidian interactions and inform entrenched forms 
of discrimination in Mexico City. They are evident, for example, in the advertisement of 
employment opportunities, where buena presentación—that is, good or proper 
appearance—is interpreted to mean lighter skin together with other class attributes such 
as certain notions of hygiene and appropriate dress. They are equally present in aesthetic 
categories that divide “beautiful” and “ugly” people, best exemplified in the common 




pretty” (Navarrete, 2004).  But, as I have argued throughout this chapter, more than 
referring to “race” as a set of perceived immutable biological traits, these racializing 
idioms index one’s status as a “modern” subject, pointing to a series of moral attributes 
associated with modernity, from intelligence to responsibility or beauty, as well to one’s 
class position. In this sense, while “race” doesn’t appear or emerge as a problem for 
many Mexicans, the racial imaginary of the Indian permeates everyday social relations, 
and divides social space between “good” and “bad,” “ugly” and “pretty,” “decent” and 
“indecent,” “reliable” or “dangerous” in effect construing class differences in terms of 
racialized incommensurability. 
Take, for example, Leonor’s continuous remarks about vecindad dwellers in Regina 
Street. A widow in her late fifties and comfortably middle class until the death of her 
husband a few years back, Leonor took a job as the cook and manager of Pedro’s bar 
(which she found through kinship ties with a member of Culture Space’s staff), in order 
to guarantee that her son could complete his private college education. Kind and 
affectionate, Leonor soon became a motherly figure for many regulars at the bar, always 
ready to give advice and to remind patrons not to drive while drunk. Like many new 
residents, she constantly made distinctions between the “good” and the “bad” among the 
poor and lower middle class residents of Regina, distinctions that, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2, were rather slippery. One day, for instance, as she offered to introduce me to a 
friend from her middle class residential neighborhood in the northern periphery of the 
city who had spent her childhood on Regina Street, Leonor clarified that “before” the 
inhabitants of the historic center were “decent and educated people,” in contrast to the 




in the popular masses, and was used to negatively describe the attributes of the 
inhabitants of Regina and surrounding streets, poor, uneducated, coarse and ultimately 
violent.  
Moreover, idioms of race serve as crucially mediating terms between different 
social groups. For instance, güero or güerito is a common form of address in urban public 
space, such as a street vendor addressing a potential customer by saying: “what can we 
offer you, güera?”(que te damos güera?). Such deployment often denotes a perceived 
class position of affluence, and yet the meaning of güero also contains a racializing 
dimension. In this second sense, it could be translated as “white” or “fair skinned.” Such 
deployment of güero in anonymous interaction introduces the interlocutors to the domain 
of personal relations an into a patron-client form of sociability. In other words, both the 
addressee and the speaker move from a space of presumed equality to the domain of 
racial and class hierarchies in Mexico and to a relation of proximity and distance, not 
unlike Bernardo and Giovanni at the party. But this is not always an innocuous operation. 
The artists and young professionals living in the historic center with whom I conducted 
my fieldwork felt that being perceived as güeros by the old inhabitants of the center 
enhanced their vulnerability to being attacked. 
Consider a story narrated by Nancy, an art student who was one of the first to move 
into a renovated building in Regina Street and, having meanwhile relocated elsewhere, 
visited there regularly during my fieldwork. It is a story about two friends of hers who 
visited someone in Regina and were robbed and violently attacked outside a vecindad as 
they went out to buy beers late at night: 




them] “give me everything you got, fucker,” and so they began to take out their 
things and they took their beers and [one of my friends] took off running, came 
here. [The other one] stayed by himself and told me that when he was ready to 
escape, they grabbed him by the waist, threw him on the floor, and started to kick 
him; they took his jacket, they took his wallet, took everything he had, and 
wanted to take him inside the vecindad, and yelled at him “pretty boy” [bonito], 
pretty boy, that’s what you get for being a pretty boy, fucker” and the guy is not 
even [a pretty boy], I mean, he’s darkish [morenón]. It is a resentment, “if you 
come to this building I’m going to fuck with you” (Interview with the author, 
January 21, 2007). 
Nancy framed the violence towards her friends in terms of racialized class 
differences and resentments. That is, her friend was attacked for being “cute” and for 
visiting a renovated building, which, she felt, marked him as “rich” in the eyes of the 
attackers (as discussed in Chapter 2). At the same time, according to Nancy conventional 
notions of beauty (based on skin color and other racialized criteria) would not consider 
him a “pretty boy” at all. The problem then presented itself of why would the not-even-
cute friend deserve such hatred. According to Nancy one could potentially be mistaken 
for someone one is not, becoming the unsuspecting victim of resentment. The story thus 
expressed both the persistence and slipperiness of racialized categories. 
In order to better understand the anxieties over class and racial difference expressed 
in Nancy’s story, as well as in the incident narrated by Bernardo, we need to consider 
their specifically spatial dimension. In other words, we need to place them within the 
context of an unusual residential contiguity brought about by the rescue project between 
different social classes, and specifically between a young cultural elite and poor or lower-
middle class tenement dwellers and street vendors. Indeed, precisely because of such 
particularity these events fall outside of the multiple but generally expected settings 




particular relations of proximity and distance, encounter and mis/recognition, that bear 
the traces of this spatial urban history but which also exceed it. 
Mixing and Unmixing in the City 
A birds-eye view of Mexico City would reveal a general pattern of residential 
segregation that started to take shape as the city began to outgrow its colonial boundaries 
in the late nineteenth century. According to this general geography, the majority of 
affluent areas are located in the South and West of the city, with better urban 
infrastructure and a higher concentration of services, educational and cultural institutions, 
green areas and heritage sites. In contrast, the city’s poorest areas are located in the 
industrial North and East, generally more overcrowded and lacking adequate 
infrastructure, and in which the majority of the city’s peripheral slums are concentrated 
(Ward 1998; Duhau 2003). However, a closer look at any given area would reveal a more 
complex pattern of proximity and distance between social classes.  
To begin with, throughout the city we find pockets of wealth and poverty, where 
different groups live in close, even contiguous, but always contrasting spaces (Duhau 
2003: 178).19 But more importantly for our discussion, this general pattern of residential 
segregation does not entail as rigid a social division of space. For even though it could be 
argued that the elites and middle classes of Mexico City have generally aimed to separate 
themselves from the lower classes—in what I call an aspiration of unmixing—they have 
                                                 
19 Perhaps the most striking examples of this contiguity and contrast are the middle and upper class 
residential developments—from suburb-like neighborhoods to gated communities—that stand side-by-side 
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proximity and distance, and the anxieties that it arouses among the elites have recently been explored in the 





historically depended on the latter’s proximity, especially for cheap domestic labor. 
Indeed, the aspiration of unmixing has historically been inseparable from the anxieties of 
actual mixing.   
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the elites began to abandon the socially 
mixed and densely populated spaces of the old city for new exclusive residential 
developments along Reforma, a wide and elegant boulevard built in the mid nineteenth 
century to connect the central city to the president’s residence in Chapultepec Park 
(Piccato 2001). During this time the city underwent radical transformations, as 
modernization and the separation of social classes into distinct urban spaces became a 
priority of the Porfirian regime (Tenorio Trillo 1996).20 A number of policies and 
regulations were implemented to eradicate the poor (and especially such delinquent 
figures as peddlers, drunkards, prostitutes and petty thieves) from the more elegant areas 
in the city’s urban center, and to prevent their appearance in the new wealthy residential 
developments. But despite efforts to enforce separation, the boundaries between rich and 
poor areas in the city were rather porous and interlocking and the exclusion of the poor 
from the elegant quarters of the city was never fully completed (Lear 2001; Piccato 
2001). 
The city’s explosive growth form the 1940s onwards intensified already existing 
patterns of spatial segregation. But a concomitant process must also be noted. Very little 
historiography of Mexico City after the 1940s is available. Yet, as the writings of 
chroniclers such as Jorge Ibaregüengoitia (2002) and of novelists such as Jose Emilio 
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Pacheco (1999) among others make clear, during this time there were a number of spaces 
of interclass sociability in the city. The historic center, for example, remained a multi-
class area at least until the late 1970s. Public universities, too, were spaces where 
different social classes came together. The parks and plazas of the city, and even public 
transportation, were socially mixed. This period indeed marked an era of social mobility 
and of the expansion of the urban middle classes (Loaeza 1988), a dynamic that started to 
unravel in the 1980s. And yet this image of social mobility and interclass sociability, as 
faithful to history as it may have been, disavows another important dimension of urban 
life during the golden years of “stabilizing development,” namely, the failure of the post-
revolutionary state to incorporate the bulk of the urban poor into its modernizing 
projects.21  
Be that as it may, the point I want to make is that while unmixing has historically 
been an aspiration of Mexican elites and middle-classes, spatial separation has always 
been an unfinished and unstable process in Mexico City.  It has always been disrupted by 
the presence of the urban poor, even if only during certain times of day, and haunted by 
racial anxieties. The close, even intimate spatial interactions between social classes take 
the form of patron-client relations. Take, for instance, relations between middle class 
employers and domestic workers. While there is little anthropological research on 
domestic work in Mexico City, my own observations on the topic resonate with Donna 
Goldstein’s (2003) highly nuanced and informative discussion of domestic work in Rio 
                                                 
21 This other dimension was described by Oscar Lewis in the 1960’s in his (in)famous ethnography The 
Children of Sánchez and by Luis Buñuel’s film Los Olvidados. See: Lewis, O. (1961). The children of 
Sánchez : autobiography of a Mexican family. New York,, Random House, Lomnitz, L. A. d. (1977). 





de Janeiro. Goldstein discusses the intimate relations between (often female) employers 
and domestic workers as “ambiguous affections,” that is, relations characterized by 
friendliness and proximity and yet by an unbreachable distance.  “The site of employer 
and domestic worker relations is really a site of class formation and differentiation,” she 
argues, where class differences and inequalities come to be seen as “natural.” 
But there is more to these interactions. Precisely because of their oscillation 
between proximity and distance they also allow the domestication of anxieties about the 
urban poor. Located in a hierarchical relation of dependency, the domestic worker 
becomes separated from the unknown and dangerous urban masses “out there.” A similar 
logic informs fleeting interactions in urban space. The figure of the franelero, literally the 
man with the cloth (which refers to a piece of red fabric used to indicate to drivers where 
to park their cars) is a paradigmatic example, to which I shall return in detail in Chapter 
5.  The franelero is usually a young male who charges “a tip” for keeping watch over cars 
that are parked on public (and presumably free) spots on the street. At the moment of 
transaction he is located within a relation of co-dependency between social classes. To be 
sure, the relations between domestic workers and their employers differ in numerous 
crucial ways from the fleeting transactions between car owners and people like the 
franeleros (not least because the latter mobilize a subtle threat of violence, along the lines 
of: “I’m not responsible for what might happen to your car if you don’t pay”). But they 
are informed by a similar patron-client form of sociability: social classes coming together 
in relations of hierarchical co-dependency, where each performs his or her place and 
which, precisely because of this, serve as sites of class formation and differentiation and 




Patron-client relations have been defined in social science literature as consisting of 
forms of reciprocal exchange between actors in an unequal power relation. (Fox 1994) In 
studies of political “clientelism”, “clients” appear as “actors who give their political 
support to a broker or a patron in exchange for particular goods, favors and services.” 
(Auyero 2000) Scholars of “clientelism” in post-revolutionary Mexico have argued that 
the state was the quintessential patron, distributing protection to a variety of clients, who 
in turn acted as patrons of their own clients (and so on, recursively, throughout social 
hierarchies) (Lomnitz 1982).  The “patron-client” relation is often thought about as one 
between the poor and corrupt political leaders, such as, for example, the paradigmatic 
case of street vendors. But patron-client relations have also been central to individual 
everyday activities in an unequal society like Mexico. In this broader sense, a patron is, 
as Foster described it in his classical study of Tzintzuntzan, “someone who combines 
status, power, influence, authority” and who enters into a relation with “someone of a 
lesser position—a client, who under specific circumstances he is willing to help” (Foster 
1963: 1282). 
The relation between Bernardo and Giovanni is of a somewhat different nature: 
they are neighbors, with only a wall separating the latter’s vecindad from Bernardo’s 
renovated building. As such it cannot be located within the usual sites of encounter 
between social classes. In this context, Bernardo’s appeal to patron-client forms of 
sociability becomes especially unstable. Giovanni has offered to protect Bernardo from 
potentially hostile and unwelcoming people in the barrio, a protection that Bernardo 
welcomes, acknowledging that he is in “their” territory. Indeed, Bernardo’s description of 




character, resentful and aggressive. In this respect the figure of Giovanni resonates with 
the pelado or the urban rabble, including the traces of the “Indian” within him and a 
temporality of backwardness. But their residential proximity and Bernardo’s own (neo) 
liberal sensibilities throw their seemingly natural differences into question, anchoring 
Bernardo within the violence of class and racialized difference in contemporary Mexico 
City. In this sense the interaction destabilizes Bernardo’s own aspirations to an imagined 
cosmopolitan modernity.   
Beyond the Pale… 
As we have seen, oscillating between proximity and distance, Bernardo’s relation to 
Giovanni exposes a particular ambivalence: the wish to be accepted into the barrio, the 
fascination with its urban charisma (Hansen and Verkaaik 2009), appears together with a 
sense of threat and apprehension, which bears the spatiotemporal imaginaries of 
mestizaje. But as I discussed in the introduction, the rescue is not only about an aspiration 
to experience and come to terms with the barrio and its characters. It is also about 
intervening upon both the space and its inhabitants. On the one hand, the rescue is 
concerned with redeeming and modernizing the masses that inhabit the historic center 
(and removing their atavisms). On the other hand, the rescue entails a spatiotemporal 
overhaul of the space, which would bring it into line with a cosmopolitan present not by 
reforming the masses who inhabit it, but rather by simply removing them from it. This 
inherent tension of the rescue was especially visible in regards to the presence of informal 




problem in the financial corridor.22  
In this better conserved and more elegant quarter, where buildings restored for 
residential use ranged from seventeenth century mansions to art-deco architectural gems, 
the Foundation had targeted a more affluent market, mainly young professionals such as 
Armando, whom we met in the introduction, and well-to-do, recently married couples 
like Camille and her husband Daniel. While their social networks of these residents 
overlapped with those of artists and cultural promoters living in the cultural corridor, 
there were also significant differences between both groups. Residents in the financial 
corridor generally came from affluent families and many grew up in the most exclusive 
neighborhoods of the city. They tended to have more economic security than their 
counterparts in the cultural corridor, with professions and occupations ranging from 
investment bankers or graphic designers to architects, members of the film and 
advertising industry, government officials, journalists and art and cultural promoters.  
The new residents of the financial corridor thus had a somewhat different 
experience of the historic center. To begin with, crime was not a central concern for 
people living there. Indeed, some viewed this area as safer than other parts of the city 
                                                 
22 These streets were once the wealthiest and most exclusive quarters of the city, where the elites dwelled in 
monumental palaces. And although it gradually lost its residential character it continued serving as the 
city’s business and commercial center well into the twentieth century. While its economic centrality 
declined as the city further expanded in the last decades of the twentieth century, the financial corridor 
remained the site of important commercial and governmental activities, now increasingly mixed with 
tourism functions. Indeed, this area alone contains many of the Historic Center’s heritage sites, as well as 
the majority of its hotels, restaurants, and museums Coulomb , R. (2000). "Gobernabilidad democrática y 
sostenibilidad financiera para el Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México." L'Ordinaire Latino Americain 
181: 65-80., Thus, although its gradual deterioration proceeded hand in hand with that of the rest of the 
historic center, it never reached the levels of dereliction and abandonment visible in other neighborhoods to 
the south and especially to the east and north of the Zócalo Monnet, J. (1995). Usos e imágenes del centro 
histórico de la ciudad de México. Mexico, D.F., Departamento del Distrito Federal, Centro de Estudio 
Mexicanos y Centroamericanos, Suárez Pareyó, A. (2004). "El Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México al 





thanks to the heavy police presence and the sophisticated security apparatus that had been 
introduced as part of the rescue. Moreover, there were very few vecindades in this area, 
and hence almost no troublesome neighbors to be reckoned with. Indeed, the trope of 
standing out because one has arrived to a barrio—central to the narratives of artists living 
and working in Regina—was not as salient among new residents here. But much like the 
artists living in Regina and its surrounding streets, residents of this area were attracted to 
the historic center by a yearning to inhabit Mexico City as a vibrant, cosmopolitan urban 
space. And yet, just like in Regina, a sense of menace permeated the new residents’ 
conversations and narratives about living there. Here, however, the menace was not 
embodied in the figure of the neighbor but in the figure of the street vendor. The latter 
appeared as a nebulous force, depicted with clearly racialized and racist undertones as a 
spreading disease or plague, and—most worryingly from their perspective—possibly a 
chronic condition.  
Such concerns routinely took central stage during meetings of the Historic Center 
Residents Association, a tenants organization that brought together a number of new 
residents’ who lived in this area.23 Take, for example, a conversation that took place one 
Wednesday morning in April 2006, when the Residents Association was holding its 
                                                 
23 The Residents Association originally congregated at one of the restored buildings owned and operated by 
the, where a group of neighbors came together to discuss and act upon their dissatisfaction with the 
Foundation handled their concerns as tenants. But it quickly opened its doors to other new inhabitants of 
the Historic Center, including those living in the few renovated buildings that were not the property of the 
Foundation, as well as to prominent business owners in the area. When I started frequenting its meetings 
and activities in February 2006, just a few months after its official foundation in November 2005, the 
Association was composed of a few dedicated individuals who served as unofficial liaisons with both 
government officials and Slim’s Foundation. The association’s stated mission thus became broader: to 
ensure the proper implementation and maintenance of the Rescue, especially the removal of street vendors 
and the continuation of public security measures. But most importantly, the Association brought new 
residents together in a myriad of social events, from private parties to restaurant openings and art 





weekly meeting in a recently opened café. As usual, there were very few people at the 
gathering. Present as always was Armando, who lived in a spacious and sparsely 
furnished apartment a few blocks from the café. Gabriela, an academic in her mid thirties 
was also in attendance. After many years living in the United States, where she had 
pursued graduate studies in history, Gabriela had returned to Mexico in 2005 and settled 
with her husband, a member of Mexico’s diplomatic corps, in an apartment they had 
recently bought in the vicinity. A politically committed and resourceful person, Gabriela 
was active in a non-governmental organizations working to foster transparency in public 
life and she was also an enthusiastic member of the Residents’ Association. She, for 
example, was responsible for organizing public meetings between residents of the historic 
center and the candidates running for mayor in 2006, in which they were invited to 
discuss their plans specifically for this area. Finally, beside myself, there was a new face 
at the meeting: Juan, a forty two year old Argentinean who worked as an independent 
publicist. Both his apartment and his studio, which he used primarily for photo shootings, 
were located in a stunning art-deco building on a busy pedestrian street nearby.  
The tone of the conversation that morning expressed the usual sense of urgency that 
discussions of the street vendors problem exuded. Juan complained about the recurrent 
and abrupt changes of voltage that happened on a regular basis in his street and which 
negatively impacted his work. He blamed street vendors for such occurrences, claiming 
that they illegally connected to the street’s electricity grid, creating disruptions in the 
system. Armando seconded this complaint and added that, because street vendors often 
occupied entire sidewalks, walking became an almost impossible and always unpleasant 




problem of street vendors was “to build an underground tunnel below the historic center 
and to concentrate them all down there.” “Or at least to put them in the subway,” replied 
Juan, further adding that the biggest obstacle to their removal was the vendors collusion 
with the police. Just a few days earlier, he reported, outside his building, he heard one 
vendor warning another not to set his stand, as the police were about to make their daily 
round.  
Street vendors were indeed a recurring theme not only in meetings of the Residents 
Association but, more generally, in quotidian conversations among new residents of the 
historic center with whom I conducted my fieldwork. The most common expression that I 
heard in reference to street vendors was that they were “a plague that keeps reproducing 
itself” (which cast the phenomenon as a sort of natural disaster). But there were many 
others: “filthy,” “noisy,” “rats” (that is criminals), “thieves,” “corrupt,” “illegal,”  “a 
nuisance,” “an unpleasant sight,” “a bomb on the brink of explosion.” Interwoven with 
such negative images, new residents referred to street vendors as the embodiment of the 
forms of illegality, corruption and clientelist political practices that have hindered the 
consolidation of democracy in Mexico, a topic that I will develop in detail in Chapter 4. 
While most vendors had already been removed from this area, a number of them 
used to concentrate around the subway station at the intersection of Tacuba Street and a 
pedestrian walkway with several renovated buildings, as well as in a handful of other 
scattered intersections. The police intermittently removed them from the area. Their 
presence there was thus neither constant, nor permanent, nor, for that matter, excessively 
numerous. It ranged from several of them on some days to few isolated ones or even none 




the racialized masses, gestured to the always latent possibility of their return en masse 
and suggested that the promise of rescue could turn out to be void. Roberto, the cultural 
promoter and small entrepreneur who owned a cultural venue in the financial corridor 
and whom we met in the introduction, voiced the space-time relations of race and class in 
the historic center quite clearly by formulating his concern about street vendors in terms 
of “barbarian invasions” waiting to erupt at any moment.  
And yet, as I hinted above, the rescue also entailed a certain incitement to reform 
the urban rabble, a modernizing imperative to educate the barbarian masses into modern 
standards of citizenship rather than to banish them from the center altogether. In the next 
chapter, I will examine in detail how new constructions of citizenship and democracy in 
neoliberal Mexico express themselves within the rescue project. To conclude the present 
chapter, however, I would like to show how the racial imaginaries that I have discussed, 
and specifically the construction and experience of class differences in terms of racialized 
incommensurability, saturate such idioms of citizenship.  
Alfonso, a civil servant in his late twenties, and Marisol, a twenty four year-old 
student of art, were a recently married couple living in one of the renovated buildings on 
Regina Street. They arrived shortly after the violent incident that I discussed in Chapter 2 
(the break-in during Eduardo’s party) and quickly befriended other residents in the 
building, like Omar, the performance artist working in the cultural center whom I also 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Alfonso grew up in a working class neighborhood in 
the southern periphery of the city and pulled himself up the social ladder. Although very 
involved in the social life of his building, he stood apart from the rest of his neighbors 




working long hours) and wore a suit and a tie on a daily basis. He spoke in a formal 
manner (although he cursed often) and his training as a political scientist often became 
evident during conversations, as he would refer to particular laws, even to specific 
segments of those laws, when discussing, for example, the legal status of some of the 
street’s building or Slim’s participation in the rescue.  
Perhaps because of his provenance and his own being out of place in his building, 
Alfonso was especially insistent that he and Marisol kept their interactions with old 
residents of the street and its surroundings to bare minimum. They would for sure make 
incursions to the small store down the street or to the tortilla shop in the callejón, but 
Alfonso was adamant about the importance of keeping distance. Indeed this was a topic 
that he mentioned constantly. During an interview Alfonso elaborated:  
My cousin tends to arrive [to visit] a bit drunk, and he greets the people over 
there, “What’s up my friend?”—the guys across the street, and he talks to them 
and everything. And I told him very clearly: “I do not want you to talk to those 
guys. If you want to talk to them, talk to them and leave. Don’t enter my place. 
And under no circumstance do I want you to invite them in fucker. Never, ever.” 
“Hey, but if they’re the guys”(la banda, as in a gang of friends). “They are not 
the guys, those assholes are people that live on the same street and have their own 
logic, and I don’t want to engage them, because they would eventually end up 
entering the building, and that’s not good for us, because the building is not made 
for that, it doesn’t have strong doors. I mean no! (Interview with author, 
November 18, 2006) 
For Alfonso, there was no possibility of identification with old residents. Unlike 
Bernardo and others, he instead insisted that they must be kept at a distance at all times. 
And yet, while he wanted no personal intimacy with them, Alfonso partook of the 
pedagogical discourse of rescue. Consider, for example, a couple of interactions with the 




Alfonso:  My first contact, my first friction, with the people of the barrio 
was with the woman at the (small grocery) store. I went to buy 
some beers, and I knew how much beers cost, and the lady 
increased the prices of everything by two or three pesos. So she 
says, “it is this much.” And I say, “why so much?”  And she says, 
“because that’s how much beer costs here, always.” And I say, “so 
you have your own prices then?” “Yes.” And I say, “and you have 
never been visited by the procuraduría?  A recommendation about 
it should be in order.” (…) And actually yesterday something very 
interesting happened—you gradually start to get the dynamics of 
the barrio. We were arriving home from the movies at around 10 
at night, and Marisol tells me… 
Marisol: I say—a guy was standing by his car, looking at it—and I say, 
“ouch, someone broke that guy’s car window, we must file a police 
complaint or something… (…) 
Alfonso: There was a lot of broken glass on the street. And I say, “that’s 
terrible” and we start to walk and then I thought—because the car 
was in front of the store, and besides they [the owner and her 
family] are always sitting right outside the store. (…) And then I 
said out loud, “these things should not happen in this street and the 
way to prevent them is by working together…” 
Marisol:  Filing complaints! 
Alfonso:  So then I turn to the store and I say to the woman, “did you see that 
this guy’s window was broken?” [And she replied:] “No, no, I 
didn’t notice. God only knows when it happened!” (…) And I said, 
“well it is terrible that these things happen and we don’t notice,” as 
if saying, “give me a break, if you see that someone breaks a car’s 
window, do something!” 
Alejandra:  You think they did see? 
Alfonso:  No, I don’t know and I don’t care. That’s not the point. The point 
is that, in a polite but consistent way, we must get these people to 
engage (Interview with the author, November 18, 2006). 
In the fragment that I have just quoted Alfonso positioned himself on the civilizing 
end of the longstanding temporal, spatial, and racial relations that I have mapped out in 
this chapter. In other words, he conceived of himself as standing on the side of modern 




behaviors, such as arbitrarily incrementing the prices of products. But he also activated 
(neo) liberal idioms of citizenship, according to which one ought to take responsibility for 
one’s own actions and actively participate in public life. Like Leon Krauze with the 
intolerant teenager of his newspaper editorial, Alfonso took it upon himself to educate the 
storeowner, that is, to encourage her to partake in civic values, such as reporting 
transgression or illegal behavior. But from his perspective she ultimately appeared as 
beyond the pale of such redemption and indeed, as I will argue in Chapter 4, as beyond 






Clients of Slim 
Introduction 
It was a cool February evening and the views of the National Palace and the 
Cathedral from a roof-terrace bar that overlooked the Zócalo were magnificent. Furnished 
with lounge-style couches and minimalist lamps that cast a dim light, this was a favorite 
meeting place for new residents, executives of nearby banks and young civil servants 
working for the local government. On this occasion, the Residents’ Association was 
holding a town hall meeting. Government and police officials were expected to talk about 
the rescue and address quality of life concerns, particularly the problem of parking in the 
financial corridor, which was a foremost concern among new residents. Since this was 
the Association’s first high profile meeting, Armando and Gabriela, its most committed 
members, had worked hard to secure a large turnout. In addition to their own 
communication channels (primarily email lists and word of mouth) they had used the 
Foundation’s networks to reach out to artists and cultural entrepreneurs living or working 
in the cultural corridor. Therefore, in contrast to the handful of inhabitants of the financial 
corridor who usually frequented their meetings, this occasion brought together a far wider 
assortment of people—residents, gallery owners, artists, cultural promoters, restaurateurs 
and investors—all loosely connected to each other through their involvement with the 
rescue and more specifically with Slim’s Historic Center Foundation.  
With a live band playing jazz as the guests arrived, the event exuded a cool and 




moved across the terrace, introducing themselves to new faces or engaging in small talk 
with previous acquaintances, glasses of wine in their hands. Armando, who could not 
hide his satisfaction with the large turnout, enthusiastically greeted people as they 
arrived, while Gabriela made sure that the panel was ready, name-holders and 
microphones in place. Donning a suit for the occasion Bernardo chatted with Andres, a 
young executive of the Foundation, and with various members of its board of directors, a 
group of affluent, middle-aged women locally known as “the aunts of Slim.” Pedro, 
dressed in corduroy pants and jacket, a distinctly formal outfit for his standards, sat in a 
table nearby with Monica, also formally attired in a purple suede dress and black leather 
boots. They were accompanied by Mario, a very young chef who had recently opened a 
restaurant and concert venue in the cultural corridor and who was struggling to keep his 
business afloat on a low budget.  
Present was also Luis, an engineer in his late twenties responsible for the award-
winning renovation of a building owned by his family (one of few new residential 
complexes in the financial corridor that were not property of Slim), together with some of 
his tenants, many of whom he counted as friends as well. Juan, a publicist who had 
recently moved to the historic center, conversed with Carla, a visual artist, and Mariana, a 
graphic designer, both of them regulars at new residents’ events. Camille and her 
husband Daniel, who would soon open a restaurant nearby, stood in a corner with other, 
already well-established restaurateurs.  
When approximately sixty people had arrived Armando invited all to take their 
places so that the presentations could begin. Using the formal demeanor appropriate for 




the director of the Fideicomiso, the local governments office in charge of the rescue, and 
the spokesperson for the historic center’s security program—and thanked them for 
listening to the concerns of new residents. A slim, good-looking woman of delicate 
manners and affable smile, the Fideicomiso’s director was an experienced politician who 
had occupied various high profile positions in the local administration before mayor 
AMLO put her in charge of the rescue in 2002. She was highly esteemed by new 
residents and investors alike. But while most described her as well-intentioned and 
efficient, they considered her incapable—citing corruption and lack of support in the 
local government—of adequately handling the center’s most pressing problems, 
especially the increasing return of street vendors to the renovated area of the financial 
corridor.  
The director presented an overview of the rescue, insisting that this was an 
economic and not a cultural endeavor,  “a crucial project for the future and the economic 
viability of the city.” Many jobs had been created since the renovation works began, she 
reported, and the numbers of visitors and tourists had dramatically increased. Several 
formerly “invaded” (invadidos) spaces had been recently “recovered” (recuperados) 
while others, like the sidewalks around the Zocalo, remained a challenge. But a question 
remained, she continued. How to make life more enjoyable in the historic center, with all 
the noise, pollution, traffic and lack of parking? “We must understand that [this] is not a 
private residential neighborhood. There are two million people passing through [this area] 
everyday.” She assured her audience that the Fideicomiso was currently working on a 
project to modernize public parking lots through fiscal incentives, but this would 




The police’s spokesperson, a lawyer in his late twenties named Tomás, who had 
worked in a private law firm before joining the local administration a few years back, 
declared that his job was “to establish links with citizens”, and as if to prove his point he 
referred to multiple meetings he had recently held with new residents to discuss the 
problem of parking. An official request (oficio) for special parking documents had 
already been submitted to the higher authorities, he reported, and the police were waiting 
for an answer. Additionally, police officers had been instructed to allow new residents 
vehicular access to the historic center during protests and blockades by presenting proof 
of address. “Some of you have mentioned,” he continued, “that [police] officers don’t do 
their jobs.” And he encouraged the audience to report such cases, or any other problem, 
by calling the police’s command center, for which he provided their “direct” (i.e. non 
public) number. But he also encouraged new residents to respect parking hours in the 
financial corridor: “we have traffic regulations that we must respect.”  
Daytime parking was indeed strictly prohibited in all renovated streets. The police 
would place a wheel clamp on any car within minutes after it parked there, and would 
charge a four-hundred-peso fine for releasing it.1 But while parking was officially 
allowed in the area after six in the evening, new residents complained that their cars were 
sometimes nevertheless fined, or even towed. They demanded more transparent 
regulations and clearer parking signals. But they also asked for special permits to park 
outside their buildings at night. 
After the presentations Armando reminded all those who wanted parking 
                                                 
1 Although traffic in the historic center improved drastically after the introduction of this regulation in June 
2003, it remained highly unpopular among the public. Most registered complaints about the police in the 





documents to write down their information on slips of paper placed at a table near the 
entrance. He also encouraged the audience to help themselves to a copy of the Civic 
Culture Act brochure, which summarized a recently passed local legislation dealing with 
“quality of life” infractions (See Chapter 5). “We suffer from noise and other annoyances 
that are prohibited by [this law],” declared Armando.  “The rescued zone ought to be 
clear of street vendors, so we must denounce them when we see them. (…) The homeless 
can also be removed.”  
The contours of a community of new residents were delineated at this meeting: not 
only as composed of a generally young, educated and culturally sophisticated group of 
people, but also as engaged with the city’s public life and committed to the recovery of 
the historic center. And yet that which granted a semblance of coherence to this 
community, which enabled its coming together and which guaranteed its sustainability 
was present in the meeting only in absence, though no less forcefully for that: Carlos 
Slim. To begin with, Slim had created the conditions for the convergence of this rather 
diverse group of people in the historic center— appropriate conditions for investment, 
residential spaces, support for the arts. He was thus, too, what continued to connect most 
of the meeting attendees, as many were tenants of his properties, artists working for his 
cultural projects, or executives of his Foundation. But most importantly, I would argue, 
he rendered their otherwise sometimes extraordinary expectations and demands 
imaginable, such as obtaining special parking permits in this chaotic and heavily transited 
area.  
Slim’s immense political capital and summoning power and prestige distinguished 




economic interest in the historic center, he stood as the quintessential embodiment of the 
moral authority of civil society working to recover the symbolic heart of the nation from 
crime, disorder and illegality. In fact, precisely because Slim was a spectacularly 
successful businessman (at the time of my fieldwork the third richest in the world 
according to Forbes magazine, by now the first) and, simultaneously, the representative 
of civil society’s moral authority, he was perceived by the new residents of the historic 
center with whom I conducted my fieldwork as a powerful guarantor of the promise of 
rescue, that is, of the transformation of the historic center into a cosmopolitan urban 
space.  
The new residents related to the figure of Slim in his double appearance as 
businessman (and a generous patron of the arts) and as the embodiment of civil society. 
This complicated relation expressed itself forcefully in the activities of the Residents 
Association. As I described in the previous chapter, the association emerged as a group of 
Slim’s tenants coming together to demand good services in exchange for their rents, but it 
quickly opened its doors to other new inhabitants of the historic center and to certain 
business owners in the area. It thus formulated its mission in terms of organized civil 
society working to ensure the success of the rescue, and especially the removal of street 
vendors and the continuation of public security measures. What became evident with the 
association was therefore how the figure of Slim, which enabled and authorized it, 
oscillated from landlord to the moral leader of civil society.  And with this oscillation the 
image of his clients, too, shifted.  
The meeting I described above thus captured the porous and always shifting 




public space, indeed as the symbolic heart of the nation, and on the other hand a private 
business enterprise. It showed how new residents navigated this porosity. In other words, 
the meeting revealed how the nature of the rescue project implies a fundamental 
illegibility, for the historic center’s new residents, between their roles as committed 
citizens partaking of a national public project and as clients of Carlos Slim. 
The redrawing of the public-private distinction under late capitalism has received 
ample attention in recent scholarly literature (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Hibou 2004), 
together with the redistribution of risks and responsibilities from the state to society that 
it appears to entail (Rose, Barry et al. 1996). Most work has concentrated on mapping this 
reconfiguration, on understanding how the state governs from a distance, or how it makes 
itself present in unexpected sites, such as for example non-governmental organizations 
(Trouillot 2001). According to this literature, what is of the state and what is not has 
become particularly unstable in this historical context. In contrast to this approaches, 
which seem to take the public/private distinction for granted, others have argued that the 
line dividing state and society, public and private, is constitutively porous and unstable, 
indeed that it is in itself an effect of state power (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991).   
The question then becomes how the state effect is produced at different moments, 
and with what political implications. Along these lines, Das and Poole (2004) have 
argued that the illegibility of its rules, procedures and practices is a central feature of  the 
modern state and of the ways in which it penetrates into and is experienced by local 
communities (See also: Aretxaga 2003).2 Drawing on these insights, I aim to understand 
                                                 
2 Das’s has argued that tied to the state' technologies of writing and to the idea of the signature, the state’s 
illegibility enables it oscillate between a “rational” mode—a set of rules and regulations—and a “magical” 




how new residents navigate the elusive distinction between the state and the private as 
represented by the figure of Carlos Slim. I argue that the private/public (in) distinction 
that the rescue entails and inscribes upon the historic center results in a series of 
illegibilities, for example, of the role and location of the police. This, in turn, entails 
another crucial illegibility, namely, that of the distinction between the “citizen” and the 
“client.” In other words, while claiming the position of “citizens” (invested in a civic 
culture that has surmounted an authoritarian and antidemocratic politics) new residents 
continuously slide into the position of “clients” (people who enjoy special group 
privileges and protections via the mediation of Slim), until the distinction between these 
two forms of political belonging collapses. This distinction, then, is at once crucial for 
and untenable within their cosmopolitan class position of new residents. 
I first explore the historical and political context—the conditions of possibility—for 
Slim to stand as an emblem of civil society. I analyze how in this context the figure of the 
street vendor has been construed as the ultimate embodiment of outmoded forms of 
inhabiting public space and thus as the antithesis of civil society. I then move on to 
explore the ambiguous location of Slim within the historic center’s policing project. 
Finally, I analyze how the figure of Slim mediates interactions between new residents, 
street vendors and the police. In such interactions, I show, the boundary between citizen 
and client collapses. 
                                                                                                                                                 
contradictory aspects of the legibility and iterability of the written sign suggest that forms of governance 
instituted by the state through technologies of writing also open up “the possibility of forgery, imitation and 
the mimetic performance of its powers”. Das, V. (2004). The Signature of the State. The Paradox of 
Illegibility. Anthropology in the Margins of the State. V. Das and D. Poole. Santa Fe, School of American 





The Rise of King Midas  
“He is a King Midas, who turns everything he touches into something beautiful,” 
said the clerk of a print shop on Regina Street in reference to Slim and his participation in 
the rescue. This was not the only time that I heard people describe Slim as King Midas 
during my fieldwork, although most often the reference was to gold, rather than to 
beauty. For Slim’s spectacular rise to one of the world’s wealthiest people is common 
knowledge in Mexico. Some regard this rise with admiration, the deserved good fortune 
of a hard working, brilliant man who creates thousands of jobs for Mexicans; others view 
him with pride, as if his astonishing wealth was a collective accomplishment; many 
criticize him as a ruthless monopolist.  
Be that as it may, Slim’s economic climb and his position as an ambiguous symbol 
of civil society is intimately bound with Mexico’s recent history. He first attained 
national and international prominence after buying the state-owned telephone company 
Teléfonos de México (later renamed TELMEX) in 1990. Already a successful 
businessman by the time of this acquisition, he had an especially close relationship to 
President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), responsible for consolidating the neoliberal 
restructuring of Mexico’s economy, which included the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises that his predecessor Miguel De la Madrid had started.3 Along with other 
businessmen and women, Slim was a prominent protagonist of the transformation of the 
post-revolutionary state’s relation to national business elites.  
Despite the populist stance of the regime, and although business elites were never 
                                                 
3 As Minister of Planning and Budget Salinas was in fact the main architect of economic reforms during De 





part of the PRI’s three corporate sectors (worker, peasant and popular), they maintained 
an intimate and highly advantageous relation with the state throughout the twentieth 
century. Although some of the regime’s policies went against the interests of these elites, 
(for example land reform) the overall economic direction of the post-revolutionary state, 
and especially after the 1940s when industrialization became the primary goal, was 
favorable to private capital, national and international.4 But, rhetorically describing itself 
as the representative of the popular masses, the state generally disavowed—at least in 
public—its cozy and corrupt relations with business elites (Knight 1996). Official state 
rhetoric often decried these elites as antinational, and at some specific moments, there 
were important ruptures between business interests and the state.5 This public relation, 
however, had changed by the mid to late 1980s. At that time, Slim and other business 
people openly supported the candidacy of Carlos Salinas. The Salinas millionaires, as 
they came to be known, benefited from this support via the privatization of state 
enterprises. Slim, at the time dubbed “the favorite businessman of (Salinas) presidency,” 
came to be identified in popular imagination as the main beneficiary of Salinas’s reforms 
(Rodríguez Reyna 1992). 
As is well known, Mexico’s turn to neoliberal policies followed the massive 
financial crisis that engulfed the country in the early 1980s, which further delegitimized 
                                                 
4 This is an overtly abridged description of more than seven decades, in which, to be sure, relations between 
the private sector and the state were constantly changing. For a detailed history of these relations see: 
Camp, R. (1989). Entrepeneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
5 One critical rupture between the post-revolutionary state and business elites happened in 1982, as 
President López Portillo responded to the growing economic crisis by condemning the massive capital 
flight as anti-Mexican and nationalizing the banks, a desperate attempt to re-anchor the legitimacy of the 
ruling party in the narrative of the Revolution. See: Lomnitz, C. (2008). "Narrating the Neoliberal Moment: 





an already challenged post-revolutionary state. As elsewhere, here too the usual panoply 
of Washington-inspired structural adjustment policies was implemented during the 1980s 
and the 1990s. These ranged from trade liberalization (most notably the North American 
Free Trade Agreement) to the privatization of state-owned companies and the opening to 
private capital of areas previously reserved for state investment; or from the reduction of 
public spending in health and education to the restructuring of poverty alleviation 
programs (Weiss 1996). As elsewhere, too, precisely the authoritarian character of the 
regime, which enjoyed both excessive presidential power and lack of congressional 
opposition (the PRI only lost its congressional majority in 1997), allowed for the 
relatively rapid and successful introduction of the reforms. While they were controversial 
and mired in accusations of corruption, they also generated significant expectations, 
especially among the middle classes, who had seen their incomes and their quality of life 
dramatically plummet in the aftermath of the 1982 crisis (Lomnitz 2003). Indeed, against 
such a bleak background, president Salinas’ promises to bring about economic and 
political modernization and to lead Mexico into the “first world” were enthusiastically 
received. 
In the case of Telmex, Salinas fast-tracked privatization, ensuring that the process 
would be completed during his presidency, in order to capitalize on the political gains of 
his “modernization” program. This resulted in, among other things, deferring regulation. 
As opposed to what the World Bank and foreign investors advocated, namely, a 
regionally segmented company that would entail more competition, the privatization 
favored a nationally integrated company. This option was not only favored by Slim, but 




privatization off the ground (Mariscal 2004: 90). 6  In the end, the privatization conferred 
enormous political power on Slim. For instance, Telmex was the only company trading 
stocks internationally, so moves in its stock had a significant impact on the financial 
stability of the country (Ibid.: 92-93). Moreover, as part of the privatization package, the 
company was guaranteed a monopoly for several years before the market would open up 
to competitors.  
But regulation has only been partially implemented and competition remains scant. 
Critics have accused Slim of keeping competitors at bay through questionable practices. 
As an editorialist for the New York Times put it, Slim’s monopoly has come to be seen as 
“the natural order of things” (Porrter 2007). Between the privatization of Telmex in the 
early 1990s and his coronation by Forbes as the world’s richest person in March 2010 
Slim’s fortune skyrocketed from one to 53 billion dollars.7 As Slim’s staggering rise has 
gained him national and international fame, he has increased his philanthropic endeavors 
and public profile; at the same time he has been openly denounced for his monopolistic 
practices. And yet, as I already mentioned, he remains an ambivalent figure in Mexico, 
revered as a national entrepreneur, a Midas king who turns everything into gold, and 
reviled as an obstacle to the country’s true liberalization.  
The history of Mexico’s neoliberalization is, of course, part of a global re-
                                                 
6 The union demanded maintaining its structure and guarantees of no-layoffs, which would have been 
difficult in a disaggregated and segmented company. These demands were granted in a 1989 agreement 
between President Salinas and the telephone workers union leader, in exchange for their support of the 
privatization. Moreover, workers were given shares of the company.  Mariscal, J. (2004). 
"Telecomunications Reform in Mexico from a Comparative Perspective." Latin American Politics and 
Society 46(4): 83-114. 
 
7 2.1 billon dollars in 1992, 3.7 billon dollars in 1993, and 6.6 en 1994. Salas Porras, A. (2000). "Hacia un 
nuevo mecenazgo político? Democracia y participación electoral de los grandes empresarios en México." 





orientation of the economy that has seen the gradual dismantlement of the welfare state 
(either as a reality or as an aspiration) and the concomitant reconfiguration of state-
society relations (Rose, Barry et al. 1996). In Mexico, the history of neoliberalization has 
been tied to the demise of the twentieth century revolution and to the regime that 
stemmed from it. For decades, the legitimacy of this regime rested on the rhetoric of the 
revolution as a still unfinished project. The promises of the revolution were yet to be 
delivered, perennially postponed in the interest of economic growth and social stability, 
which the state prided itself to have accomplished while continuing to represent the 
interests of the popular masses (Joseph and Nugent 1994; Meyer 1995; Knight 1996). 
The strength of the state crucially rested on its inclusionary appearance, that is, on its 
capacity to appear as a social arbiter, or as the regulator of social relations in a context of 
inequality, class fractures and the specter of revolutionary violence. Thus, while the 
authoritarian character of the post-revolutionary regime facilitated the implementation of 
neoliberal reforms, this very same process in turn hastened the loss of its legitimacy 
(Lomnitz 2008).   
Carlos Slim’s fortune and prominence have emerged out of this transition. A direct 
beneficiary of his close links to the PRI regime and of the latter’s less than transparent 
privatizations and a monopolist who fiercely combats competition on his own turf, he has 
also become the symbol of an entrepreneurial, hard-working and forward looking 
Mexico. Moreover, for many he stands as a moral figure who can represent the interests 
of the nation, a point that I will elaborate in more detail in the next section. Slim’s power 
and influence on Mexico’s public life is perhaps well captured in the following statement. 




outcome might impact the rescue and Slim’s interests in the area. He gave me a 
patronizing smile, as if he could not believe my naïveté, and replied: “Whoever wins has 
to sit and discuss with [Slim]. Not the other way around.” 
Civil Society to the Rescue  
The rescue of the historic center was by no means Carlos Slim’s only appearance as 
the moral authority of civil society. Simultaneously with his involvement in the rescue, in 
the Fall of 2005 Slim was the originator and the main promoter of a much higher profile 
project: the “National Agreement for Unity, Rule of Law, Development, Stability, and 
Employment,” also known as the Chapultepec Agreement. This was a twelve-page 
document that, claiming to be the initiative of a diverse group of citizens and to express 
the views of civil society, contained a series of proposals for putting the country on the 
right course towards the future: consolidating democracy, strengthening the rule of law, 
and accelerating economic growth through private investment. All Mexicans were invited 
to sign the Agreement, which began as follows:  
The signatories of this document propose a National Agreement to all Mexican 
society. As members of society we assume our co-responsible role in the 
advancement of the country, respectful of the State’s constitutional responsibility 
to coordinate and channel the efforts of all Mexicans towards Mexico’s 
development. 
The Agreement was presented to the public in a solemn yet glamorous ceremony at 
the Chapultepec Palace, the magnificent nineteenth century presidential residence turned 
museum, on September 29, 2005. More than three hundred famous celebrities and public 
intellectuals attended the carefully staged and highly publicized event and ceremoniously 




intellectuals, journalists, distinguished scientists, pop singers, soap opera actors, and 
football players, among others. After the public signing ceremony Slim and other 
organizers, which included the president of the most powerful business association in the 
country, a Nobel prize winning scientist and a famous pop singer, offered a press 
conference to further elaborate on the context and the content of the document. Slim 
presented the Agreement as: “an initiative of civil society that originates in the productive 
sector, workers and businesspeople” but that also included the perspectives of other 
“sectors” of society. Indeed, Slim and his fellow speakers constantly reiterated that this 
was a consensual and inclusive initiative, which reflected months of intense debate. But if 
the contours of civil society remained vague in their declarations, as indeed he referred to 
“sectors,” a language reminiscent of the corporatism of the old regime, its force seemed 
all too clear.  As an initiative of civil society, the Agreement was taken to represent the 
general sentiments of the nation, and, as such, to stand beyond criticism. In the words of 
pop singer Emmanuel:  
I think that the [points in the Agreement] are good for all Mexicans. I don’t think 
that there is a sector or a Mexican that says that these points, well, they do not 
strengthen my way of life, and they don’t strengthen my country and my sector. I 
think these points help us all. 
In this declaration, too, it was unclear whether civil society was composed of 
“Mexicans” or “sectors,” but its force was nonetheless reiterated. As members of civil 
society the Agreement’s promoters presented themselves, and the document they 
produced, as bestowed with seemingly unquestionable moral authority and as 
representing principles that every Mexican would obviously want to promote, which 




authority, moreover, appeared in sharp contrast to a tainted, corrupt and power-hungry 
political class and an incompetent state. In other words, without renouncing to the 
language of “sectors” or organized groups, the Chapultepec Agreement construed civil 
society and the citizens that it congregated as ethical beings, morally superior to corrupt 
politicians, and co-responsible for the country’s development and future.   
In the background of the Agreement stood the very real possibility that AMLO, by 
then the candidate of a center-left coalition, would win the presidential election in July 
2006, with the campaign slogan “for the good of all, the poor first.” But as he traveled the 
country to promote the Agreement and to recruit adherents in what some commentators 
dubbed parallel campaign or the rise of a new Silvio Berlusconi, Slim continued to insist 
that the initiative was by no means a strategy to “pressure” or “tie the hands” of the future 
president, whomever he or she might be. It was, quite on the contrary, an initiative that 
detailed basic principles and ideals all Mexicans could agree upon: employment, stability, 
security, democracy.  
The agreement enjoyed a mixed reception in the press. While political 
commentators were generally enthusiastic about it as an initiative of civil society, some 
expressed concern about Slim’s high profile involvement. Some pointed to his 
monopolistic practices, arguing that the word “competition” was conspicuously absent 
from the document. But while it was amply clear that Slim was exerting his enormous 
power on the political field to ensure his interests would be protected regardless of the 




authority of a concerned citizen and someone with the capacity of guiding the nation.8  
Something akin to what Zizek has called cynicism as a form of ideology was at 
work here: “one knows the falsehood very well,” writes Zizek, “one is well aware of a 
particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still one does not 
renounce it” (Zizek 1989: 29). For all its claims to a post-ideological era, Zizek explains, 
cynical reason continues to operate as an ideological fantasy, that is, people know how 
things are yet they still continue to act as if they did not know. What was interesting in 
the Chapultepec Agreement, then, was not that it represented the interests of particular 
stakeholders—that much was evident to most observers and commentators—but rather its 
extraordinary ability to stand as an ideological fantasy and the willingness of so many to 
adopt a cynical distance and act as if civil society stood for the real thing.  
In part this is because, at this historical juncture, Slim’s interests could indeed be 
conceived as national interests. As Jean and John Comaroff have argued, 
The call for civil society typically presents itself as an emancipatory reaction to a 
familiar doubling: on one hand, to the greater opacity, intrusiveness and 
monopolistic tendencies of government; on the other hand, to its diminishing 
capacity to satisfy even minimally the political and economic aspirations of its 
component publics, to guarantee the commonwealth, or to meet the needs of its 
citizenry (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 43). 
The roots of the fetishization of civil society, the Comaroffs continue, lie in the 
displacement of political sovereignty by the sovereignty of “the market”, “as if the latter 
had a mind and morality of its own”(Ibid). And no one in today’s Mexico could appear at 
once as the embodiment of the sovereign market and as the voice of civil society better 
than Slim.  
                                                 
8 Indeed, Slim seems to be perceived differently by many different people: a rightist Catholic by some, a 





And yet, Slim’s rise as the icon of civil society marks its transformation. In Mexico 
City especially, civil society came to the foreground in the aftermath of the devastating 
1985 earthquake. It emerged as a term to designate the vibrancy and growing force of a 
civilian population capable of organizing relief efforts despite the incompetency and 
corruption of the state. As Fernando Escalante has argued, such local meaning resonated 
with the usages of the term in the context of the post-cold war democratic transitions in 
the former Eastern bloc, that is, as a “master term” that designated “political subjects 
who, from the outside of the political system (as understood to be the government, the 
party, and the bureaucracy), would finally undermine the Soviet system” (Escalante 
Gonzalbo 2006: 267). Yet Escalante points out that “civil society” emerged as a 
substitute not only for the political system, but also for el pueblo. This is so because, as I 
have discussed in the Introduction, in the context of post-revolutionary Mexican 
nationalism, the concept of el pueblo could not be mobilized without reference to the 
state, and it always entailed strong class and racial undertones.   As it is used in the 
historic center and in contemporary public discourses about Mexico’s transition to 
democracy, “civil society” not only presents itself as clearly distinct from a corrupt and 
inefficient state, but also as a counter-concept to el pueblo, now seen by the elites as 
representing the atavisms of the post-revolutionary state, and emblematically epitomized 
in the historic center by the figure of the street vendor. 
In the Introduction I charted the emergence of (neo) liberal discourses of citizenship 
in Mexico, which are produced and circulated in a multiplicity of disparate sites and 
registers: from government programs that demand individual conducts in exchange for 




corruption or to encourage civic participation, or to the works of intellectuals, academics, 
experts, political commentators and pundits whose cacophonous voices saturate the 
printed and electronic media on a daily basis. One aspect of these discourses that interest 
me in particular, as it is central to the political and social sensibilities of new residents as 
well as to their temporal imaginations, is that they posit an almost evolutionary 
distinction between the “citizen”, an impossibly ideal type, and the “client,” associated 
with the corporate structures of the past.9 The latter appears as an illegitimate, but also 
very importantly atavistic and residual form of political belonging (not a form of 
exercising citizenship rights). What I want to emphasize is that this image of the 
“citizen,” impossible as it may be, is not just the imaginary construct of intellectuals but a 
meaningful form that permeates social relations and interactions in the historic center.10  
Consider, for example, the following excerpt from an interview with Andrés, a 
young high executive of the Foundation, a man in his mid thirties who lived in one of 
Slim’s renovated buildings for several years, before moving back to his childhood 
neighborhood, an affluent residential area near Chapultepec Park. Andrés, who was part 
of the social circles of new residents of the financial corridor (many of whom were his 
friends or acquaintances since childhood), was a very successful young executive who 
had quickly ascended to an important position within Slim’s emporium:  
The [leaders of street vendors] are there because they handle ten, fifty thousand, a 
                                                 
9 This also reduces, or overlooks, other forms of popular politics, as for example represented by the 
Zapatista movement in Chiapas, where the demands are articulated in the form of autonomy from the state.  
 
10 Cahn, for example, studied the sensibilities and practices of small entrepreneurs, multilevel marketers, in 
the state of Michoacán to argue, precisely, that the tenets of “neoliberalism” have been embraced by a wide 
variety of people. Cahn, P. (2008). "Consuming Class: Multilevel Marketeers in Neoliberal Mexico." 





hundred thousand people, for a vote, for a march, for whatever you want. … But 
they don’t have a vision for the city or for the country. They are seeing where to 
position themselves, how to position themselves, how to stay in power. And they 
also receive a lot of money. I mean, each vendor pays between a hundred and four 
hundred pesos per day to their leader … So, those who think (I don’t want to be 
malinchista11 or anything like that), but those who see the potential, the jobs that 
could be generated, all that we could offer [by a successful rescue project], are 
outside this little world. [He points to a piece of paper where he has drawn a map 
of the historic center where street vendors concentrate]. So, [my own] vision of 
Mexico fights with this little world, but this little world is very strong (Interview 
with author, August 22, 2006). 
As part of his duties at the Foundation Andrés had worked very hard to bring other 
private investors to the historic center (for months he had unsuccessfully tried to 
convince supermarket and fitness chains to invest there) and had grown increasingly 
disillusioned about the prospects for future investments in the area. It was clear to Andrés 
that the local administration was not keeping its promises to expand the rescue or to 
maintain the renovated areas free of street vendors. To be sure, the post-election protests 
of 2006 only increased his sense of despair with regards to the center’s problems. But 
Andres’ disillusionment reflected his social and political sensibilities more broadly.  
Indeed the “little world” of street vendors, their leaders and the corrupt state 
officials that allowed them to sell in the center’s streets seemed unfathomable to him. His 
clarification that he was not malinchista suggested that he indeed imagined an elsewhere, 
probably the United States, where these figures and their forms of political belonging 
would be unthinkable. Depicting them as part of world that was radically different from 
his own—progressive and forward looking—he partook of the perception of racialized 
incommensurability that I discussed in Chapter 3. But this figure of incommensurability 
was inseparable from the atavistic political forms that the vendors represented for him. I 
                                                 





would like to emphasize the spatial and temporal imaginary visible in Andres’s words. 
He and his vision for the country represented the future (which exists elsewhere), but the 
vendors, a powerful and amorphous force that he could not control, kept him anchored to 
the here and now. The latter appeared in this rendition not so much as the predecessors of 
citizenship and civil society, epitomized by new residents and by Carlos Slim himself, 
but rather as the latter’s veritable antithesis.  
Time and again street vendors emerged for new residents of the historic center as 
the prototypical representatives of clientelism, understood as an atavistic obstacle to 
modern forms of citizenship and belonging. And yet, as I argue in this chapter, such 
distinctions between clientelism and citizenship, past and future, did not map nicely onto 
the apparent dichotomy between street vendors and new residents. Instead, the street 
vendors exposed the illegibility between clients and citizens that was inherent to the 
position of new residents of the historic center themselves. This illegibility was perhaps 
most visible in their relation to the historic center’s police, as I will discuss in the next 
section. 
Slim’s Police 
A national project to “recuperate” the symbolic heart of the nation for all Mexicans, 
the rescue constantly slipped into a private enterprise. This slippage was particularly 
accentuated in the security program implemented in the historic center in the context of 
this project, and more specifically in the areas to be targeted by renovation works. As I 
have mentioned before, this program included a newly created police force, the Citizens 




young new recruits, with better training and equipment, as well as better salaries, and 
thus purportedly more efficient and less corrupt officers. Security also entailed the 
installation of more than a hundred closed-circuit security cameras at the majority of 
street corners as well as panic buttons at several intersections.12  
Policing operations in the historic center were loosely based on the 
recommendations of Giuliani Partners, the ex-mayor of New York’s private consulting 
firm, to the local government on how to fight crime and improve the image and the 
effectiveness of the police. In the following chapter I will discuss the actual content of 
these recommendations and their implementation in the center. For now I would only like 
to emphasize that from the start of the rescue Slim’s staff were very involved in the 
design and implementation of policing operations, especially with regards to their 
technological components.13The command center, the office that coordinated all security 
measures in the area, was located in a building properly of Slim. His real estate company 
had lent it to the city’s police department (the Secretary of Public Security) for an 
indeterminate period. The furniture in the command center, from desks to computers, 
were also properly of Slim’s Foundation. There was a customer service type of office 
located on the ground floor of this building that was in charge of disseminating 
information about the security program. It looked like a branch of Telmex (Slim’s 
telephone company).  
                                                 
12 For a discussion of Slim’s intervention in the Giuliani “affair” see: Davis, D. (2007). "El factor Giuliani: 
delincuencia, la “cero tolerancia” en el trabajo policiaco y la transformación de la esfera pública en el 
centro de la ciudad de Mexico." Estudios Sociológicos 75: 649-681. 
 
13 The latter was as a purportedly bilingual unit that donned mariachi dress and rode horses, and was 





In an effort to attract residents to their newly renovated buildings, the Foundation 
widely publicized these security measures among potential new residents. It organized 
weekly tours of the command center that consisted of a video overview of the security 
apparatus (in which tough policing was presented as the solution to the problem of crime 
in the center) and a detailed demonstration of its surveillance and video technologies. 
Crime rates had significantly dropped since the implementation of these measures, which, 
together with the thorough renovation of the area and the fact that streets were clean and 
well lit at night, contributed to the safety of the area.  In the case of new residents, their 
close familiarity with and privileged access to policing operations also contributed to 
their perception that the historic center, and particularly the financial corridor, was safe. 
This perception of safety therefore rested in part on the illegibility of the role of the 
police or, in other words, in their slippage from public force to private security.  
Take for example my first meeting with Luis, the young engineer whom I 
mentioned above.14 It was an evening in April 2006, when I accompanied Armando to an 
art opening at a retail space on the ground floor of Luis’s building, which was 
temporarily being used as an art gallery. Luis had already heard about me and my work 
and kindly offered to show me his building. He had recently won an award for its 
renovation. Armando came along. After a walk around the building, the three of us stood 
at the balcony of an empty apartment on the second floor, contemplating the beauty of the 
                                                 
14 Luis lived in a remarkable building that belonged to his s family. According to family lore, this three-
story building, once a magnificent palace, had belonged to the family since the late eighteenth century, but 
neglected for decades, it was falling apart.  After hearing about the new wave of private investment in the 
historic center, especially in real estate, Luis persuaded his father and other relatives to renovate the 
property into upscale housing. At the time of my fieldwork, most of the buildings’ spacious studios and 





place and looking at the hustle and bustle of the street underneath. “This is one of the 
safest streets in the planet,” Luis told me and pointed to five surveillance cameras in the 
corner. Armando was not so sure: “A car-stereo was robbed last night across the street”, 
he told us, which Luis seemed genuinely shocked to hear. “Either the thief was 
disoriented (despistado) or the police are getting a bit too relaxed,” was his reply. 
Armando explained that “at the beginning,” there were many different police officers in 
the center: Slim’s police, private police, public police. Luis again (I paraphrase form my 
fieldnotes):  
When you were walking down the street [the police] would be watching you and 
informing by radio to their partners around the corner, so they would be waiting 
for you and also watching you, protecting you, making sure that nothing happened 
to you. Friends walking with miniskirts would have an escort of policemen, 
protecting them. And it really feels safe.  
Luis then pointed at one of the cameras that had just moved in our direction and 
started waving at it, amused, with absolute nonchalance. It seemed that Luis and 
Armando perceived the police in the center as their police; a force working to make sure 
that they were protected. Luis’ gesture stroke me as particularly odd, considering that 
surveillance technologies precisely depend on the public’s inability to know who or what 
is “watching” them. But Luis’ familiarity with the surveillance apparatus, his waving at 
the camera as if expecting someone to recognize him, suggested an intimate knowledge, 
or at least a performance of intimacy, with the “other side.” Later on it will become clear 
that the new residents relation to the police was more complicated than this gesture 
suggests, but for now I want to emphasize this image of the police as if it were a private 
security force.    




police department itself, and it was often experienced with frustration. During my 
fieldwork at the command center the bureaucrats with whom I spent my time often 
insisted that Slim did not have a say over security operations. “Imagine!” replied Tomás, 
the bureaucrat who was present at the meeting that I discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, when I once asked him about Slim’s role in financing the police in the historic 
center.  “No, no, no! Imagine! Telmex should not be involved, the security program, 
security, is of the state, not of individuals” (los particulares). But Slim’s influence was 
indeed felt in the command center every day and in the most disparate places: from the 
Telmex logo on the brochures promoting the security program, right next to the police’s 
own, to the constant supervision of his representative, vocally present at weekly staff 
meetings. Allow me to discuss a couple of scenes from my fieldwork to illustrate Slim’s 
appearance within the police. 
One morning at the command center I chatted with Federico, a talkative man in his 
early thirties responsible for producing crime statistics, while he searched his computer 
for a survey that he had promised to give me. “What does [Slim’s representative] do at 
the meetings?” I asked him, referring to the weekly staff meetings, which I had not been 
allowed to attend. “She is the representative of [Slim’s security team],” replied Federico. 
“But what’s her role?” I pressed. “She reports to [Slim’s team] and on whatever she 
reports hangs my boss’s job [the command’s center director]”. “Why?” I continued my 
interrogation. “Have you ever been to the police department’s city-wide offices?” he 
replied, and without waiting for my response he continued to explain that they were in a 
deplorable state compared to the relatively comfortable offices in the center. “Why?” 




could not have his own police,” he added with more than a tinge of sarcasm, “he 
subleased [us].” Slim’s representative entered the headquarters whenever she pleased, he 
complained, still in a sarcastic voice, and she always wanted to find their offices and 
desks in a tidy state. 
Since the surveys were nowhere to be found on his computer, Federico suggested 
we go to his immediate boss’s office next door to continue looking in another computer.  
We had not yet even entered this office before Federico commented to his superior, the 
sarcasm escalating:  “The licenciada here wants to know if Slim’s representative tells us 
what to do.” Visibly uncomfortable, the superior responded with a timid smile, but 
Federico continued to complain: a co-worker used to have a plant on his desk until 
[Slim’s representative] told him to get rid of it because she didn’t like it at all. Such side 
comments, and many other seemingly banal instances, gave palpable expression to the 
salience of Slim’s figure in the command center, which, in turn, had an impact on the 
bureaucrats’ perceived expectations of their work.  
Moreover, Slim’s invisible presence in the command center was linked to the 
bureaucrat’s relation, often tense, with new residents. During one of my first days there 
Bety, an administrative assistant in her mid twenties and my most important contact 
there, introduced me to Tomás, the spokesperson who had participated in the 
Association’ meeting with which I opened this chapter. I mentioned that I had seen him 
there. “You are also a resident, then,” he replied, in a somewhat uncomfortable voice. I 
explained that I was living in the historic center to conduct an anthropological study on 
the rescue and he immediately assumed a more relaxed demeanor. This is my 




Tomás:   We should feel proud that insecurity is no longer an issue for [new] 
residents. Not at all, but since [insecurity] has been resolved now 
they make tons of demands that are driving me crazy! (me van a 
sacar canas verdes! )  
Alejandra:  Like what?  
Tomás:  Like the issue of parking! They want these so-called parking 
permits, but we cannot give this to them. Imagine! They sometimes 
think that we are a private police, and this is the historic center, 
and there are regulations. We like helping them, that’s why I tell 
them to call us and I give them our private numbers, but we cannot 
overlook the regulations. 
Bety interjected to complain about Armando: “He calls Tomás almost every day 
and gets furious if he doesn’t return his calls.” And she continued her list of grievances 
about new residents. For example, that same morning a woman had called to complain 
because she was returning home from the supermarket and could not get through, since 
access to the center was blocked due to a demonstration.  
Bety: So we have to call the [police] officers [and tell them] to let her 
enter. All things considered she is nice. She calls to thank us. But 
that’s why people say that we are a private police force. (…) We’re 
fed up with [new residents!]”  
As this exchange suggests, there was uncertainty and exasperation among police 
bureaucrats regarding who they were expected to serve and how, an uncertainty that was 
traversed by the figure of Slim. But while new residents related to the police as their own 
private security services they themselves were also uncertain about and frustrated with 
their own relation to Slim, as I will explain in the section that follows.  
Illegible Citizens, Illegible Clients 
“I work for Slim,” said Arturo in a sarcastic tone. He was a forty-three-year-old 




Aren’t you independent?” was my confused reply, as I was under the impression that 
while he rented his gallery’s premises (a beautiful nineteenth century three story mansion 
that he had renovated himself) from Slim’s real estate company, his work had nothing to 
do with the Foundation. His answer (I paraphrase from my fieldnotes): 
But everything I earn I pay to Slim, the rent [for his gallery], my cigarettes, my 
phone and cell phone, my coffee at Sanborns.15 (…) I would like to move to the 
center, but if I did, I would be better off just transferring my entire earnings to 
Slim. I already pay him too much as it is!  
As Arturo’s remarks eloquently show, new residents were quite literally clients of 
Slim. Many were his clients as tenants, but all were clients of his telephone company (a 
monopoly in landline service, a near monopoly in mobile services), his restaurants and 
his stores. In this they resembled many of the city’s inhabitants. But as Arturo’s less than 
innocent joke suggests, the new residents’ client position vis-à-vis Slim exceeded its 
literal commercial dimension and included, as well, a different relation of dependency.  
As a patron Slim had many faces in the historic center. He was a generous sponsor 
of the arts who provided opportunities for young, emerging artists and for cultural 
producers, of whom there were many among the center’s new residents. Through his 
influence and power, as we have seen in this chapter, he provided new residents with 
privileged access to state officials and the police, whether for requesting special parking 
permits or for circumventing the labyrinthine bureaucracy of the historic center. At the 
same time, he was perceived as a brilliant businessman, using artists as “guinea pigs” to 
foster his own private interests, and generating a certain confidence and optimism among 
investors and entrepreneurs. Whatever his motivations (love of the arts, patriotism, greed, 
                                                 





etc.), his very involvement generated an expectation that things would get done.  
There was a common thread to all these perceptions: Slim was viewed as an all-
powerful force. Consider for example the following exchange, taken from a group 
interview conducted at Eduardo’s building with current and former residents two years 
after the break-in that I discussed in Chapter 2. Here the figure of Slim seems to merge 
with another contemporary omnipotent power: 
Omar: Slim himself heard about [the break-in]. That’s when they said, 
what do we do? 
Alejandra:  Slim heard? 
Omar:  Yes, yes… 
Lucía:  Of course, he hears about everything! 
Igor:  He is hearing us right now… 
[Everybody laughs] 
(…) 
Alfonso:  He is hearing us through Google earth… 
[Laughter continues…] 
 Such immense powers no doubt incited anxieties, but for the clients of Slim-as-
patron, they also provided reassurance. They presided over and authorized the new 
residents’ quotidian negotiations in the historic center.  
 In the remainder of the chapter I will analyze new residents’ doubled position as 
clients and citizens through a close reading of a story narrated by Armando, which 
brought together a couple of new residents, a group of street vendors and several 
policemen. It happened in the Spring of 2006 on the pedestrian street at the heart of the 




supposedly been cleared of vendors a few years before. A great storyteller, Armando’s 
narrative of this incident eloquently expresses the tension between, on the one hand, his 
construal of himself as a particular kind of citizen and his affective commitment to this 
political subjectivity and, on the other hand, his being at home in the forms of clientelism, 
personal relations and negotiation that he not only disavowed but cast as regressive. 
Because of its richness I will take the liberty to quote the story in its entirety, in a number 
of different segments. 
 
Figure 5. View of pedestrian street in the financial corridor, with no street vendors in sight. Photograph by 
author. 
Let us recall that Armando made himself into an unofficial representative of new 




such as the police, the authorities and the Foundation. He was keen on boasting, although 
always in an indirect way, about his unrestricted access to the police, which he 
nonetheless expressed in the language of citizenship rights. In other words, while 
confident (or as we shall see expectant) that his relation to Slim granted him a special 
relation to the historic center’s police, he construed his constant demands to them 
(demands that exasperated police bureaucrats) in terms of an individual exercising his 
rights to police protection. But I’m getting ahead of the argument. Let us turn to the story 
as Armando narrated it to me during an interview: 
One Saturday afternoon, a blue-eyed güerita neighbor of mine had the 
ingenuousness of telling a street vendor in front of her house [on a pedestrian 
street in the financial corridor] selling pirate CDs, shamelessly camping with his 
family and all…  
So she says: “Hey, you know that you cannot be here, right?”  
And the vendor becomes hostile and starts telling her all sorts of unimaginable 
things and more, very intimidating, [such as] (he assumes an aggressive voice) 
“What? Are you going to feed me?”  
To the point that [she was] left with two options, to cry and run, or to confront 
him, and she did confront him, I mean, very brave, she summoned two policemen 
(Interview with author, September 27, 2006) 
Armando begins the story by establishing a distinction between his “blue-eyed 
güerita” neighbor and friend and the vendor selling outside her house, gesturing to the 
history of the racialization of class distinctions that I discussed in Chapter 3. He portrays 
his friend as standing on the side of civility and legality and the vendor on the side of 
disorder and violence. “Hey, you know that you cannot be here,” the woman addresses 
the vendor, appealing to a presumed common knowledge of the law as an abstract 
principle that regulates encounter and conduct in public space and at the same time to the 




words also divulge an anxiety over this promise. Indeed, from Armando’s standpoint, the 
vendor refuses to know the law, as he understands it. Instead he sells illegal commodities 
and denigrates public space, “shamelessly camping with his family.” Even more 
worryingly from Armando’s perspective, he resorts to violent intimidation. But 
Armando’s friend stands her ground. Knowing her rights and responsibilities as a citizen, 
she summons the police.  
And yet, in her very summoning of the police Armando’s friend begins to slip into 
the position of the client, that is, she discloses her own location within the promise of 
rescue and her advantageous relation to the police. In this sense, her address to the 
vendor, “you know that you cannot be here” is also an assertion of her knowledge that 
street vendors no longer belong in the center. In other words, Armando’s friend call to the 
police starts to appear as both an enactment of citizenship and an appeal to her special 
location within the rescue. The contrast between citizen and client starts to appear 
illegible. This illegibility increases as the narrative unfolds. “I’m passing by,” continues 
Armando, who from this point onwards tells the story in the first person, his friend’s 
voice disappearing: 
Armando:  …and there are two vendor leaders with walkie-talkies standing in 
front of the building and the neighbor leaning against the door of 
the building, the güerita, and the leaders with their radios. […] I 
take pictures. […] So, they become hostile.  
Alejandra:  And the police?  
Armando:  Ah! I had already called the police chief. Two policemen were 
over there with the vendor, two leaders here with the radios… they 
talk over the radios and more than twenty vendors come running. 
At this point more policemen had already arrived. The sector’s 




others.  In less than five minutes there were twenty-five policemen 
and several vendors. Surrounding us.  
 What started as an assertion of citizenship and a civic act, namely calling the police 
to report transgression and violent intimidation, has taken the appearance of a street 
quarrel between two groups, each mobilizing its supporters. Tension mounts. Within a 
short time the vendor counts on the backing of his peers, including two leaders 
summoned by radio. The two policemen called in by the neighbor, on the other hand, 
silently witness the event, seemingly irrelevant to its unfolding. But, flaunting his own 
power Armando photographs the vendors (a common police practice) and summons the 
police chief himself, who arrives within minutes accompanied by scores of other officers. 
It is thus impossible to say, at this point, whether the police are there to mediate a quarrel 
between citizens or as reinforcements to back Armando and his friend in their personal 
confrontation with the vendors. The police, as mediated by the figure of Slim, appear not 
as the abstract bearers of law but as authorizing Armando’s actions. As tensions 
climaxes, the story moves toward resolution without any explicit intervention by the 
police: 
I say, I say to the leader: “regardless of who is right in this situation what is not 
acceptable is to disrespect a lady, that is no way to speak to a woman.”  
And so, [the leader] being a woman, she replies: “the güero has a point here, the 
güero is right about this.”  
So [she] forces the vendor to apologize to my neighbor. […] And the leader 
realizes that they were making a big fuss and she says: “curve your wings” [that 
is, get going], and all the vendors leave. […]  
Because more police were arriving, our side started to get even more intimidating 
for the vendors. They realized that maybe they were making a big mistake 
intimidating who they should NOT intimidate, because A LOT of police arrived, 
and VERY fast, and on motorcycles, the ones who remove them, and then they 




As Armando’s police, the officers seem to authorize his negotiation with the leader. 
That is, the conflict is ultimately resolved through the personal and skilful exchange 
between the representatives of two groups, each with their forces at hand, and not through 
the police as mediators or as representatives of law. But at this point the narrative moves 
into another form of sociability and into a different temporal imagination. All differences 
notwithstanding, Armando suggests, everybody would agree that women should not be 
disrespected. He positions himself as a gentleman and as a protector of women, not 
precisely a cosmopolitan gesture.  
Moreover, traversing Armando’s boasting about his special powers of summoning, 
through which he purportedly can conjure massive police forces for his defense, is a deep 
suspicion that, after all, the police might not be on his side to begin with. It is this tension 
in the place of the police in the historic center, and specifically within the rescue project, 
that will stand at the center of the next chapter. For now, let us note that Armando 
establishes himself as a street-smart negotiator capable of fending for himself and of 
looking after his own. 
As things started to calm down I said to the vendor’s leader: “look, any incident 
that any of my neighbors has with a vendor you will see me, unfortunately. They 
will call me, I will have to come, and it is going to be ugly. Why don’t we avoid 
the mess and you give me your cell phone and, any incident with a neighbor, I will 
call you.” […]  
“All right.”  
She gives me her number and I give her my number, and now we have a direct 
line to the vendors’ leaders, which, I mean, is nothing to be proud of, I wish they 
didn’t exist, but if a problem arises, I know who to call (Interview with author, 
September 27, 2006). 




incapable of dealing with the vendors. If he wants to get things done, he seems to be 
saying, if he wants to live in the historic center, he must engage with other forms of 
political negotiation and mediation; other forms of being a citizen. While he is at home in 
these forms of sociability, while he indeed boasts about his negotiating skills and about 
his now unmediated access to the illicit world of street vending, which appears as a 
source of power, he clarifies that this is “nothing to be proud of.” It would be better if 
they didn’t exist. The tension inherent in his position becomes clearest in his afterword to 
the story:  
I know that we play an important role as citizens because if citizens don’t 
denounce [or report street vending], well, the police cannot act that easily. But it 
goes a bit beyond that. It is obvious that there is a corruption network and without 
political will, well, it is not going to end. In a way, [street vending] is 
disrespectful. It is disrespectful to those trying to do things right, those who pay 
taxes, those who want to contribute to society, to the historic center, to build a 
better society. And it is a bit like Mexican crookedness, you know, like, “not me,” 
right? “I take my own path and I do whatever I want.” To me it is like dishonest 
competition, it is opportunistic. All Mexicans, in some way, carry it integrated 
within their chip, cheating and corruption  (Interview with author, September 27, 
2006). 
The point that I want to make now is that while appealing to a privileged access to 
the police and while also displaying remarkable negotiation skills, Armando never 
renounces to the position of “citizen” and casts the corporatist forms of belonging 
represented by the vendors as regressive and incommensurable. In other words, while the 
liberal discourse of citizenship is crucial in his own rendering of the incident, his 
narrative also reveals a much more complex picture where political belonging and 
citizenship take place through negotiation.  
And yet it is his claim to a privileged position, and the presumptions that underpin 




and to the beneficiaries of rescue. It is the street vendor, he implies, who has a corrupt 
and truculent crook within him, not “us,” enlightened modern citizens. And while in this 
he builds on the long history of class and racial tensions in Mexico, some of which I 
touched upon in the previous chapter, his narrative also shows how the contemporary 
fetishization of democracy and (particular forms of) citizenship has engendered new 
forms of exclusion. Armando can claim that it is he who possesses the civic competency 
to properly inhabit public space and to engage with a modern police, in contrast to the 
atavisms of the past. And yet, the crucial point is that he cannot be sure: he cannot be sure 
that the police are actually on his side, nor that the promise of rescue will be fulfilled. 
Most importantly, he cannot be sure that he doesn’t partake of “Mexican crookedness” 
and he cannot be sure that in invoking the abstract law of liberal democracy, he does not 
in fact invoke the privilege—and the constraints—of a client.  
In this chapter I have argued that for Armando clientelism and patronage networks 
appeared as residual. They pertained to that large segment of Mexico which, according to 
the Foundation executive whom I quoted, was holding back the forward-looking, 
entrepreneurial Mexico to which both himself and Armando belonged. As such, 
clientelism signaled to another temporality that punctured new residents’ own 
cosmopolitan present. At the same time, I suggested, Armando was at home in a 
particular form of life in which personal relations and quotidian negotiations are 
indispensable and where being on the receiving end of special privileges (in this case vis-







The Rescue of Law 
Introduction 
The police, we have seen, were a crucial element in the rescue of the historic center, 
but they were a suspicious force as well. Armando was adamant that the police were on 
the side of law, but he also suspected that, despite claims to their reform, they were 
inefficient, corrupt and ultimately complicit with street vendors and their leaders (see 
Chapter 4). Likewise, Pedro doubted the police’s capacity, despite their good intentions 
(and good looks), to handle the complicated problems in Regina and its surroundings, 
from petty crime and street violence to small drug dealing operations (see Chapter 2). 
While both Armando and Pedro felt protected by the police, they had serious doubts 
about their capabilities and their allegiances. In other words, whereas the police made it 
possible for both of them to live and work in the historic center, they also appeared 
suspicious and possibly irredeemable. 
When I started fieldwork in early 2006, many new residents of the renovated area 
(as opposed to those new residents living in the cultural corridor) assured me that 
“insecurity” was no longer a problem there, thanks to the sophisticated security apparatus 
and the presence of a newly trained police. Despite the fact that the number of police 
officers patrolling the streets of the renovated area had decreased since the first years of 
urban renewal, new residents continued to place high hopes on the new police, and 
especially on their technological apparatus, for delivering order and safety. Contrast this 




Pedro placed the URGENT NOTICE in the cultural corridor that I discussed in Chapter 
2. In March 2007, a group of new residents got together for a breakfast meeting to discuss 
the deterioration of security in the renovated area, including the increasing presence of 
street vendors and other worrisome persons and activities.  
About nine people showed up, among them Armando, Luis and Daniel. The talk of 
the day was a party that had taken place the previous weekend at Daniel and Camille’s 
recently opened restaurant.  Everyone was curious as to how the problem with the valet 
parking had been resolved. Daniel explained, rather annoyed, that it had taken until seven 
in the morning to find the car whose location the valets had not specified before leaving.1 
Luis intervened (I paraphrase from my fieldnotes): “We should not bring valets to the 
center, neither valets nor franeleros [informal parking attendants]. 2 They only bring 
trouble.” Daniel agreed, but argued that for some events valets were necessary, especially 
when older people were in attendance. He claimed that his younger clients had no 
problem parking on their own, and as an example he mentioned a couple, friends of his, 
who parked on the street the night of the party. Then he added, with a tinge of irony, that 
their car stereo had been stolen. Luis blamed the franeleros, as he was convinced that 
they were responsible for several other thefts as well. Armando wanted to know: “Did 
[Daniel’s friend] report the theft to the police?”  Daniel didn’t think so. “It was five in the 
morning”, he replied. “They probably just went home.”  
                                                 
1 Valet parking services often use the surrounding streets to park cars. 
 
2 As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 3 franeleros have different modes of operation. Some direct drivers as 
they park on the street and ask for a “voluntary” contribution from their drivers. Others set aside street 
parking spaces, usually with cardboard boxes, and demand money for their use. Some work alone and 





Armando:  That is the problem, that people don’t file police reports. You 
should tell [the command center’s director] about the theft.  
Daniel:  But that’s what cameras are for. Why do these things happen if 
there are cameras?  
Luis:  The cameras are useless. Surely no one is looking at them, surely 
they don’t even know which is which. When you call and tell them 
[to look at] the camera on [a particular intersection] they go, 
which? 
An anxiety over the absence of law transpired at the breakfast, both in the sense that 
disorder, illegality and criminality persisted (as we will see there were slippages between 
these notions) and in the sense that the police were not, after all, what the neighbors 
believed they would be. A few stolen car-stereos would hardly qualify the area as a 
criminal hot-spot in Mexico City, especially considering the high levels of criminality 
just a few blocks north and east of the renovated streets. But why would theft happen at 
all when hundreds of cameras were supposed to turn the renovated area into a thief-free 
zone? Weren’t the police here supposed to be better, more efficient and non-corrupt? And 
didn’t the law forbid franeleros from working on the city’s streets? Indeed, like many 
other conversations that I documented during my fieldwork, that morning’s talk about 
theft as well as about the ineffectiveness of the police registered a tone of disappointment 
over the broken promise of law. The conversation thus captured the entanglement of 
circulating discourses, personal investments and affective attachments to a particular 
ideal of the law, and the political subjectivities that correspond to it.  
As we have seen in previous chapters, the discourse of rescue crucially mobilized 
the aspiration to eradicate disorder, illegality and criminality from the historic center. 




itself be rescued from the people and practices that prevented its reign, such as, for 
example, street vendors and franeleros. This chapter explores the expectations, hopes and 
desires that new residents placed upon the rescue of law in the historic center, the 
promises that it held for them and the threats that it posed to them. I analyze how locally 
situated understandings of law and legality in the historic center intersected with broadly 
circulating discourses about “the rule of law” (el estado de derecho) in Mexico. At the 
same time I explore how, in restituting the law, the police must also represent the law, 
and hence how the rescue of law entails a rescue of the police themselves. I thus analyze 
how the police were construed as agents of rescue and at the same time as themselves 
suspect.  
The problem of the rule of law is often discussed in relation to rising levels of 
disorder and criminality, on the one hand, and in relation to the police’s involvement in 
illegal and criminal activities. Indeed, corruption, violence and inefficiency have for a 
long time been trademarks of the police in Mexico.3 The police have been an infamous 
institution known for their widespread use of torture and extralegal violence, their open 
involvement in criminal activities and their unlimited impunity. As one study about 
“police criminality” concluded: 
It is evident that in Mexico the police intimidate. Particularly because lack of 
knowledge of what their intentions might be (there is a popular joke that it is 
better to be robbed by a criminal than by a police-criminal). It is known that they 
can and often do act against the law; it is known that they can commit almost any 
crime; but it is impossible to know if there is a limit to what they can do 
                                                 
3 For a history of the police as an institution in Mexico see: Vanderwood, P. (2002). "Los rurales. Una 
mirada a los orígenes de la policía mexicana." Renglones 51: 73-83, Davis, D. E. (2004). Historia de 
detectives: rastreando a la policía de la capital en la historiografía política de México. Los últimos cien 
años. Los próximos cien. A. Rodríguez Kuri and S. Tamayo Flores-Alattore. México, D.F., Universidad 





(Martínez de Murguía 1999: 28). 
In this context, police reform has become a fundamental issue in the agenda of 
democratization. Think-tanks and citizen groups working on police reform have 
proliferated, together with international conferences, expert reports, fact-sheets and 
consultancies all devoted to discussing the proper workings of policing in democratic 
contexts and how to attain an efficient and accountable police in Mexico.4 At the same 
time, the growing preoccupation with crime and insecurity has placed a double pressure 
on the police: demands for a more democratic and transparent police have overlapped 
with demands for tougher measures on crime, including the death penalty, and for faster 
results at any cost.5  
Statistically speaking, the historic center had been a crime-ridden area. But it was 
also a space imagined to be dangerous, perhaps the most dangerous in the city, by broad 
segments of Mexico City’s population. Its dangers exceeded petty crime and robberies, 
which at the times were cited as among the main preoccupations of the city’s inhabitants. 
                                                 
4 Advocates of police reform demand the introduction of “instruments of control” and propose to replace 
the notion of “public security,” centered around the idea of “public order,” with “citizen security,” 
considered as a fundamental right, and positioning the citizen at the heart of all “security” policies. Their 
central claim is that while the thrust of “public security” falls on the state, which acts independently of its 
subjects, “citizen security” relies on both the government and the governed. According to these arguments 
the problem of police violence, corruption and criminality would be resolved once the police is purified 
from its vices and once proper systems of accountability are implemented. For discussions about the police 
reform in Mexico see: Alvarado, A. and S. Arzt, Eds. (2001). El Desafío democrático en México: seguridad 
y estado de derecho. México, D.F., El Colegio de México, López Portillo Vargas, E. (2002). The Police in 
Mexico: Political Functions and Needed Reforms. Transnational Crime and Public Security: Challenges to 
Mexico and the United States. J. Bailey and J. Chabat. La Jolla, University of California San Diego: 109-
191. 
 
5 This seemingly contradictory pressure is, to be sure, constitutive of a “democratic” police, which always 
combine “might and right”, as I will discuss towards the end of the chapter. See: Benjamin, W. (1986). 
Critique of Violence. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings. P. Demetz. New York, 
Schocken Books, Taussig, M. (1996). The Injustice of Policing: Prehistory and Rectitude. Justice and 






The center was dangerous because it was “dark,” “abandoned,” filled with street vendors, 
franeleros, prostitutes and a myriad of disorderly activities.6 The space itself had to be 
recuperated, and in this recuperation, brought into the cosmopolitan present: from a new 
police to a new regime of visibility, to the eradication of disorderly practices, to the 
introduction of more efficient regulations.7  
The rescue thus activated an image of the state recuperating a space taken over by 
illegality and criminality. But it was not as if law per se had been absent from the historic 
center. Quite the contrary, the historic center was a space constituted and traversed by an 
excess of law, both in the sense of sovereign authority—the space has been construed, let 
us recall, as the symbolic heart of the nation—and in the sense of rules and regulations. 
As I discussed in the introduction, its status as national heritage has placed the historic 
center within an exceptional legal regime, whereby any intervention upon the built 
environment is subject to complex and labyrinthine regulations and procedures involving 
both federal and local legislation and a myriad of different governmental offices – “A 
bureaucratic nightmare,” as an executive of the Foundation explained to me.   
Likewise, the state was anything but absent from the historic center. The state was 
present in the myriad symbols through which it claims to be isomorphic with the nation: 
from Aztec ruins to the enormous flag that flutters in the middle of the Zócalo. It was 
present in institutional forms, from the National Palace, to the Senate and the Supreme 
                                                 
6 The term insecurity linked very different activities. There was petty crime in the form of street-level 
muggings and robberies of businesses. There were small drug dealing operations, called drug retailing 
(narcomenudeo). There was also contraband, counterfeit, prostitution and street vending. 
 
7 Security, and specifically zero tolerance style policing strategies, has been a central element in urban 
renewal projects across the world. For the case of Mexico City see: Davis, D. (2007). "El factor Giuliani: 
delincuencia, la “cero tolerancia” en el trabajo policiaco y la transformación de la esfera pública en el 





Court, and several federal and local governmental offices. It was present (although this 
was not a legitimate presence in the eyes of many new residents) in manifold political 
arrangements with street vendors, franeleros and other “informal” actors. What was at 
stake was not—or not only—the absence of law in the historic center, but the very 
meaning of law itself.  
How should we understand, then, the meaning of law that emerges from an 
obsession with its alleged absence? In the introduction to Figures of Criminality (1999), 
Vicente Rafael poses the following question: “In whose eyes and under what conditions 
of looking do “crimes” and “criminals” appear?” He points to the fact that law and 
criminality are mutually constitutive: “just as the law is productive of crime, so is 
criminality an enabling condition for the materialization of the law and its powers of 
recognition” (p. 12). But his analysis moves beyond the “productivity” of crime. He asks:   
Is crime always reducible to its social effects and harnessed to the production of 
social types? Does the disruptiveness inherent in criminality inevitably lead 
towards a conservative resolution? Must it always reiterate the power of the 
government and its legal institutions to determine the limits of sociality? (Ibid.) 
Drawing on Rafael I would like to reflect on what kind of law appears through the 
figuration of the masses of informal street workers in the historic center, and particularly 
the franeleros, as “criminal.” The term that I most often encountered in the field in 
relation to informal street practices was “illegality” (ilegalidad). These practices were 
either explicitly described as illegal or otherwise framed in terms that signaled their 
illegality (as we saw in previous chapters, street vendors and franeleros were described as 
part of entrenched networks of corruption, or as not paying taxes). But as is evident in the 




violent criminality.  Indeed, there is never a clear line between these notions in the figure 
of the franelero, but rather a continuum. The franelero epitomizes the disorder and 
illegality that prevails in the city’s streets, but also the growing menace of violent 
criminality, and finally, too, the incompetence and corruption of the police. As such, he 
stands as the opposite of a lawful subject, that is, a subject oriented to and by law. But, as 
I will argue in this chapter, there is an excess of meaning in the figure of the franelero 
that marks the very limits of law in contemporary Mexico City.   
Writing about discourses of transparency in Thailand, Rosalind Morris argues that 
‘transparency’ emerges where ‘class’ disappears, that is to say, when social inequalities 
are no longer talked about in relation to the structural inequities of capitalism but rather 
in idioms of corruption and transparency. Such apparently minor change in terminology, 
Morris continues, “indexes a radical transformation in how the social is conceived.”8 
Moreover, discourses of transparency are crucially mediated by a sense of being looked 
at from afar, or, in other words, by a preoccupation with the kind of image of Thailand 
that appears to the foreign gaze (Morris 2004: 227-228). 
A comparable logic takes place in Mexico City with regards to idioms of legality 
and illegality, which are intimately linked to idioms of transparency and corruption. 
Borrowing Morris’s formulation, I argue that in the context of Mexico’s democratic 
transition, idioms of legality and illegality have come to replace idioms of “class.” As 
                                                 
8 Morris argues that society’s problems in Thailand, from incomplete highway constructions to electoral 
frauds, are thought about as resulting from lack of transparency, “wherever the discussion of social 
inequality was once explained by reference to the structural inequities inherent in the sakdina system or 
capitalism, it has been replaced by a rhetoric of transparency and corruption.” Morris, R. (2004). Intimacy 
and Corruption in Thailand's Age of Transparency. Off Stage/On Display. Intimacy and Ethnography in the 





Morris suggests, this shift in lexicon poses a temporal reversal. In the case of Mexico 
City, illegality—or the absence of the rule of law—emerges as the cause of all the city’s 
problems, for example, the proliferation of informal street activities, from vending to 
cleaning car windows or “watching over” vehicles. This shift is forcefully captured in the 
figures of the franelero and of the police officer on the street.  The latter, as we will see 
below, bears a close resemblance to the former. Analyzing the slippages between 
illegality and criminality I argue in this chapter that the “criminal” produces a law that 
stands in the absence of “class.” Following Morris, I show that a doubled law (the law of 
liberal democracy and a revanchist law that cancels the fiction of equality) holds the 
promise of the cosmopolitan present while at the same time canceling this promise. 
Law—an orientation to and by law, equality, transparency, strong institutions—is 
imagined as that which will bring the lawful, forward-looking Mexico closer to Europe 
and the United State and at the same time as that which promises to eradicate the masses 
of the urban poor such as franeleros from view.  
The Rescue of Law  
Back at the breakfast, Daniel narrated an incident with a man he called a homeless 
and a franelero, known as Porteño, who used to loiter outside his building and with 
whom he and many of his neighbors had an uneasy relationship. Daniel described 
Porteño as a usually harmless man who occasionally asked for money in return for 
watching over the neighbors’ cars. Armando once explained to me that despite Porteño’s 
“normal” attitude he sometimes didn’t “recognize [the neighbors] and [got] intimidating” 




to visit Armando as he was parking his car by telling him that he should not come to the 
center because something could happen to him or to his car there. 
A cultured man in his early thirties, of refined manners and strong opinions, Daniel 
moved to the historic center in the Spring of 2001, during the very early stages of rescue.  
He heard about the project from Armando, his childhood friend, just a few months before 
he got married to Camille and the couple moved to the area shortly after their wedding. 
According to Daniel’s own narrative, living in the historic allowed him to break from his 
previous life, and especially with his profession as a producer in the film and advertising 
industry, which he had grown tired and disillusioned with. In the center he yielded to his 
old-time passion for cooking and together with Camille, a recent college graduate, 
ventured into the restaurant business. After trying several alternatives, the couple 
renovated and re-launched an old restaurant on a pedestrian street at the heart of the 
cultural corridor, which they struggled to keep afloat, due especially to the lack of 
customers. Creative and resourceful, they came up with alternatives, such as organizing 
private parties or renting the premises for film productions. What follows is the story as 
told by Daniel that morning in March 2007. 
A few days before the party mentioned at the breakfast, Daniel rented his restaurant 
for an all-night film shooting. As the film crew parked outside, Porteño asked them for 
money in exchange for “taking care” of their vehicles. As is customary, the film crew 
replied that they would give him some cash on their way back. But as it happened, the 
filming lasted until the following morning and the crew left without giving any money to 
Porteño. When Daniel was preparing to leave his restaurant and cross the street to his 




claimed was owed him. Daniel refused while trying to close the door, but Porteño resisted 
and began to aggressively threaten Daniel, yelling that he knew where he and his wife 
lived and that they both would regret having messed with him. Daniel called the police’s 
command center and, within a few minutes, several police cars arrived. 
 Daniel recalled, with a lot of frustration, that it took at least five police officers and 
a very long time to finally arrest Porteño and get him into a police car. Daniel narrated 
that after Porteño was finally subdued an officer told him, by way of an explanation, that 
policemen feared coming into physical contact with the homeless because they often have 
needles and could infect them with HIV. As Porteño fought his arrest, Daniel continued, 
he tore the uniform of a policeman and wounded another one in the head. But despite 
Daniel’s insistence, the injured officer refused to accompany him to the Civic Court9 to 
denounce the incident. If he went along, the officer claimed, he would lose several hours 
and his supervisor would refuse to pay him for that working day. When a few days after 
the incident Daniel talked to the director of the command center, this bureaucrat 
dismissed the policeman’s claims as outright lies. He assured Daniel that it was certainly 
part of the responsibilities and risks of a policeman’s job to come into physical danger. 
Likewise, he insisted that there was no way that a supervisor would deny pay to a 
wounded officer. But Daniel was not so sure that the police director was telling the truth. 
He strongly suspected that supervisors did indeed abuse policemen in this way.  
Daniel continued his narration recalling that as the policemen struggled with 
Porteño, the noise woke up some of his neighbors. Sticking her head out of her window a 
                                                 





friend of Daniel yelled at the police officers to stop abusing their authority and to 
immediately release Porteño. Daniel asked her to please stay out, to no avail. She 
continued to yell at the police, in turn waking up other neighbors. Daniel added that 
something very similar happened to him at the Zócalo. Noticing a man in the crowd 
inappropriately touch a woman, he summoned the police. But as they were arresting the 
man a passerby yelled at them not to be abusive. So Daniel intervened: “Do you have 
kids, missus? This guy has just inappropriately touched a woman (manosear). Would you 
like him to do that to your daughter?” The woman left without reply.  
After finally subduing Porteño the police drove him to the Civic Court. Daniel 
followed along, and Porteño continued to threaten him in front of the judge, but now in 
flawless English. It turned out, according to Porteño’s own declaration, that he was a US 
citizen of Caribbean descent. He had left the US several years back because of 
unspecified problems. After submitting his own declaration, Daniel returned home and 
reported Porteño to the immigration authorities, via their website. But a few days later 
Porteño was back on the streets. Daniel had seen him several times already. 
Daniel’s narrative forcefully captured his ambiguous relation with Porteño. Let us 
recall that until that day Daniel had experienced Porteño as a sometimes annoying, even 
mildly threatening man, but like the majority of his neighbors, he had been on good terms 
with him. In the story, however, Porteño slipped from an abject figure, a homeless drug 
addict who occasionally asked for money in exchange for rendering a “service”, to a truly 
menacing and violent one, which made Daniel feel vulnerable. After all, this was not an 
anonymous encounter. Porteño knew Daniel’s routines as well as the places where he and 




The logic of the patron-client that underpinned Daniel relation with Porteño had been 
suspended and, with it, the possibility of recognition.10 I will return to the slippage from 
the franelero as a somewhat domesticated figure with whom one interacts to the 
franelero as a truly menacing figure, but for now I would like to focus our attention on 
another figure of the story, namely, the police. 
Indeed, Daniel’s story was not so much about the franelero as it was about the 
police in their relation to the franelero and, no doubt, in their relation to new residents. 
What stood out in the story, and in the breakfast meeting during which it was narrated (or 
rather re-narrated, as many were already familiar with it), were the types of concerns that 
neighbors expressed about the police. Daniel was not (or not only) complaining, as it is 
often the case, about police corruption, that is, about the police allowing franeleros to 
“work” in exchange for a “fee.” The police in Daniel’s story—at least the street officers 
who responded to his call—were acting according to law and due process:11 they 
responded promptly to Daniel’s call; they arrested the man who was engaging in a 
forbidden act—demanding money for cars parked on the street and threatening Daniel—
and they turned him to the appropriate authorities. And yet, while seemingly acting 
according to law and procedure the police were unable to meet Daniel’s expectations. He 
portrayed them, especially street level police officers, as an ignorant and incompetent 
bunch, incapable of efficiently subduing Porteño due to their fears of contagion (an issue 
                                                 
10 A similar logic underpins Siegel’s discussion of stories of kriminalitas in Jakarta, in which, “those one 
knows turn out to be unrecognizable.” Siegel, J. T. (1998). A new criminal type in Jakarta : counter-
revolution today. Durham, N.C. ; London, Duke University Press. 
 
11 Here again I refer to the law as both the law of the sovereign (the force of law) and particular rules and 





to which I will return later) and to their lack of organization. He also described them as 
victims of abuse at the hands of higher-level officers, which only augmented their 
helplessness. In other words, the police appeared as worryingly out of joint with the 
rescue of law and with the cosmopolitan present they were charged with bringing about.  
New residents were surely invested in the rescue of law in the historic center. Some 
had opened small businesses in the area, others had made their homes there, or were 
planning to buy property, under the assumption that at least a certain area, and eventually 
the entire historic center, would become more orderly, and that certain transgressions 
would simply not be tolerated. No street vendors would be allowed, no franeleros, no 
homeless people, and no graffiti. Moreover, legal procedures, such as obtaining permits 
for operating restaurants or for remodeling heritage buildings, would be streamlined and 
simplified. At the same time, new residents were under the assumption that the center had 
become, and would continue to be, safe.  
But their investment in the rescue of law resonated with a particular imaginary of 
law and with the types of subjects they identified themselves as being: responsible, law 
abiding citizens. Not unlike Armando in the incident with street vendors that I discussed 
in Chapter 4, Daniel positioned himself in this story as a subject oriented to and by law: 
someone who abides by the rules, who values institutions and who respects the rights of 
others. The rescue of law in the historic center thus resonated with a wider discourse that 
emphasizes the need to modernize Mexican institutions in order to close the gap between 
the way things should work and actually existing practices.  
In the introduction to Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (2006), Jean and John 




of neoliberalization, there is a renewed fetishization of law across the globe. In Mexico, 
an internationally circulating discourse about the rule of law, together with a series of 
demands stemming from international aid organizations to reform and streamline the 
judicial apparatus, has dovetailed longstanding anxieties about disorder, illegality and 
corruption. The absence of the rule of law, so goes a widespread assertion in public 
discourse, stands as an impediment of the country’s full-fledged democratization. This 
imaginary entails spatial and temporal references: if only Mexico, and Mexicans, could 
be like Europe, or like the United States, presumed paragons of legality.12 Recall how 
Tomas, the police bureaucrat whom we met in Chapter 4, commented that the neighbors 
used to tell him "that [the police in the historic center] should act like in Madrid, or like 
in Amsterdam.”  
Now contrast this image of law, citizenship and the cosmopolitan with another 
image from my fieldnotes. A managerial executive working to modernize the police in 
the historic center explained to me during an interview that it was difficult to enforce the 
law, especially the Civic Culture Act (which I will discuss in the next section). The 
reason was what he called the “deeply engrained” practices of the people living and 
working in the center, like washing sidewalks with soap or throwing trash: “If I stopped 
them [for doing these types of things] they would laugh at me,” this bureaucrat told me. 
That very morning, he continued by way of illustration, the police immobilized the car of 
an elderly couple for parking in a forbidden spot. In no time a group of people gathered to 
                                                 
12  This imaginary reproduces the global talk about a legal developed world, and an illegal south and east, 
hotbeds of corruption. See: Taussig, M. (1999). Defacement. Public Secret and the Labour of the Negative. 
Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, Nuijten, M. and G. Anders, Eds. (2008). Corruption and the secret of 





defend the couple and to accuse the cops of abusing their authority. The officers held 
their ground and the group ended up in the Attention Center denouncing the “abuse.”  
The bureaucrat presented this anecdote to illustrate the need to inculcate a culture 
of legality among Mexico City’s inhabitants. People who lacked respect for the police—
and for the law itself—were, according to this bureaucrat, the most severe obstacle that 
law enforcement agents faced in the streets of the center. In the story that he narrated at 
the breakfast meeting Daniel too complained about people who obstructed the work of 
the police. Let us recall that both his neighbor and an anonymous woman in the crowd 
yelled at the police to stop abusing their authority without any real grasp of the context. 
Perhaps voiced from two different class positions, their antagonism towards the police 
nevertheless reflected a common perception in Mexico City that the police are always 
arbitrary and violent.  
In the different versions of this incident that I heard before and after the breakfast 
meeting, some of Daniel’s neighbors expressed their concern about the unwarranted and 
excessive police force that had been used to arrest Porteño that morning. For example, in 
a version of the story as told by one neighbor (who claimed to have heard it from 
someone else) it was Porteño’s shirt that had been ripped during the fight, and not a 
policeman’s. Daniel, too, had expressed his opposition to police force in other occasions. 
In fact, when he left the breakfast meeting that morning, other neighbors commented that 
while he was now bitterly complaining about others interfering with the use of police 
force, he and Camille had themselves made similar objections during another incident, 





All this suggested that new residents, Daniel included, were ambivalent about the 
use of police force. But what was at stake in Daniel’s narrative that morning was not the 
violence of the police (which he disavowed), but rather their ability to effectively enforce 
the law and deal with Porteño. Indeed, a lawful subject such as the one Daniel aspired to 
be would require a proper police—not only non-corrupt and well-intentioned, but also 
well-trained and effective. So despite all the evidence that he himself cited to the effect 
that they were truly incompetent, which suggested that it was he, and not the police who 
was out of joint with the realities of the historic center, Daniel could not but maintain his 
hopes on the police. Moreover, unlike his neighbor, who took it upon herself to defend 
Porteño from police abuse, Daniel depicted the franelero as a menacing figure. Porteño 
was dangerous and Daniel wanted him out.  
In other words for new residents such as Daniel, Luis and Armando law holds the 
promise of a cosmopolitan present. It holds the promise of order and of clear rules and 
regulations. It holds the promise of subjects oriented to and by law, that is, subjects who 
would not throw trash on the street, who would not sequester public space for the benefit 
of the few, and who would not pay bribes to the police. As the law of liberal democratic 
ideology, it poses the fiction of equality, where everyone appears as the equal bearer of 
rights and responsibilities. But the law in which new residents are affectively invested—
and indeed the "rule of law”—is doubled. It means more police and zero tolerance to 
transgression. It means the criminalization of illegality: no street vendors or franeleros in 
public space. It means creating the conditions for safe investment, at all cost.  It is, to 
borrow Neil Smith’s formulation, a revanchist law, where the fiction of equality is 




thus entails equality and clean, safe and orderly streets. And the dissonance between 
these two horizons is disavowed through idioms of legality and illegality. 
Franeleros and the Law 
Although a longtime source of frustration and anxiety for Mexico City’s drivers, 
the legions of franeleros whose presence in the streets of the historic center preoccupied 
new residents at the breakfast meeting attained heightened visibility in the summer of 
2004. That year, Mexico City’s legislative body enacted the Civic Culture Act,13 a 
controversial legislation based on Rudolph Giuliani’s 2003 consultancy to the local 
government that aimed to curve “antisocial” behaviors in public space.14 The aim of this 
law, according to then Secretary of Public Security (SSP) and its principal advocate 
Marcelo Ebrard, was to reduce criminality in the city. Specifically building on the 
“quality of life” approach to policing that Giuliani’s report recommended, the Civic 
Culture Act linked and penalized such disparate “disorderly” activities as vending on the 
streets, informally watching over cars, cleaning car windows at traffic lights, painting 
graffiti or engaging in street prostitution.15 What these behaviors had in common, besides 
                                                 
13 Mayor López Obrador first introduced the Civic Culture Act to the local assembly in December 2002. It 
was voted down and a modified version was introduced in December 18, 2003. This was finally passed in 
May 2004.  
 
14 Mexico City’s government hired Giuliani Partners, the private consultancy firm founded and owned by 
New York’s ex-mayor, in October 2002. 
  
15 Giuliani’s “quality of life approach” sustains that crime and disorder are intimately intertwined. 
Tolerating minor offenses and infractions creates the conditions for more serious crimes to occur. Thus, 
emphasis shifts from “fighting crime” to “keeping order” and to “policing everyday life.” Following this 
logic, the Civic Culture Act almost doubled the number of punishable “administrative infractions” (from 22 
to 43) involving loitering, soliciting and panhandling, and established harsher penalties ranging from fines 
(of up to 30 daily minimum-wage salaries) to administrative arrests (of up to 36 hours). For critical 




their putative disorderly nature, was that they happened in public space. In a document 
outlining Giuliani’s recommendations to the public Ebrard presented the issue as follows: 
In the past few years the number of people who make the street (vía pública) their 
workplace has multiplied exponentially, be they the franeleros who use objects to 
reserve parking spaces and then charge money for their use, or the windshield 
cleaners, who impose an unsolicited service. The fact is that both cases constitute 
a problem for the city’s inhabitants (SSP 2003: 39).   
The Civic Culture Act was the most spectacular, and the most controversial, result 
of Giuliani Partners’ consultancy, which from the start was mired in controversy.16 The 
consultancy was proposed by a group of prominent business people, most notoriously 
Carlos Slim, who also footed its 4.3 million dollar bill. Besides the issue of who paid for 
the consultancy, critics—from business associations to non-governmental 
organizations—expressed concerns about the viability of Giuliani’s model of policing for 
a place like Mexico City. Some pointed to the endemic corruption of the police, or to the 
complexities of the megalopolis, or to persistent social inequalities. Others decried that 
again Mexico’s elites—in this case the business sector and the city’s elected officials—
looked for solutions abroad (en el extranjero). Likewise, human rights organizations, 
numerous public intellectuals and opposition politicians criticized the Civic Culture Act 
                                                                                                                                                 
Revanchist 1990s." Social Text 16(4): 1-20, Feldman, A. (2001). "White Public Space and the Political 
Geograpgy of Public Safety." Social Text 19(3): 57-89. 
 
16 While the Civic Culture Act was the most visible and most controversial product of Giuliani’s Report, 
the bulk of his recommendations concerned the modernization of the police. According to the report, what 
the city required was a modern police, with modern technologies and modern training. This modernization 
entailed the introduction of information technologies, such as the centralization of crime data collection and 
production of statistics, and the constant sharing of this information between different sectors. Other 
recommendations concerned the implementation of efficiency and anti-corruption measures. Modernization 
also included the organizational re-structuring of the police according to managerial efficiency models. 





for its “repressive nature” and its “criminalization of poverty.”17 
The Act went into effect in August 2004 with a spectacular crackdown on 
franeleros and windshield cleaners, especially in heavily commercial areas such as the 
historic center or other central neighborhoods with a high concentration of large 
corporate offices and retail and leisure spaces. These operations generated great 
expectations amongst Mexico City’s drivers. “Mexico City’s government launches itself 
against franeleros,” read a headline of Reforma newspaper on July 31st, 2004, the day 
before the law went into effect. “War against franeleros starts tomorrow”, read a headline 
in El Universal. As the pros and cons of the Civic Culture Act and of the crackdown itself 
were discussed in the press, anxieties and fantasies about franeleros intensified. And 
although their media presence has diminished from the hyper- visibility they attained in 
2004, they continue to figure prominently in discussions about informality, illegality and 
criminality, together with street vendors and other informal occupants of public space.  
The mass media generally depicts franeleros as an incontrollable plague and as a 
powerful mafia, which resonates with the views of new residents of the historic center 
(and indeed of many people I know in Mexico City). Newspaper reports and editorials 
                                                 
17 Take, for example, a letter to Ebrard written by a prominent police reform and human rights campaigner 
after the SSP publicized Giuliani’s recommendations in 2003:  
“Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the approach is the pressure it places on the police to solve problems 
that are largely beyond its competence to resolve. Indeed, in the area of public order and regulation of the 
uses of public space, the differences between New York and the Federal District are most pronounced. 
Mexico City's hundreds of thousands of franeleros, windshield wipers and ambulatory vendors are a 
reflection of a massive informal sector that has no real counterpart in New York (whose "squeegee men" 
totaled less than 200 when Mayor Giuliani ordered his crackdown on them). Their significant presence is 
virtually guaranteed by the weaknesses and inequities in the District's economy and local public 
administration — problems that are neither the fault of the police nor overly susceptible to their efforts, Mr. 
Giuliani's recommendations notwithstanding. Under such circumstances, the consequences of criminalizing 
the lifestyles of last resort are difficult to predict, but unlikely to be sustainable or an unalloyed benefit for 





portray their activities as a greatly lucrative business based on obscure corruption 
networks that involve franeleros and their leaders, police officers and high-ranking 
government officials. The consensus is that franeleros illegally profit from privatizing—
some called it kidnapping—public space, thus contravening the rule of law. Moreover, 
they are suspected of partaking of, or at least abetting, criminal car-theft networks. It goes 
without saying that there is little public discussion and very few media reports about the 
working conditions and the kinds of problems that franeleros face on the streets, or about 
the types of extortions they endure on a daily basis.  
Take, for example, an opinion piece from the widely read newspaper El Universal, 
published in January 2006. The author describes franeleros as an “entrenched urban 
virus” that, since its appearance at the turn of the twentieth century, has slowly taken 
possession “of the ‘virginity’ of our streets, turning Mexico City into the biggest for-pay 
parking lot in the world.” According to this editorial, informal car watching is:  
One of the biggest informal businesses in the history of the city, [which generates] 
millionaire profits, and [propitiates] a pyramid style corruption, that goes from 
traffic officers to state officials, and even delegados (borough presidents) (Bazán 
2006).  
 The author declares having received more than “372 emails” regarding franeleros 
since 2002, in which readers “bitterly complain” about the “outright theft” of informal car 
watching, to which state authorities “turn a blind eye.” He refers to the contents of two 
such letters. The first is from a woman who conducted research on franeleros in a 
southern district of the city for her Master’s thesis: 
Each franelero confessed making an average of 800 pesos every day, which, 
multiplied by more than 50 of them operating in this area, generates the not 
insignificant sum of 40 thousand pesos per day, which, in a year, adds up to more 




The second is from a man who reports receiving death threats from a group of 
franeleros after refusing to pay them for parking outside his home: 
After refusing to pay the daily sum [that franeleros] demanded, his car has been 
stoned and damaged, and now even his life is at risk for parking on the streets, 
whose ownership, at least in theory, has not been transferred to a group of 
criminals (hampones) (Ibid.). 
Not unlike Daniel’s story with Porteño, there is a slippage in these narratives 
between illegality and violent criminality in the figure of the franelero. From being 
someone who engages in illegal activities, the franelero turns into an outright criminal. 
But anxieties about the franelero also reveal drivers’ ambivalent relation to him, as I 
suggested in Chapter 3. He is an unsettling figure; someone with whom the car-driving 
middle classes enter into fleeting and sometimes not-so-fleeting interactions on the street, 
in which the provision of a “service” is involved. In other words, while the franelero is 
dreaded he is at the same time needed. For example, drivers, especially in heavily 
commercial areas, often prefer to leave their cars with franeleros than to pay the high 
prices of parking lots. In areas with high concentrations of office buildings, drivers 
sometimes pay weekly fees to franeleros to watch over their cars during their workday, 
and even entrust them with their car keys. In this sense, franeleros destabilize class 
relations in Mexico City. They occupy middle class spaces, but they do not always do so 
in a relation of dependency. They therefore occupy an ambiguous position between the 
subservient subordinate and the menacing criminal. 
In other words, interactions between drivers and franeleros are shot through with 
ambivalence. Let us return to the historic center to explore this ambivalence further. Juan 




During an interview that I conducted with both of them at their home in February 2007, 
Juan, an architect in his early thirties, talked about his fascination with the street life of 
the historic center and with the multiplicity of characters and scenes that he encountered 
there on a daily basis. Carol, in her late twenties and also an architect, did not share this 
fascination and talked about the historic center as a dangerous place. Allow me to quote 
extensively from this interview, as it forcefully captures the ambivalence of the franelero 
and the specific conundrums of the historic center’s new residents vis-à-vis this figure:  
Juan: At first they think you are crazy, right? I mean, you sit to get your 
shoes shined and that’s it, right? You return the next day and they 
look at you strangely, I mean, “What’s this guy doing here?” and 
later “Whassup, how are you”, or you bring your shoes [and tell 
them]: “bring them upstairs, [when you finish and leave them] with 
the porter.” And that’s the point where I think they give in. At first 
I think they do put a certain barrier, even the franeleros, this big 
guy…  
Carol: Yes, at first he was aggressive, like, (with an unfriendly tone): 
“Ay, the guys from the [renovated] building...”  
Juan:  And now, I mean, I leave them the keys to my car… 
Carol: (With a disapproving tone) Yes!  
Juan: Yes, I swear. One Sunday I arrive to pick up Carol, horrible traffic. 
(…) There is no parking. He stops me [and says]: “I park it for 
you”. I leave him my car keys. I return and he had even bought me 
a coke, I mean, a really nice guy. If I tell this story at Carol’s 
[parents] house, they would tell me: “Are you crazy or what?” (…) 
Now, you must keep some mistrust. I think this is a basic rule; one 
thing is that they don’t do anything to you, or that they have certain 
codes, but you also must get their codes, respect them. And also, 
well, try to blend in. But they perceive you as different. That’s a 
fact. I mean, for example Daniel, I mean, he is a person who looks 
different. Armando is a person who looks different. (…) I mean, in 
the end, I think that ultimately all of us who are here, I mean, we 
all look kind of different. (…) The point is to not have a fall out, so 
it won’t get worse. I mean you mark your limit the same way as 
they mark their limit. There is a relationship and that’s it. To go 




I mean, for example, the guy who is a shoeshine, we didn’t know, I 
thought he lived in the center, he gets here at 7:30 in the morning 
to polish shoes, [so I thought that] he must live around here. It 
turns out he lives in [the periphery]. I ask him: “Hey! I brought my 
shoes last Friday and you weren’t here.” [He replies]: “No, I got it 
really bad! I got a bad beat-up in my hood (barrio), and, well, I 
was gravely ill,” and I don’t know what, and Carol gets 
(uncomfortable). Like why… 
Carol: …are you telling me this?   
Juan: Yes, I mean, there is a certain closeness, but up to a certain limit, 
right?  
Throughout the passage that I quoted (and indeed throughout the entire interview), 
Juan and Carol differ on how they present themselves as individuals and as a couple. Juan 
emphasizes his fascination with the historic center’s sensual excesses, its publicity, and 
its characters. Carol, in contrast, describes it as a difficult place to live, with multiple 
layers of danger and potentially unpleasant encounters always looming nearby. To be 
sure, these discrepancies betray a gendered experience of the city and its perils, with 
Carol feeling more vulnerable than Juan—and feeling more at ease with expressing this 
vulnerability—during her encounters with the franelero or the shoe-shine. Towards the 
end of the passage, however, their perspectives converge and Juan agrees with Carol: one 
should not get too close to them, “you mark your limit the same way as they mark their 
limit.”  
Indeed, Juan’s attraction to the street-characters of the historic center (the 
transvestite, the shoeshine and the franelero) and his fascination with establishing 
quotidian relations with them goes hand in hand with his (and Carol’s) fear of an excess 
of intimacy with them. While Juan desires closeness (e.g., he asks the shoeshine why he 




know that the shoeshine was badly beaten-up in his neighborhood). Perceived by Juan 
and Carol as a harmless and picturesque inhabitant of the area the shoeshine turns out to 
stand for a far more violent reality, of which they would actually prefer not to partake. It 
is as if the logic of the patron-client upon which Juan’s relationship with these street 
figures depends would collapse with an excess of intimacy.  
A few days before the breakfast meeting that I discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, Armando had already told me the story about Porteño threatening Daniel. As he 
was telling me the details of the story, I asked him if the police had indeed arrested 
Porteño that morning.  Armando replied, in his characteristic lecturing tone (I paraphrase 
from my fieldnotes):  
What happens is that there is a law that was made when Ebrard was Secretary of 
Public Security, which is like Giuliani’s law in New York, in which you can be 
detained for cleaning windshields, for everything. At the beginning they detained 
franeleros, prostitutes, street vendors, but then it happened that Ebrard was 
removed because of [a lynching incident in a different area of the city], and this 
law was forgotten, but now it is a good moment to do something about it again. 
While the rescue of law thus proclaims the promise of the cosmopolitan (indeed, in 
the quote above, of New York), the franelero locates new residents in the here and now 
of Mexico’s class hierarchies. In other words, the cosmopolitan present to which new 
residents aspire to is at once predicated upon and undone by the exclusion of the 
franelero. As we have seen throughout the chapter the talk about franeleros reaches 
levels of panic and hysteria. He is described as committing acts of extortion, as a car 
thief, or as part of lucrative corruption networks. The consensus is that franeleros benefit 
while law-abiding citizens pay the consequences of corruption. Indeed, there is an excess 




the total collapse of the urban order.  
Intimacy, Contagion, Corruption 
As we have seen, anxieties about the franeleros were inseparable from anxieties 
about the inefficiency and corruption of the police, especially of street-level police 
officers charged with enforcing the Civic Culture Act. At best, such police officers were 
said to be ignorant of the specifics of the law and of the procedures for arresting 
franeleros and taking them to Civic Courts, as was painfully evident to Daniel during his 
confrontation with Porteño. Let us recall that it took more than five officers to detain the 
homeless man, as they were afraid he would infect them with HIV. At worst, they were 
thought to be extorting franeleros or to be in on the “multimillion dollar” business of 
watching over cars.  
This should not be surprising. Drawing on Benjamin, Taussig argues that the police 
are not and cannot be subject to law. They are constitutively suspended from both law-
making and law-founding forms of violence. Policing, he writes, “is that enigmatic power 
arising from its immersion in and constant contact with contagion, with the tabooed, thus 
partaking of the properties of corruption itself” (Taussig 1996: 20). Taussig’s aim is to 
destabilize the idea that the police in the United States,18 that is, in a liberal democratic 
context, abides by the law, in contrast to other, distant places, where police corruption 
and violence are rampant.19 He wants to bring “home” the notion of the constitutive 
                                                 
18 The article I’m referring to discusses a case of corruption within the New York Police Department. 
 
19 Here Taussig draws on Benjamin’s argument that it is particularly in the institution of the modern police 
that the “rottenness” of law attains its most ignominious manifestation. For Benjamin, the police are always 
suspended between law-preserving and law-making violence. This contradiction becomes especially 




violence and corruption of the police: “we do not at first think of war in foreign lands 
where the exotic and the horrific loom large when we think of the police—‘our police.’ 
As we are wont to say” (Ibid.). But the policeman that appears in Tausig’s argument, 
even as he is intimately connected to the criminal, is different from him: “It’s not that 
cops are thieves, too! No! I insist on the difference. If they’re thieves, then they’re ‘cop-
thieves’” (Ibid: 22). In other words, Taussig argues that in their “unholy” alliance, cops 
and thieves, the police and the criminal, constitute each other as different from each 
other, even as the line that separates them is always ambiguous. 
Yet something different from an unholy alliance between the “police” and the 
“criminal” is at work in Daniel’s depiction of the police as an incompetent, gullible and 
ignorant bunch incapable of dealing with a homeless franelero. Let us recall that Daniel 
narrated, in a rather annoyed voice, how a policeman explained that he and his peers 
feared the homeless because the latter could infect them with HIV. In other words, 
Daniel’s narrative exuded more than mere anxiety about police corruption. I do not mean 
to disavow the very real problem of police violence, which still prevails in Mexico City, 
as well as the problem of corruption. But I want to direct our attention to an issue which 
appeared more pressing for new residents of the historic center (in a context where police 
corruption, although seen as a problem, was not the most significant issue). What 
Daniel’s words suggest is that the police are not entirely different from the franelero. It is 
as if they partake of similar traits, which Daniel cannot fully fathom.  
A similar anxiety appears in the following newspaper report on policemen working 
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as franeleros in Mexico City’s metropolitan area: 
Although their job is to guard the Agrarian Tribunal, two state policemen make 
the most of their time there, allowing drivers to park in a forbidden area, in 
exchange for a few pesos. 
[The policemen] don’t wear the orange vests or the name tags that [state 
authorities] provided to the franeleros. In their [police] uniforms, consisting of 
black pants and white shirts, they also “direct” (echan aguas) drivers and extend 
their hands to receive a tip.  
Although the sign that forbids parking in the area is very visible, one of the 
officers declares that he allows the use of those spaces because the area is very 
chaotic: finding a place to park can take up to 30 minutes.  
“(I let them) because there is no parking, I only provide this service so it is 
quicker to go in and out [of the Tribunal] and [drivers] will leave in less time and 
they won’t double park” (Ibarra 2004). 
 We find in this story no doubt a sense of the cop-thief as Taussig talks about it, that 
is, of the policeman using his authority to profit from allowing drivers to park in 
forbidden spots. But something other than a fallen cop is at stake in this episode. Here the 
policeman turns uncannily similar to the franelero (as well as to others who make a living 
working in the street’s informal economy). It is not so much that in their proximity the 
two constitute each other as different, as Taussig would have it, but that they come to 
appear indistinguishable. The policeman reveals himself as a franelero. What I’m 
suggesting, then, is that the policeman on the street slides into the dangerous pueblo, the 
urban rabble. He comes to resemble the masses of the urban poor that he is charged with 
policing. For example, the same managerial executive working to modernize the police in 
the historic center whom I quoted above explained to me during an interview that police 
officers on the ground were ill-prepared for handling the problem of informality and 
illegality in the streets. He expressed concern over the intimacy between the police 





Their daily interactions (…) in the street become a problem, because they 
establish very close relationships. The woman selling food snacks (garnachas) 
gives [police officers] a food snack, they exchange presents in December.  
The point to be made, then, is that at his most “cosmopolitan,” legal and orderly 
(and hence in his farthest form from the franelero) the policeman on the street would be 
invested with the metaphysical distance of law (of liberal democracy) and with an aura of 
honor and duty. Let us recall Derrida’s argument that the police are more than policemen 
in uniform.  They are “present or represented everywhere that there is force of law. They 
are present, sometimes invisible but always effective, wherever there is preservation of 
the social order” (Derrida 1990: 1009). At its farthest from the franelero the police would 
enforce the Civic Culture Act and would keep out street vendors from the historic center. 
Indeed, the problem with a democratic police is not whether they follow a transcendental 
law, as they necessarily stand outside and inside the law in what Taussig calls the 
“metaphysical warfare” of the police. But, as Slavoj Žižek might put it, they work as an 
institution in such contexts because citizens act “as if” they are the ultimate bearers of 
law.  
But the policeman on the street, we have seen, is suspiciously similar to the 
franelero. He slips into the dangerous masses that dwell in the city’s streets and he cannot 
be trusted. For Daniel, the problem seems to be that he doesn’t know what side the police 
are on and whether they are at all fit for the demands of a cosmopolitan present.  Daniel’s 
anxiety, then, is not that the line separating the police and the criminal will collapse, but 
that it was never there to begin with; not that corruption will ensue but that the 









Chapter 6:  
The Return of the Masses 
Introduction 
On Sunday July 30, 2006 Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the presidential 
candidate of a center left coalition that included the Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD) addressed hundreds of thousands of people who gathered in the historic center. He 
was disputing the results of the recent presidential election. It was the third weekend in 
less than a month that protesters packed the Zocalo and its surrounding streets to 
denounce electoral fraud and to demand a full ballot recount.1 That day I was supposed 
to meet Victor, a visual artist living on Regina Street who was an enthusiastic supporter 
of AMLO, in a roof terrace restaurant overlooking the Zocalo. Offering a panoramic 
view of the square, this was a preferred meeting place for high-up members of the PRD 
                                                 
1 On the night of the election, the results were too close to call but Felipe Calderon, the candidate of the 
governing Democratic Action Party (PAN), was declared winner a few days later, by a margin of less than 
half a percentage point. On July 6 AMLO declared that he would contest these results at the Electoral 
Tribunal, the institution in charge of resolving electoral disputes. He claimed that an “old-fashioned” fraud 
had been perpetrated, by which he meant that, besides the negative campaign waged against him during the 
runoff to the election (with the president openly supporting his party’s candidate in violation of electoral 
law), the ballots themselves had been tampered with. AMLO and his staff mounted a doubled strategy to 
contest Calderon’s victory. On the one hand they presented their case to the Federal Electoral Tribunal, 
offering proof of irregularities in several polling stations and demanding that all votes would be recounted.  
On the other hand, they called for massive demonstrations all over the country that would converge in 
Mexico City’s historic center. The first demonstration took place on July 8, a week after the election. 
According to the organizers it had a turnout of more than half a million people. The number of protesters 
increased in a second demonstration held on July 15 and on the third demonstration, held on July 30th. The 
aim of these demonstrations and of the plantón  (sit-in) that ensued was to demand that the Electoral 
Tribunal ordered a full ballot recount. On August 5th the tribunal ordered a partial recount and 11,839 
ballot boxes were opened and the votes recounted, with no significant alteration of the previous results. On 
September 5th the Tribunal presented a 309-page final decision on the election, validating the results and 
officially declaring Calderon as president elect. The document recognized that there had been irregularities 
and illegal conducts (most notably by the president and business groups) during the campaigns but 
declared that their effects on the results could not be measured. For a detailed analysis of the post-election 
crisis and AMLO’s strategies see: Aziz Nassif, A. (2007). "El retorno del conflicto. Elecciones y 





as well as sympathetic intellectuals and journalists during the post-election protests.   
Before leaving my apartment that morning I could already hear the sound of the 
crowd, which got louder and louder as I walked towards the intersection of Juarez Street 
and Eje Central, where I paused to watch the demonstration, headed by AMLO himself, 
as it moved towards the Zocalo. A sea of people walking shoulder to shoulder loudly 
proclaimed their support for their candidate as they crossed Eje Central onto Madero 
Street (the central street of the financial corridor). Multiple organizations affiliated to the 
PRD walked in large groups, donning yellow shirts (the color of their party) and carrying 
printed signs that read: “AMLO hang in there, the people are rising up.” There were 
musicians playing drums, families with children, and people of all ages holding balloons, 
Mexican flags and banners bearing the most disparate condemnations of outgoing 
President Fox,2 candidate Calderon and the Federal Electoral Institute, the de-centralized 
institution charged with organizing and overseeing elections in Mexico:  
“Fox, traitor of democracy” 
 “My country hurts” 
“Democracy, R.I.P., July 2nd”   
 “Calderon what do you fear?” 
After a while I tried to make my way towards the Zocalo to meet Victor at the roof-
terrace restaurant, but the sheer density of the crowd prevented me from moving forward. 
I finally settled in a spot on Madero Street, just a few blocks west of the Zocalo, in front 
                                                 
2 Having defeated the PRI as the candidate of the National Action Party (PAN) in the 2000 presidential 
election (and after seven-decades of one-party rule), Vicente Fox became the symbol of Mexico’s 
“transition to democracy.” AMLO supporters thus depicted him as the worst kind of traitor. Someone who, 






of a giant screen that would broadcast AMLO’s speech. From a stage placed at the 
eastern edge of the Zocalo, in front of the National Palace, and against the deafening 
noise of the crowd screaming “you are not alone, you are not alone,” AMLO began to 
speak. Repeating a theme that he often used during the campaign, he declared that he was 
committed to defending democracy and the will of the country’s citizens:  
What is being decided these days is whether we once and for all establish a true 
democracy in Mexico, or whether a regime of democratic simulation will be 
imposed, one where the privileged of old will ultimately continue to decide the 
nation’s destiny. 
AMLO denounced what he claimed was a fraud intended to “falsify the citizen’s 
will” as it had been expressed on July 2nd. “We have the certainty,” he continued, “all the 
elements and proofs to assert without hesitation that we have won the Presidency of the 
Republic.” The crowd erupted in thunderous cheers and applause and began to chant 
what had become the slogan of the post-election protests: 
“Vote by vote, polling booth by polling booth.” 
“Vote by vote, polling booth by polling booth.” 
“Vote by vote, polling booth by polling booth.” 
He asked everyone to listen attentively to what he had to say next and to respond 
only after careful consideration. There was silence before he continued: “I propose that 
we stay here, that we remain day and night, until all votes have been counted, and we 
have a president elect with the minimum legality that all Mexicans deserve.” Everybody 
around me on Madero Street was staring at the giant screen, which showed a close up of 
AMLO, in absolute silence, their faces betraying confusion.  “Is he saying that we remain 




answer from her fellow protesters. “On the streets or on the sidewalks?”   
AMLO proceeded to lay out a detailed plan to set up multiple campamentos 
(encampments) that, starting at the Zócalo, would continue in a long line out of the 
historic center along Madero and Juarez streets, and would occupy a large segment of 
Reforma Avenue, the broad and elegant tree-lined boulevard that houses important 
financial institutions, corporate headquarters, hotels, embassies, government offices, and 
museums. Representatives of the thirty-one states would camp at the Zócalo, he 
suggested, while protesters from Mexico City’s sixteen administrative districts would 
occupy the rest of the proposed route on Madero, Juarez and Reforma.  
AMLO asked the crowd: “Should we stay? Yes or no?” Although a loud “yes” was 
chanted in reply, there was tension in the air. He had taken the crowd by surprise. “I will 
ask again differently,” he continued, “those who are for staying, raise your hand.” Some 
chanted, “Yes, we are staying! Yes, we are staying!” Many raised their hand, rather 
undecidedly. “Those who don’t agree, raise your hand.” No hands were raised.  
“Abstentions?” Again no hands. “We are staying!” Thus began the forty-seven day long 
plantón3 that literally and metaphorically divided the city—and the country—in 2006. 
People began to disperse shortly after AMLO’s speech, many trying to find more 
information about the proposed campamentos. I called Victor’s cell phone to comment 
upon what had just happened. “Where are you? Did you hear the speech?” he asked me 
before I had the chance to say hello. “I don’t know what to make of it,” he continued. 
“Has this man become crazy?” I told him that it was indeed an unexpected move and that 
                                                 
3 The term plantón, which could be translated as a sit-in, refers to a form of popular politics that consists in 





AMLO would probably lose a lot of supporters because of it. A few days later I ran into 
Victor at Culture Space. He was chatting with Bernardo. They were both convinced that 
such a large-scale plantón meant political suicide for AMLO: “Now people can say that 
he was [after all] ‘a danger for Mexico,’” Victor said, referring to the negative campaign 
slogan that had been used by the PAN candidate (to which I will return below). Victor 
and Bernardo’s support for AMLO, like that of many other people I knew in the historic 
center, dwindled as the weeks went by. Indeed, neither they nor any other new residents 
who had voted for AMLO and had participated in the post-election demonstrations took 
part in the plantón.  
That very same evening improvised campamentos began to appear on the Zocalo 
and along the eight-kilometer route proposed by AMLO. Protesters set up tents or used 
ropes and sheets of plastic to build their temporary shelters as the police blocked 
vehicular traffic from the designated streets.4 Already by the following morning it 
became clear to me that life in the center would turn rather unusual during this time. As I 
left my apartment at the corner of Cuba and Isabel la Católica, four blocks away from 
Madero Street, I noticed that the streets were oddly calm and quiet and that there was an 
absolute absence of cars. Although these streets remained open to vehicular traffic, the 
fact that their intersections with Madero street were blocked discouraged drivers from 
                                                 
4 The failure of Mexico City’s government, headed by AMLO’s party, to prevent protesters from blocking 
Madero and Reforma streets became one of the most contentious issues during the plantón. Indeed, critics 
claimed that the local administration was using taxpayer money to support the plantón by, for example, 
providing electricity or police support, which the interim mayor vehemently denied. The latter’s official 
line was that his administration was protecting the demonstrators’ constitutional right to free assembly as 
well as ensuring that the protests did not get violent. Critics argued that the sit-in was violating their 
constitutional right to freedom of movement. However, there were only few voices that demanded the use 
of police force to remove the protesters from the streets, which reflected the tense political climate and a 





using them. Pedestrians now had the streets all to themselves and did not have to battle 
their way through the crowded sidewalks, jostling street vendors, as they usually did. I 
remember thinking that morning that this was how a pedestrian historic center would 
look and feel. 
As the days went by, the campamentos acquired a less improvised appearance.  
White metal and awning structures typically used in outdoor events at the Zócalo, such as 
book fairs and official ceremonies, covered the large expanse of the square as well as the 
entire ten blocks of Madero Street, from sidewalk to sidewalk, and small scattered areas 
on Juárez and Reforma avenues. Underneath them, the campamentos were for the most 
part equipped with electricity and well delimited sleeping and eating sections. The 
Zocalo was tightly packed with different campamentos, one for each of the 31 states of 
the country, connected by narrow passages.  
On Madero the campamentos occupied only one side of the street, leaving the other 
side as well as both sidewalks free for pedestrians.  There were several assembly areas 
along Madero, outfitted with chairs, couches, and television sets where political films—
from documentaries about AMLO to films about the US invasion of Iraq—as well as art-
house movies were constantly being shown and where information about the 
irregularities in the election was constantly being disseminated. There were multiple 
visual art installations and exhibits across the campamentos, as well as several stages on 
which musicians performed a wide variety of musical genres, from punk rock to folk, 
throughout the day. There were improvised “cultural centers” where artists and cultural 
promoters offered all sorts of activities, from story time for children to acting classes or 




placed on tents, metal structures, tables, stages and stands proliferated as weeks passed. 
Alongside an assortment of vending stands and “cultural centers,” the emptier and more 
thinly scattered campamentos on Juárez and Reforma avenues boasted a modest fun fair, 
equipped with a carousel and a small Ferris wheel, as well as two small soccer fields.  
In general the plantón exuded a festive atmosphere, which nevertheless was 
occasionally punctured by anger and frustration. It was populated by a sundry assortment 
of people, from organized popular groups affiliated to the PRD, which composed the 
majority of protesters, to middle-class professionals, artists, students, and intellectuals. 
During the day, and especially on weekends, the campamentos along Madero and Juarez 
were usually very crowded, with large concentrations of people making it almost 
impossible to walk through them. Hundreds strolled looking at the painting and poster 
exhibits, listening to concerts or stopping to buy from the countless street vendors 
scattered throughout the plantón. Other pedestrians who came to the center for work or 
consumption could be seen walking on Madero’s sidewalks nervously and indirectly 
glancing at the protesters.  
The image of the historic center as a clean, safe and pleasant space to visit, work or 
live, which many new residents and small investors with whom I was in regular contact 
had worked hard to cultivate among friends, family, prospective new residents and 
potential investors, was reverting back to an image of disorder and violence. The 
message conveyed by the media, most of which was harshly critical of the plantón, was 
of a chaotic and sequestered historic center. News item after news item emphasized the 
millions of pesos that were being lost every day because of the plantón and the 




representations echoed racialized political discourses about plantones in general, which 
the media often depict as “invasions” of public space that go against basic rules of 
propriety and civility. But in keeping with the affectively charged tenor of the entire 
2006 election season, the media (especially national TV, radio and some newspapers) 
portrayed this particular plantón as an assault on Mexico’s young democracy like no 
other before and as threatening the political stability of the country. 
Such mass-mediated images of chaos and total disruption, of a historic center under 
siege, failed to capture how new residents experienced the plantón in their everyday 
lives. For the people we have met throughout these pages, whether Daniel, Camille, 
Monica or Bernardo, and especially for those living on or near Madero Street, the 
plantón was a tangible, physical presence to be reckoned with in their daily routines, 
regardless of their political positions. It was an event that disrupted the “normal” pace of 
life in the historic center and that had direct and concrete effects for them. People who 
worked outside the center, for example, complained about a significant worsening of 
their travel times. Luis lived at the corner of Madero and Bolivar streets and worked in 
Santa Fe, the city’s newest financial hub located in the western periphery. For him, going 
to work and returning home had become, in his own words, “a true nightmare,” as the 
plantón severely disrupted traffic near the historic center. But like many others he too 
appreciated the absence of cars and noise in the historic center and went on with his life 
as usual, attending meetings of the Resident’s Association, visiting friends in apartments 
nearby, or going out to drinks at the local cantinas.  
At the same time, new residents lived the plantón as a mass-mediated event that 




As such, the plantón acquired a multiplicity of meanings for them, from offering a 
renewed experience of the historic center as a pedestrian space to raising serious doubts 
about the long-term viability of the rescue; from being a daily nuisance to destabilizing 
their own place in the historic center and the constant labor of “rescue” that they 
performed. Indeed, for many new residents the plantón appeared as a crucial turning 
point in the narrative of rescue, a return of the masses to the spaces of the historic center 
that destabilized their very aspiration to a cosmopolitan present while locating them in 
the here and now of Mexico City’s class and racial hierarchies. But in their return to the 
historic center, in showing that they had actually never left, the masses also returned to 
the heart of national politics, disrupting far more than the narrative of rescue. For they 
had shaken as well the mainstream narrative of “democratization,” with its emphasis on 
catching up with the present, and revealed the tensions that traverse this narrative. 
What does this affectively charged period reveal about social and political 
belonging in Mexico? How are we to understand the concerns and anxieties that the 
plantón triggered among new residents of the historic center? What kinds of fears did it 
incarnate for them? In what ways did their anxieties reference far broader concerns, and 
what in turn were those concerns about? What sorts of political forms and political 
memories haunted the plantón and the discourses about it? In this chapter I take up these 
questions, exploring how the specter of the popular masses that hovered over the historic 
center in the context of the rescue erupted onto center stage during the elections of 2006 
and the post-election protests that followed.  
In exploring the intersection of localized experiences of the plantón and its effects 




stability of the country on the other, I aim to expose the resonances between the small-
scale localized interactions that have formed the focus of this dissertation and broader 
political configurations in contemporary Mexico. I hope to show in a clearer way how 
the sensibilities and aspirations of the historic center’s new residents, what I have called 
their cosmopolitan aspirations, are inscribed within a larger reconfiguration of political 
sensibilities and forms of social and political belonging. More specifically I aim to 
explore how the figure of the urban masses (from the criminalized crowds of street 
“informals” to the ostensibly amorphous crowd of demonstrators) at once informs and 
disrupts these sensibilities and forms of belonging.  
Farewell to the Masses?  
The 2006 election and the protests that followed, especially the plantón, at once 
revealed and deepened an important fissure in the narrative of “democratization” in 
Mexico. Both supporters and critics of the plantón claimed to act in defense of the 
country’s young democracy, which they described as severely threatened by their 
opponents. AMLO claimed that “the right” was preventing the consolidation of 
democracy and had gone as far as committing fraud—a routine practice during the era of 
one-party rule—in order to protect its entrenched “interests.” His critics asserted that he 
himself was an authoritarian figure who undermined the country’s “democratic 
institutions” and represented all the evils of “populism.” To be sure, such cacophony 
expressed the constitutive ambiguities of the modern concept of democracy, which 
articulates, often uneasily, two different traditions: the “liberal tradition” with its 




tradition,” which stresses equality and popular sovereignty (Mouffe 2000; Rancière 
2006). But the cacophony also expressed a fundamental tension and, most importantly, a 
destabilizing proximity between ostensibly conflicting forms of social and political 
belonging.  
Like elsewhere in Latin America, in the 1980s and 1990s a wide range of actors 
from different political orientations converged around the struggle for democratization in 
Mexico. In this particular case the common enemy was the authoritarian one-party 
regime. While liberal ideologues and activists pushed for creating the institutional 
conditions that would enable a peaceful transition, the left saw a multiplicity of emergent 
social movements as vehicles for bringing about a more inclusive form of government 
and a more egalitarian society (Dagnino 1998). In other words, different political 
horizons and aspirations came together under the banners of “civil society” and 
“democracy” during this period (Gutmann 2002). But, as I argued in Chapter 4, a 
particular meaning of these terms has become dominant within the mainstream narrative 
of democratization: civil society has come to stand as the alternative to el pueblo, which 
today smacks of lower class crudeness, lack of political maturity and, ultimately, a threat 
to democracy. The latter, in contrast, refers to strong institutions, individual liberty and 
last but not least, the rule of law. 
As I argued in Chapter 5, this obsession with the rule of law, and especially the 
fixation with “informal” street workers and their disorderly and illegal practices, has 
displaced any serious reflection on the economic, social and political context for the 
explosion of street informality in the past two decades. Put differently, the focus on 




and social insecurity, marking them instead as the cause of the city’s problems. Such 
discourses about informality-as-illegality-as-criminality (to refer again to Chapter 5) 
must be placed within the context of a new criminalization of poverty in different regions 
of the world (Wacqant 2002). But what interests me in this chapter is to explore the 
connections between the types of anxieties about the urban masses that I have discussed 
throughout this dissertation and certain concerns about mass-based political 
mobilizations, particularly as they were articulated during the plantón. In other words, I 
explore how in this affectively charged moment the armies of “informals” routinely 
denounced for sequestering the city’s public space in the context of rescue (as I have 
discussed throughout the dissertation), and the masses of demonstrators who camped on 
the center’s streets during the plantón were construed and perceived as identical: a 
residual and threatening force, never a constitutive element of the (neo) liberal present. 
In “The Myth of the Multitude, or, Who’s Afraid of the Crowd” William 
Mazzarella argues that in contemporary academic and political parlance (in both 
“conservative” and “progressive” milieus) the crowd appears outmoded, even rank. 
“Crowds,” writes Mazzarella, “supposedly belong to the past of the (neo) liberal 
democracies of the global North. By the same token, they also mark the present of non—
or insufficiently—liberal polities in the global South” (2010: 697). According to this 
depiction, crowds were the paradigmatic formation of an earlier phase of modernity, 
characterized by (now extinguished) mass utopias and top-down monumentalism (Buck-
Morss 2000). Indeed, in the context of renewed celebrations of the autonomous self—
free and responsible for his own destiny and his own self-fulfillment—and of 




is pushed to the past (Rose 1999).5 It seems to evoke today the potentials of mass 
democratization and collective forms of social solidarity as well as the horrors of 
twentieth century totalitarianism (in both its fascist and communist modes). 
Anachronistic and regressive in the present, the crowd ostensibly has currency only when 
it bursts onto the streets in a self-consciously quotational manner, that is to say, as an 
aestheticized evocation of older political formations (Schnapp and Tiews 2006, quoted 
by Mazzarella, p. 6). 
As I have discussed throughout the dissertation, the figure of the crowd has had a 
similar fate in Mexico. From the perspective of Mexico’s mainstream political discourse, 
it appears to smell of populism, nationalism and outmoded forms of social and political 
belonging, such as corporatism and clientelism. Here the specter to be grappled with is 
inextricably linked to the country’s twentieth century revolution and the political regime 
that stemmed from it, a history that was firmly inscribed within twentieth century mass 
politics worldwide. The masses were an ambivalent element and legacy of the revolution. 
They were at once menacing (backward, uncouth and always potentially violent) and 
successfully incorporated into (and co-opted by) an authoritarian post-revolutionary 
regime. The masses were the future citizens of the country, to be educated and 
modernized by the state. In the contemporary moment, in contrast, the masses appear 
residual in two ways: first, as those who have been left out of a changing economic 
landscape; and secondly, within the neoliberal regime, as those who have been excluded 
                                                 
5 In Powers of Freedom, Nikolas Rose traces the transformation of a notion of freedom as solidarity, the 
very foundation of the 20th Century welfare state, into freedom as autonomy, where collective forms of 
social and political belonging associated with “solidarity” get repositioned as obstacles for the self-
realization and fulfillment of free and autonomous individuals. Rose, N. S. (1999). Powers of freedom: 





as political subjects. In this narrative it is not the mass, who represent an atavism from 
the past and a relic of PRI-style politics, but the upstanding individual, who can claim the 
position of national subject (Yeh 2009).6  
In the context of the 2006 presidential election and the post-election protests the 
ostensibly old-style forms of political belonging were regularly denounced under the 
term populista. In newspaper editorials and dinner table conversations alike the term was 
often deployed as an insult, which echoed a larger trend in Latin America, where 
“populist,” a term with long history in the region, has become synonymous with a wide 
variety of left leaning leaders. 7 Echoing a number of scholars of populism, Ernesto 
Laclau (2005) notes that this term is characterized by linguistic dispersion and by 
subsuming the most disparate movements under its mantle. Moreover, Laclau continues, 
the term “populism” always refers to its object in negative terms: populist movements 
(from both the “left” and the “right”) lack coherence, are intellectually poor, driven by 
affect rather than “rational” arguments (the leader’s charisma), and, worst of all, 
drastically simplify the political terrain into antagonistic dichotomies (the most classic 
being “the people” versus the “oligarchy” or “the elites”).  
According to Laclau, who proposes a different theorization of populism, such 
dismissal is inscribed in what he calls the denigration of the masses in political discourse: 
“the discursive construction of a certain normality, of an ascetic political universe from 
                                                 
6 For a discussion about the changing uses of “civil society” in Mexico’s recent history see: Escalante 
Gonzalbo, F. (2006). México, fin de siglo. Pensar en México. México, DF, Fondo de Cultura Económica: 
19-36. 
 
7 For a historical discussion of the uses of the term in Latin America and Mexico see: Knight, A. (1998). 






which its dangerous logics have to be excluded” (p. 19). Such denigration of the masses 
is in turn linked to another prejudice: “the repudiation of the undifferentiated milieu 
which is the ‘crowd’ or the ‘people’ in the name of social structuration and 
institutionalization” (p. 63). Indeed, as I discussed in the Introduction, the crowd is a 
constitutive motif of urban modernity that is likewise highly ambivalent. It refers on the 
one hand to the physical presence of the urban and evokes the dangers that threaten to 
intrude upon the social order: violence, criminality, and the specter of insurrection. But 
the term also refers to political collectivities, to the actors who erupted into history with 
the French revolution. As such, it is linked to the emergence of the people as the 
democratic sovereign (Jonsson 2006: 49). This very ambivalence of the masses is thus 
inextricably linked to the constitutive ambiguity of the people: at once the foundation of 
the democratic order and a constant threat to this very order.  
In Laclau’s own approach to populism, the division of the political terrain into two 
antagonistic camps, is in fact constitutive to all forms of politics. In this sense, 
“populism” destabilizes the terrain of respectable politics, challenging the very divide 
between “normal” and pathological forms of political belonging and revealing that 
politics is always traversed by affective commitments. In the case of the plantón, as we 
will see below, a “populist” formation destabilized the narrative of rescue and the 
assumptions upon which it rests, as it also destabilized the hegemonic narrative in which 
the rescue is inscribed. The plantón was thus a sort of return of the repressed, not only of 
forms of political and social belonging supposedly surmounted, but also of the specter of 




Hanging from the Lampposts  
Let us begin the discussion with Mario, a forty-six year old doctor working as an 
independent consultant for an international pharmaceutical company. He had settled in 
the historic center less than a year before the plantón, after moving from Boston, where 
he spent more than a decade, to his native Mexico City to be near his aging father. A few 
weeks into the plantón I met Mario for drinks at the roof terrace bar in front of the 
Zocalo. As we watched the square covered by the white tents of the campamentos the 
conversation inevitably turned to the plantón. He told me that he had reluctantly voted 
for AMLO, which he described as “the lesser of two evils,” but insisted that he did not 
endorse this type of political protest. It was not that the plantón had any serious impact 
on his everyday life, as he only left the center once or twice a week, mostly to visit his 
father, and he did so by subway. He did not mind the campamentos and in fact he praised 
the tranquility that the plantón had brought to the center’s streets. What worried him, and 
to such an extent that he decided to move out of the historic center and settle in the 
southern residential neighborhood of Coyoacán, was what would happen after the 
plantón. He feared that things could get out of control, that protests could continue for 
months and that they would turn violent. He added jokingly: “when the revolution comes 
people like you and me who live in the historic center will be the first to be hanged from 
the lampposts.” We both laughed. 
 Mario’s educated yet sarcastic reference to the dangerous mob of the French 
Revolution that afternoon, in front of a Zócalo packed with protesters and their 
campamentos, conveyed the ambivalence of the mass that I discussed above: the 




order. At the same tome his joke expressed a concern about misrecognition that in turn 
resonated with the trope of standing out that I discussed in Chapter 2. “We”, who stand 
out in the historic center, will be hanged from the lampposts. “They” will mistake us and 
“we” will have to pay the consequences. But in cynically positioning both of us in the 
receiving end of revolutionary violence he also expressed a certain (liberal) guilt for his 
own advantageous position within Mexico’s class and racial hierarchies and, thus, an 
anxiety over proper recognition: “we” are the beneficiaries of “rescue” and they resent 
us. 
At around nine in the evening, Mario and I walked on Madero Street towards his 
home in Luis’s building at the corner of Bolivar. We were attending an art exhibit 
opening in an empty commercial space on the ground floor of that building, which, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 4, was occasionally used as an improvised gallery. The daytime 
hustle and bustle of the campamentos on Madero Street, the handcraft workshops, the 
music and the movies, was giving way to nighttime tranquility. While some people, 
mostly women, prepared dinner at the improvised kitchens, others watched nighttime 
soap operas on television, lying down on the couches of their “living rooms.” These 
scenes of domesticity were suddenly interrupted by a group of young musicians who 
were signing traditional songs from the southern state of Veracruz as they walked down 
the street, followed by an entourage of approximately forty people. As we walked passed 
them they had just finished with a song and began to chant political slogans:  
“Vote by vote, polling both by polling both.” 
“Vote by vote, polling both by polling both.”     




“If there’s no solution, there will be a revolution.”  
“You see,” whispered Mario with a mocking grin, as if proud that his earlier 
comment had been proven accurate, “better not be around here when that happens.” With 
a grin and a whisper Mario marked a slippage from a group of musicians playing 
traditional folk songs (the good pueblo) to what he jokingly interpreted as revolutionary 
fever (the bad pueblo). It was indeed in the form of a joke that Mario expressed an 
anxiety not only about the general exacerbation of class-based politics but, more 
immediately, about his own position in Mexico’s class and racial hierarchies and in the 
historic center, which revealed itself as a space of popular politics and protest.  
As we arrived at the improvised gallery in Mario’s building I noticed that someone 
had written PRIVATE EVENT with blue ink at the bottom of the exhibition’s poster, 
which was hanging by the two-meter wide open entrance door on Bolivar Street, just a 
few meters away from the campamentos. To the other side of the entrance a big sign also 
read PRIVATE EVENT in black, capital letters. About ten people were smoking and 
chatting by the gallery’s entrance. Others stood on the street, taking advantage of the 
absence of cars. Inside, the space was packed, filled with the murmur of small chatter. 
The exhibition displayed the final projects of an art class in Luis’ brother high school, an 
exclusive and prestigious private school located in the nearby neighborhood Polanco. 
Therefore, besides the usual crowd who attended these events, such as new residents or 
regular visitors to the historic center, this time the guests included the young art students 
and their families. Many of them, Luis explained to me, seldom if ever visited the 
historic center and were reluctant to attend the opening because of the plantón, although 




I had attended many events at the improvised gallery before and as far as I was 
aware this was the first time that an opening there was marked as “private.” It seemed 
clear that the organizers had placed the signs, probably at the last minute, because of the 
proximity of the plantón and in order to ease the concerns of those guests unfamiliar with 
the historic center. After all, there was a massive campamento on Madero Street, just a 
few meters away. But what would it mean that this was a private event? Certainly no one 
was asked for an invitation at the gallery’s entrance and I doubt that anyone who tried to 
enter the gallery would have been turned away. To me, just like Mario’s comment about 
hanging from the lamppost, the improvised signs reading PRIVATE EVENT stood as an 
emblem of how localized concerns triggered by the plantón about the viability of the 
rescue and the livability of the center were entangled with mass-mediated anxieties about 
the political stability of the country.  
We must now consider the antagonistic and toxic environment as well as the acute 
social and political tensions that surrounded the runoff to the presidential election and 
that only intensified in its aftermath. To begin with, the campaigns, the most costly and 
mass mediated in the country’s history, were based on negative accusations and fear 
mongering (Aziz Nassif 2007: 27). Calderon, the PAN candidate used the slogan “Lopez 
Obrador, a danger for Mexico” in multiple campaign ads that suggested that AMLO 
would expropriate the houses of those who owned more than one home; or that he would 
partition people’s homes in order to house the poor; a Chavez in the making (a reference 
to Venezuela’s president), he would bring economic disaster to the country. President 
Fox magnified these negative messages through repeated public appearances in which he 




regulations, which forbid the president from intervening in electoral campaigns.8 Also 
against existing regulations, a group of businessmen partook in the negative campaign by 
running political ads against AMLO. In turn AMLO, whose campaign slogan was “For 
the well being of all, the poor first,” responded with a hardened class-based discourse. He 
constantly spoke against the “privileged” of the country—its corrupt and power hungry 
elites—or the “far-right” defending their interests against the “humble people” (i.e. the 
poor) of Mexico. Later on, when the Tribunal dismissed AMLO’s claim of fraud and 
declared Calderón as president elect, the former went on to declare: “To hell with 
(democratic) institutions.” 
There seemed to be no shades of grey, no middle ground and hence no possibility 
of “dialogue.” As anthropologist and communications scholar Rosanna Reguillo has 
argued in a nuanced analysis of the 2006 elections, there were two sentiments activated 
by these negative campaigns: fear and hatred. Such mass mediated images, she contends, 
found resonance in “the fragmented terrain of a country with profound social 
inequalities” (Reguillo 2008: 147). In such a contentious political climate the two 
different political sensibilities that were activated and mobilized around the 2006 
elections appeared to represent radically different and incompatible paths for the country. 
The presidential election became a highly charged topic around dinner tables or at 
parties, barbershops, and corner stores. The people with whom I was in regular contact in 
the historic center constantly discussed and assessed the negative slogan of “Lopez 
Obrador: A danger for Mexico”, or whether he would bring the country to economic ruin.  
                                                 
8 The election saga in fact began already the previous year, in 2005, as President Fox led a campaign to 
strip AMLO of his immunity as mayor of Mexico City based on a tenuous claim, which was ultimately 





The Internet became an arena for the expression of these anxieties. Numerous 
email chains, electronic forums and blogs denounced the “nacos” or the “resentful” 
crowds who were camping in the historic center and Reforma. Such charges were 
countered with denunciations against the “rich” or the “güeros” or the “privileged” who 
supported the PAN and its candidate. Those who criticized AMLO were equated with the 
“far-right” while those who supported the plantón were described as anachronistic 
caricatures of an outmoded left. Class became explicitly mobilized as the dividing line of 
society: the gullible and dangerous “poor” versus the machinating and evil “rich.” From 
heated blogs displaying overtly racial terminology to editorial pieces expressing 
preoccupation with democracy in the country, during the plantón racially inflected 
discourses of “decency” versus “ignorance”, “nacos” versus “gueros”, “the past” versus 
“the future”, and “citizens” versus “clients” inundated the public sphere. 
The “PRIVATE EVENT” signs, then, gestured to the plantón (and to this 
contentious political climate) and marked the art opening as separate from it, making a 
subtle distinction between two different collectivities in the historic center: on the one 
hand, the public of an art event, and on the other, the protesting masses. To be sure, 
Bolivar and Madero streets were far busier and more crowded during other events that 
had taken place at “normal” times, when the center’s sidewalks commonly bustled with 
people. Everyone walking down the street could have potentially entered these events 
and yet, as I said before, their organizers had never marked them as “private”. It seemed 
that the proximity of the plantón destabilized the signs and status markers that make 
certain spaces—like an art gallery—public yet inaccessible for many (Bourdieu 1984).  




open event was marked as “private”. In other words, a certain illusion about the public 
and of public space in the historic center became undone in this affectively charged 
context. But the sign also disclosed new residents’ fears of a particular incarnation of the 
crowd, a subtle apprehension about the defiant masses of protesters bursting into the 
improvised gallery. In previous chapters I have discussed the presence of certain 
incarnations of the crowd in the historic center, of the “dangerous classes” of old, which 
in the discourses and practices of rescue oscillate between subjects to be enlightened and 
hopelessly irredeemable others. A massive campamento just outside one’s home, the 
plantón entailed a different and more menacing incarnation of the crowd, namely, the 
rebellious and potentially dangerous masses which threatened to derail not only the entire 
rescue project but the very democratization of the country.  
The Plantón and the Temporality of Rescue 
In the year before the 2006 presidential elections mass protests in the historic 
center were almost a daily occurrence. On any given day there would be a group camping 
at the Zócalo or another nearby plaza and posing demands to the federal or local 
governments. But this time the protests, carrying on for weeks on end, were at the center 
of the most contentious national drama in decades. And this unrelenting, imposing 
presence of the organized masses during the plantón challenged, in a far more dramatic 
fashion than the lingering presence of street vendors in renovated streets or the 
occasional assault on Regina Street, the very temporality of rescue.  
It challenged, that is, the expectation that “rescue” would eventually be a finished 




populated of the city’s urban spaces could go unmarked as private.  Let us recall that for 
new residents and small investors with whom I conducted research “rescue” entailed a 
constant and continuous process of recuperating uninhabitable, disorderly or dangerous 
spaces. The rescue promised a certain future horizon in which one could inhabit the 
historic center as a cosmopolitan urban space. The very reasons that attracted new 
residents to live in the historic center, such as the allure of the urban experience, were 
inextricably linked to their expectation that the center would be transformed into a safe 
and inhabitable space through public and private investments.  
For example, those living in renovated buildings in the cultural corridor narrated a 
gradual process of improvement. They talked about a “first generation” of new residents, 
those people who moved to Slim’s residential buildings when conditions were “still very 
rough” (in 2002 and 2003) and who had eventually left the area. This was before the 
opening of Culture Space, or the renovation of the callejón and the new street lighting 
that came with it, or the introduction of a special police operation to patrol the streets and 
to safeguard Slim’s properties. New residents of the financial corridor shared similar 
expectations about a continuous process of transforming the historic center into a safe 
and livable space, one in which certain practices, like walking down the sidewalk without 
having to worry about street vendors or organizing a public art exhibit in an improvised 
gallery, would be possible.  
Let us recall that the discourse of rescue posited the historic center as an urban 
space at once empty and taken over. Rescue entailed a double move of “filling” the space 
(with renovated apartments and new consumption spaces; with new residents, local 




disorder and atavistic forms of dwelling. Unfit to inhabit a cosmopolitan urban space, the 
disorderly masses that in local parlance had “kidnapped” the center’s streets (from street 
vendors to franeleros to political protesters) would be substituted by another, more 
fitting, figure of the urban crowd: passers-by, “formal” consumers, the publics of cultural 
events (both small-scale and massive), a growing community of new residents, all of 
which would signal the vibrancy and livability of a rescued historic center. At the same 
time, the very temporality of rescue was inseparable from the temporality of the 
cosmopolitan: it was against the imagination of a cosmopolitan modernity that certain 
practices and forms of inhabiting public space were construed as outmoded and thus as 
having to be removed from the historic center, street vending being surely the most 
paradigmatic example.  
To be sure, the idea of an incessant recuperation of spaces was constantly 
destabilized in daily encounters and interactions such as the ones I have discussed 
throughout this dissertation. For example, in the story about an encounter between street 
vendors and new residents that I discussed in Chapter 4, Armando paraphrased his 
neighbor addressing a street vendor in front of her house: “You know that you cannot be 
here”. As I suggested in my reading of that narrative, this address appealed to a presumed 
common knowledge of law (which forbids such activities), and to the promise of rescue 
to remove street vendors from the historic center. At the same time, I argued, the address 
expressed doubt about the very possibility of this promise, expressing something like: 
“You know that you cannot be here, and yet you remain here.” Indeed, street vendors, 
franeleros and other members of the center’s informal economy, as well as certain modes 




to such figures (for example throwing trash or loitering, as expressed in Pedro’s 
URGENT NOTICE), continued to linger in the rescued spaces. Their continued presence 
foregrounded not only the incompleteness of the project but also the ever-present 
possibility of its failure. 
And yet it was precisely in these interactions, disruptions and negotiations that new 
residents performed the work of rescue in their everyday lives, that is, the work of 
continuously recuperating the spaces of the historic center. A series of state bureaucrats, 
the police and, most importantly, the figure of Carlos Slim, crucially mediated this 
quotidian work of rescue. There were a series of unofficial arrangements that made such 
daily negotiations meaningful and enabled them to provide a sense that the rescue was 
moving forward, as in the case of new residents’ relation to the police. In undermining 
these arrangements, the plantón brought the very possibility of negotiating the 
complicated realities of the historic center to a dramatic halt.  
 Far weightier issues and more powerful stakeholders had come to dominate the 
fate of the historic center. AMLO, the very man who as mayor of Mexico City had 
launched the rescue, making it one of the flagship projects of his administration, was 
undoing his own achievements, holding a plantón in the heart of the center. The police, 
for their part, were busy policing the plantón, and they seemed to have forgotten about 
the concerns of new residents, such as removing street vendors from the renovated streets 
or expanding security measures. Some complained that no one answered the phone when 
they called the command center to report street vendors or petty thefts. Others 
complained, based on rumors that they had heard, that the police were allowing street 




protest movement. The point to be made here is that in disrupting a series of already 
precarious arrangements (between new residents, Foundation executives, the police, and 
state bureaucrats), the plantón became an uncanny reminder of the extent to which the 
very labor of rescue itself had always been embedded in those same forms of sociability 
from which it allegedly sought to redeem the historic center.  
Beyond the fact that the police didn’t pick up the phone for a while, it was perhaps 
this reminder—the way that the absence of these arrangements betrayed something about 
their nature that was ordinarily disavowed—that really stood at the center of the deep 
concerns expressed by residents and entrepreneurs about the prospects of the rescue in 
general. Many felt that they had been deceived into thinking that a different historic 
center could be possible. It was above all the increasing doubt about Slim’s commitment 
to the rescue that appeared most worrisome against the background of the plantón and of 
the evidently widening rift between Slim and AMLO.  
In sharp contrast to his high profile campaign to promote the Chapultepec 
Agreement around the country in the runoff to the presidential election (see Chapter 4), 
Slim maintained a low profile during the plantón. He refrained from making public 
comments about the election and its aftermath. Slim’s silence was, in a way, loud. It had 
a great impact and led to all sorts of speculations. In endless conversations about the 
plantón with new residents, with friends and family in Mexico City, or with taxi drivers, 
I repeatedly heard rumors, which also circulated in the press, that Slim was financing the 
plantón or that he was secretly negotiating with Calderón and AMLO and promoting the 
idea of an interim government and new elections. In the historic center, these rumors 




project. Only after the plantón had ended,9 Slim finally made public declarations: The 
plantón, and AMLO’s actions more broadly, were  “a Mexican and Kafkaesque folly.” 
Slim immediately became a target of AMLO’s supporters, who picketed his restaurants 
and began calling him a “traitor.” 
In early November, just a month and a half after the end of the plantón, an 
exhibition opening took place at the patio of one of the Foundation buildings on Madero 
Street, an open space that continuously hosted public art shows. A few hours before it 
was set to start, Armando sent me a text message with the news: all new residents were 
invited; Slim himself would be there but we should be discreet, as his presence had not 
been publicly announced. That evening, as I was walking on Madero street towards the 
site of the exhibition, I distinguished a group of approximately fifty people concentrated 
at the fence that divided the patio from the sidewalk, with signs that I could not read. As I 
got nearer I could hear their chants: “Slim, you traitor, it is an honor to support AMLO.”  
I entered the patio to find all high executives of the Foundation looking extremely 
preoccupied. Its young director, a man with whom I had a rather amicable relationship, 
greeted me distractedly, as he was on the phone instructing someone that Slim (or el 
ingeniero as his aides and subordinates affectionately referred to him) should cancel his 
appearance. The conditions were not safe, he later explained to me, and there would be a 
                                                 
9 Already in mid August AMLO summoned a National Democratic Convention, that is, a massive 
assembly to take place at the Zócalo and that would decide on the future of the movement. This seemed to 
announce a new phase of the protests but it was not clear, however, that the plantón would continue. 
AMLO and his supporters voluntarily lifted the plantón starting on September 12, 2006, just in time for the 
military parade of September 16 to be held as usual. The first massive demonstration of AMLO’s National 
Democratic Convention took place afterwards at the Zócalo, where AMLO was “elected” “legitimate 
president” of Mexico by the crowd. On November 20th, the anniversary of the Mexican Revolution, he was 
“sworn in” during another massive demonstration at the Zócalo. Although the protests movement 





lot of negative publicity if Slim showed up. The event went on without Slim and the 
protesters eventually dispersed. Later on, at a reception in a restaurant across the street, I 
ran into the director of Slim’s real estate company in the historic center. He was furious. 
“I was going to meet him today”, he told me, “I was going to meet God himself and these 
people ruined it for me!” He wondered who could have leaked the information that Slim 
was attending the event and confided to me his suspicion that it was someone from the 
Fideicomiso, the local government’s office in charge of the rescue with which the 
Foundation worked very closely. What previously appeared as a collaborative relation 
had had become infested with suspicion and mistrust. 
Back to the Past 
In the previous section I argued that the plantón became a dramatic reminder that 
the distinction between “old” and “cosmopolitan” forms of sociability in the historic 
center was rather porous. The rescue crucially depended on the mobilization of personal 
relations and on quotidian negotiations to move forward. And yet the rescue was 
informed by, and at the same time fostered, a cosmopolitan imaginary of civility, clear 
rules and regulations and committed individuals working for the common good: from 
clear parking rules to an efficient police; from good neighborly practices to clean streets; 
from public art exhibitions to engaged citizens reporting irregularities to the appropriate 
authorities.  
Many artists working in culture space, for instance, were committed to fostering 
new forms of civility in the neighborhood where they now lived through art and cultural 




according to which other forms of sociability were out of place (and thus relegated to the 
past) also pervaded negative representations of the plantón as a regressive political and 
social formation that smacked of populism. In this last section I would like to explore this 
temporal imagination further by looking at the resonances between the political 
commitments of new residents and larger anxieties about what a political commentator 
called “a return to the past” during the plantón. 
After the presidential elections, the mood at Culture Space was generally grim, as 
many were AMLO supporters and were looking forward to a more generous budget for 
the arts under his administration. But the effects of the plantón were hardly felt on 
Regina Street and its surroundings. To be sure, there was less traffic, but life continued as 
normal, except for an intensification of talk about politics and a hardening of political 
positions. Consider for example Monica, the writer and academic whom we met in the 
Introduction. She had returned to her native Mexico City in early 2005 after four years in 
Valencia, Spain, where she earned a PhD in literature, and just when Bernardo, her old 
friend from college, was designing the cultural center and recruiting its staff. Monica 
joined Culture Space and rented an apartment near Regina Street, which she shared with 
a roommate.  
Like Bernardo, Monica knew the southwestern section of the historic center rather 
well, as she had spent her college years as a student at a nearby liberal arts college and 
had participated in the center’s alternative art scene during the late 1990s. She had an 
ambivalent relation to the historic center, which she considered at once a very familiar 
and hostile environment and where, she said, she never felt entirely welcome. Unlike 




to the kids who attended Culture Space’s workshops and their mothers, Monica had more 
ambivalent relations to “the neighbors.”10 At the same time, and as I mentioned in the 
Introduction, she had the reputation of being very daring and even a bit reckless. Recall 
how she went into a dreaded vecindad with Manuel, one of its inhabitants. In another 
story that captured this quality of hers well, and which I must have heard at least ten 
times from different people, she and her boyfriend were walking on Regina after a night 
out at Pedro’s bar. As they got to the corner they were assaulted by a group of teenagers, 
who demanded their money, their cell phones and Monica’s boyfriend’s leather jacket. 
Scared to death, he immediately complied. But Monica recognized the robbers as 
teenagers who lived nearby, and began screaming at them loudly that they should not rob 
their own neighbors. The kids immediately returned the jacket, the cell phone and the 
wallet and went away.  
One afternoon in mid August I was having a late lunch with Pedro and Sebastian 
(one of the visual artists who worked at Culture Space) at the former’s bar. We were 
talking about an upcoming installation that Sebastian was curating in Culture Space as 
part of an ongoing project in which he invited a different artist to intervene upon his 
office every month. Monica arrived at the bar and sat to join us, tossing a copy of the 
Sunday edition of the newspaper El Universal on the table. Without saying as much as 
hello she interrupted our conversation: “This is my position. Perez Gay has nailed it.” 
She was referring to an article by a journalist and fiction writer famous for his witty and 
ironic columns about the complexities (and absurdities) of life in Mexico City as he 
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himself navigates them in his daily routines.  
Just a few days earlier, Monica, Sebastian and I had had a passionate discussion 
about the plantón. While Sebastian and I were ambivalent about it politically (although 
we both unequivocally enjoyed the absence of cars), Monica was adamant about her 
criticism of the protests and of AMLO himself, whom she described as a populist and an 
authoritarian figure. AMLO was for her the opposite of a modern left, which, she said, 
she would be more than happy to support. She had now brought us the newspaper article 
to prove her point. In the piece, titled “To the Zocalo, towards the past,” Perez Gay 
described the plantón as a trip back in time: “There are some who look for their future in 
the past. It seemed impossible, but we have done it.” And in his characteristically ironic 
style he cited the works of Marx and Engels being sold at some campamentos, the 
references to the Cuban Revolution, the “popular cinemas” scattered throughout the 
plantón, and the people playing chess as incontrovertible examples of an old and rank 
left that did not, and should not, belong in the present: 
I crossed the threshold to enter the tunnel to the center of Mexico City. It is both a 
tunnel and a wall that divides the city along fifteen kilometers. “We apologize for 
the inconveniences [but] we are building democracy,” reads a sign in a 
campamento. Very strange materials for building this democracy, metal and 
awning structures paid by Mexico City’s government, supported by the 
indomitable force of faith and of PRI clientelism, now absorbed by the PRD, the 
dogmas of an antediluvian left and the figure of a leader (Perez Gay 2006). 
What Perez Gay failed to notice was how the references to the Latin American 
political struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the ones that he encountered in the 
plantón, were entangled with very contemporary forms of political mobilization, from 
the extensive use of communication technology—such as internet blogs and text 




performances. Indeed, this is how I would read AMLO’s gesture during the 
demonstration on July 1st with which I opened this chapter, when he asked the crowd to 
raise their hand and vote after “proposing” the plantón. While reminiscent of the political 
performance of the assembly, his act also activated a sentiment of individual citizenship. 
The collectivity that it invoked was not one of a crowd blindingly following its leader but 
rather of a collection of individuals being consulted by their elected representatives and 
making an informed and reasoned decision; a referendum of sorts. No doubt, the 
supposedly outmoded and the new often coexist in complex arrangements. But the point I 
want to make in quoting Perez Gay’s observations, inscribed as they were in a climate of 
anxious denunciations of the plantón as the return of a presumably surmounted populist 
politics, is the extent to which they resonated with the sentiments of many people I knew 
in the historic center.  
They echoed Monica’s own political sensibilities. In several of Culture Space’s 
staff meetings that I attended as well as in multiple informal discussions about the 
cultural center held over beers at the bar, she insistently argued against offering free 
workshops for local children. Her rationale resonated with the arguments presented by 
Perez Gay. Monica claimed that such gestures were reminiscent of a paternalistic state 
and were incongruent with the values that Culture Space aimed to inculcate in the 
community, such as civility and respect for the built environment. Only by paying for 
them, and even if but a nominal fee, would the community truly appreciate the 
workshops.  
In a similar fashion, for Monica and other new residents the plantón went against 




transparency and civility in the historic center. Entangled with new residents’ concerns 
about the livability of the center or the sustainability of the rescue, there was a sense that 
this form of protest belonged to a different time. To be sure, such ubiquitous tropes of 
pastness expressed the past as a looming threat. But the point I wish to make to conclude 
this chapter is that they expressed an anxiety over waking up to find oneself at home in 
“the past” that one had ostensibly surmounted. Or, perhaps even more menacingly, they 
expressed an anxiety of encountering that such distinctions between a “past” and a 
“future”—just like Armando’s distinction between the “citizen” and the “client” that I 






 When I arrived in the field in January 2006, my aim was to investigate the routines 
through which newly settled residents in the historic center came to inhabit this place as 
their home, producing and experiencing boundaries between safety and danger in their 
everyday lives. How, I wanted to inquire, do people threatened by the violence of crime 
simultaneously constitute the threat of violence to others in the daily, constant securing 
of their worlds? In the case of Mexico City’s historic center this happened, I thought, 
through the transformation of the built environment, the introduction of new police and 
surveillance apparatuses and the appearance of new modes of street-level interactions. 
Drawing on anthropological and philosophical writings on home and dwelling I 
conceptualized “home” as a place that, while promising security and protection, remains 
always permeable, a necessarily fragile space that must be constantly re-secured in the 
face of real and imaginary dangers. The police, I thought, were a crucial element for the 
making of home and at the very same time a constant reminder of its fragility.  
As it happened, my fieldwork took place in the affectively charged period that I 
described in Chapter 6: the heated run-up that led to the 2006 presidential elections and 
the antagonistic aftermath that followed them. These events, and the kinds of sentiments 
that were activated around them, exercised a particular impact on the rescue of the 
historic center and, consequently, on the direction of my research. To begin with, the 
intensification of racialized class tensions that suffused these events left an evident mark 
upon the forms of sociability that I was studying just as much as upon my own ways of 




administration and the Historic Center Foundation. But this localized disenchantment 
with the promise of rescue to bring about a cosmopolitan present was entangled with a 
larger sense of disillusionment among my informants, namely, the vanishing confidence 
in the possibility of catching up with an imagined spatial and temporal elsewhere.  
As it turned out, what I had come across formed part of a broad and longstanding 
obsession with “catching up” or with being up to the standards of an imagined foreign 
gaze. I found this obsession in my informants’ narratives of the most banal interactions 
(like going to the corner store), as well as in television talk shows or newspaper articles. 
It emerged in concerns about trash in the historic center or about “citizenship” in Mexico. 
The rescue teemed with images of futurity and, consequently, with images of pastness: 
from a local magazine referring to the initiative as “building a historic center for the 
twenty first century” or the continuous circulation of images of New York to certain 
imaginaries of legality and of what a modern police ought to look like. Along these 
images of futurity other modes of inhabiting public space or of practicing citizenship 
were construed as belonging to the past. These temporal imaginaries, moreover, were 
suffused with class and racialized inflections.   
Without renouncing my previous interest in the ways in which newly settled 
residents inhabited the historic center as their home, then, I was drawn to explore these 
obsessions with “catching up” and especially as they gained renewed salience around the 
events of 2006. Given the confrontational context, I was led to focus on the instability of 
social relations in such a heated and affectively charged atmosphere. What happens when 
different social groups come together in this setting as neighbors? As clients? As 




fail?  In other words, I have tried to remain attentive to the obsessive preoccupation over 
catching up with an imagined temporal and spatial elsewhere—what I have called a 
cosmopolitan present—while attending to how this obsession is intertwined with the 
“here and now” of social interaction in Mexico City’s historic center. 
Throughout the dissertation I have explored the intersection of this temporal 
imaginary with the production and experience of class (and racialized) distinctions in 
contemporary Mexico City. I have undertaken this exploration from two cardinal 
directions. First, proceeding from the perspective of urban anthropology, and 
approaching the city as a place of manifold rhythms and multilayered interactions, I have 
proposed the “urban encounter” as a crucial site for the production and experience of 
class distinctions. In this regard, my dissertation differs from other ethnographic 
approaches to the spatialization of “fear” in contemporary megalopolises (Caldeira 
2000). Ethnographic studies of cities have tended to focus on the proliferation of gated 
communities, fences, barriers and other forms of  “physical,” spatial divisions in the face 
of insecurity.  
My own focus, in contrast, has been on the “return to the city.” I have studied a 
group of people who yearn for the density, heterogeneity and risks of the metropolis, 
exploring how a diffuse sense of menace and danger has informed their aspirations and 
their modes of dwelling. I have thus traced the emergence of boundaries that are always 
shifting and unstable. And I have located these boundaries not in the physical 
construction of fences, but in everyday modes of interaction and in the often-intimate 
relations between social groups. “Urban encounters,” I have argued, entail an attempt to 




mis/recognition. One result of this approach has been that, in my analysis, policing and 
“security” have thus appeared as more unstable and ambivalent than what a focus on 
“physical” boundaries would have suggested. 
With its focus on the aspirations and desires of the protagonists of rescue, and with 
its emphasis on the ambivalence of their subject positions, the dissertation has offered a 
novel approach for studying the re-colonization of urban spaces by the middle and upper 
classes and thus for examining contemporary urban experiences. In the very particular 
context of Mexico City, I have traced connections between, on the one hand, the 
ambivalent position of the artist/bohemian subject in these processes and, on the other 
hand, the specific conundrums of my informants. I hope that I have captured how their 
aspirations to a cosmopolitan class position are constantly punctured by their own 
embeddedness in the violence of class and racialized distinctions in contemporary 
Mexico City. 
In a second direction, the dissertation has been in conversation with current debates 
on urban “public space.” It has problematized a perspective that, in my opinion, has been 
insufficiently critical in its celebration of the potentials of “public space” for the exercise 
of citizenship and democracy (See for example: Holston and Appadurai 1996). 
Citizenship is, of course, a term laden with a variety of culturally inflected meanings. In 
this dissertation I have explored a particular image of citizenship that appears as deeply 
entangled with obsessions over  “catching up”. I have discussed how the citizen emerges 
as an impossible ideal that contrasts with another figure, namely, the “client,” who is 
now cast as residual. This racialized figure, I have argued, refers to an increasingly (or 




studied is embedded in a larger shift across the world, which spells the receding horizon 
of social welfare and the ascendance of residual or surplus populations. Put differently, 
citizenship has emerged throughout this dissertation as a class-inflected social position. A 
central argument of the dissertation, then, has been that, while crucial for the 
cosmopolitan aspirations of my informants, the distinction between the citizen and the 
client becomes ultimately illegible. The ambivalence of their subject positions reveals 
itself in the ways in which they find themselves at home in those same forms of social 
and political belonging that they disavow.  
An important point of the dissertation has been to trace a certain racialized 
dimension of quotidian interactions in Mexico City. I have argued that class distinctions 
are traversed by racial imaginaries, and more specifically by what I have called the racial 
imaginary of the Indian. In revisiting the history of mestizaje I have moved away from 
the usual focus on the status of indigenous populations and into a discussion about social 
relations between “mestizo” subjects in urban space. Studies of “racism” in Mexico all 
too often seem to take the Indian/mestizo dichotomy for granted, as if a “mestizo” 
majority and an “indigenous” minority entirely heterogeneous to it exist in the country. 
As I have tried to demonstrate, the “Indian” in fact turns out to be a much more elusive 
category that permeates everyday life and racialized images of the Mexican in the most 
disparate registers, from an encounter in a pedestrian square in the historic center to an 
editorial about the problem of “informals.” The “figure of the Indian”, I have argued, is 
not anchored in particular sociological groups but has become an attribute, a menace, a 




certain whether one is an “Indian” and, consequently, neither can one be certain about 
one’s status as a modern subject.  
The dissertation has thus explored a tension between a project “for the enjoyment 
of all” (as it was expressed in Pedro’s NOTICE), and the foreclosure of its possibility. 
Situating the rescue and the aspirations, fears and affective commitments of my 
informants in a particular historical moment across the world, the dissertation has 
developed an innovative understanding of the changing dynamics of social and political 
belonging in neoliberal Mexico. I have argued that the contemporary fetishization of 
liberal citizenship has engendered new forms of political and social exclusion. More 
specifically, I have focused on how the masses appear in this political configuration as 
subjects to be redeemed and at once as ineluctably non-assimilable others, unfit for the 
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